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Abstract 
 
 
 
The UN Security Council is the preeminent multilateral decision-making body and 
has the legal authority to initiate military interventions if it first determines a threat to 
international  peace  and  security,  including  from  civil  wars  or  widespread  state 
repression. While traditional norms of non-intervention and the politics of the Cold 
War  curtailed  the  body’s  ability  to  fulfil  this  role,  evolving  understandings  and 
practices  of  sovereignty  and  security  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  have  led  to  the 
apparent emergence of a new norm permitting ‘humanitarian intervention’ and an in-
principle  acceptance  that  the  body  has  a  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  vulnerable 
civilians residing inside the borders of their own state, including through military 
means. 
 
In this context, the thesis argues that the situation in Darfur, western Sudan, has 
represented  a  quintessential  case  for  the  Council  to  fulfil  its  ‘responsibility  to 
protect’.  According  to  a  number  of  authoritative  investigations,  since  2003  the 
Sudanese  government  and  government-allied  Arab  militias  have  committed  war 
crimes and crimes against humanity on a widespread and systematic basis against 
Darfur’s non-Arab population. As a result, over 200,000 people died either directly 
from violence or indirectly from conflict-induced disease and malnutrition, while a 
further two million fled from their homes and villages in fear. A number of non-
military  measures  were  attempted  by  the  Council  but  failed  to  create  adequate 
security on the ground. 
 
As such, there was a compelling legal-institutional, normative and moral case for the 
Council to coercively deploy a military intervention in Sudan to protect vulnerable 
civilians  in  Darfur.  However,  during  the  2003-06  period  of  study,  no  such 
intervention was deployed. The thesis argues that intervention by the Council was 
precluded by the national interests of its permanent members, including a lucrative 
economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because of valuable Sudanese 
intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism operations in the region. The 
thesis  concludes  that  the  Council’s  members  chose  to  preserve  these  national 
interests at the expense of protecting civilians in Darfur. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The  brutal  conflict,  commission  of  atrocities,  and  ensuing  humanitarian 
disaster  in  the  western  Sudanese  region  of  Darfur  has  competed  with  the  post-
September 11, 2001, ‘War on Terror’ and the 2003 invasion of Iraq as preeminent 
issues on international security agenda of the early twenty-first century. Yet, while 
the latter have been highly contentious because the forms of coercive intervention 
constituting them have challenged international law and traditional norms of state 
sovereignty, the Darfur crisis has instead been characterised by a distinct lack of 
coercive international intervention. Subsequently, concern has been with how such 
non-intervention has perpetuated acute insecurity for the region’s population. 
During the four-year period of study in this thesis, between 2003 and 2006
1, 
the United Nations (UN) estimated that at least 200,000 civilians in Darfur died 
either directly from violence or from conflict-induced disease and malnutrition. Out 
of a total of nearly four million people in the wider region affected by the conflict, 
over two million had fled their homes and villages in fear, creating a situation that 
senior UN officials described as the ‘world’s worst humanitarian crisis’.
2 Moreover, 
a number of credible independent and official reports presented public evidence that 
                                                        
1 As of late 2008, the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur was ongoing with no decisive 
resolution in sight. For practical reasons, however, the analysis in this thesis is restricted to the period 
between 2003-06. Because of this, in order to accurately assess the positions of Council members 
during this period based on the publicly available information and the political environment of that 
time, any findings which have been presented post-2006 — such as the significant indictments by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) of the Sudanese interior minister and a militia leader for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in May 2007, and the ICC prosecutor’s charges of ten counts of 
genocide against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in July 2008 — have been omitted from analysis. 
Estimated death tolls and other UN humanitarian data also only pertain to the 2003-06 period. 
2 See United Nations, “Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 25 – Situation as of 01 October 2006”, Office 
of the Deputy Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, UN Resident and Humanitarian 
Co-ordinator, 2006; and UN News Centre, “Darfur: UN Envoy Heads to Sudan for Talks with 
Government, Rebels and Others”, January 5, 2007. Slight variations of the label ‘the world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis’ have been applied to Darfur by a number of UN officials, including former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan.   2 
the Sudanese government had orchestrated, and in league with allied local militias, 
directly  committed,  widespread  crimes  against  humanity  and  war  crimes  against 
civilians in Darfur. The US government and a number of academics asserted that 
Khartoum was also responsible for genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
In parallel to such atrocities and suffering in Darfur, the normative basis upon 
which  international  intervention  inside  sovereign  states  is  contested  has  evolved. 
Most centrally, the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ — a result of post-Cold 
War debates over practices of ‘humanitarian’ intervention and a direct intellectual 
product of the 2001 report of the International Commission of Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) — prescribes that the international community, acting through 
the  legal  structures  of  the  UN  Security  Council  (UNSC),  has  an  obligation  to 
intervene militarily to protect civilians from the types of ‘conscious shocking’ crimes 
that  have  been  committed  in  Darfur  by  the  Sudanese  government  and  its  proxy 
militias. In September 2005 and April 2006, respectively, the UN General Assembly 
and  Security  Council  unanimously  endorsed  this  doctrine  and  accepted  its 
responsibilities,  seemingly  representing  a  normative  breakthrough  for  the 
enforcement of human security in international society.
3 
Taking these parallel developments as a context, and examining the period 
between 2003 and 2006, this thesis investigates why the UN Security Council did not 
coercively and militarily intervene in the Darfur crisis in order to protect vulnerable 
civilians from further violence and to create the short-term conditions for security on 
the ground. In other words, it examines why, despite a persuasive moral, normative 
and legal-institutional case for doing so, the Council did not coercively deploy a 
                                                        
3 The important differences between the original proposals in the 2001 ICISS report and the version of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine subsequently formally endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly/Security Council are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.   3 
military intervention inside western Sudan in the face of staunch opposition by the 
Sudanese government and its claims to sovereign immunity. 
The central argument of the thesis is that, despite a volume of rhetoric to the 
contrary, the Permanent Five (P5) and three non-permanent members of the Security 
Council actually perceived a coercive intervention in Sudan to protect Darfurians to 
be contrary to their national interests. Such national interests were primarily in the 
form  of  existing  and  valuable  relationships  that  individual  P5  members  had 
established with the regime of President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum, ties that the 
major powers did not want to disrupt or sever through the imposition of extremely 
coercive measures which would fundamentally undermine the sovereign authority of 
the Sudanese government. As a result, I argue that while many rhetorical threats were 
made against a recalcitrant and diplomatically-savvy Sudan, and while a number of 
‘non-military’  measures  were  implemented  with  or  without  the  cooperation  of 
Khartoum,  by  not  coercively  deploying  a  military  intervention  in  Darfur  the 
Council’s members ultimately chose to preserve their national interests in Sudan over 
the protection of vulnerable Sudanese civilians. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
To develop this argument, the thesis is structured by five substantive chapters 
divided into two parts: Part I establishes the context out of which the analysis in Part 
II emerges. This Introduction and a short Conclusion chapter provide the necessary 
bookends.  The  Introduction  outlines  the  thesis  structure,  underlying  theoretical 
framework,  and  research  methods,  while  the  Conclusion  summarises  the  main 
findings  of  the  thesis  and  discusses  their  broader  significance  for  scholarly 
knowledge in the field of International Relations.   4 
Chapter 1 outlines the mandate, structure and political dynamics within the 
UN  Security  Council  and  establishes  that  the  Council  is  the  most  powerful 
multilateral  security  institution  in  post-WWII  (and  in  practice,  post-Cold  War) 
international  relations.  The  chapter  discusses  how  the  P5  established  their  own 
positions  of  privilege  and  power  in  the  Council,  most  notably  through  their 
permanency and rights of veto, but also how these special rights implied a sense of 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security as originally intended 
by the framers of the UN Charter. This notion of an international duty is central to a 
critique  of  the  response  of  that  body  to  the  Darfur  crisis,  not  least  because  the 
language  and  concept  of  ‘responsibility’  returned  to  prominence  in  international 
discourse through the influential report of the aforementioned ICISS. This provided a 
further  challenge  to  narrowly-defined  national  interests  as  an  exclusive  basis  for 
foreign policymaking, even if such interests were accommodated in the Council’s 
structure. 
The second part of Chapter 1 then explores evolution and conceptual change 
in international norms of sovereignty and security, from traditionally rigid norms of 
non-intervention and practices privileging ‘national security’, through an emerging 
acceptance  (if  still  contested)  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  of  the  argument  that 
sovereign immunity should be suspended and external ‘humanitarian’ interventions 
enacted  in  situations  of  acute  civilian  insecurity.  In  exploring  the  concepts  of 
‘responsible sovereignty’ and ‘human security’, the chapter argues that these ideas 
culminated in the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine and its later formal endorsement 
by UN member states. Chapter 1 concludes with an analysis of how the Security 
Council itself has been both a driver of, and been influenced by, such normative   5 
developments, and how it has responded to the changing nature of global conflict and 
insecurity after the Cold War. 
After  this  general  legal-institutional  and  normative  context  has  been 
established,  Chapter  2  then  examines  the  particular  conflict,  crimes  and  crisis  in 
Darfur since 2003 and argues that coercive military intervention by the Council to 
protect vulnerable civilians in the region was a morally necessary act and one that 
would  have  conformed  to  the  legal  and  normative  authority  of  the  Council.  The 
chapter first briefly outlines the origins of the conflict in Darfur between disaffected 
rebel  groups,  the  Sudanese  government,  and  government-sponsored  Janjaweed 
militia.  It  identifies  a  history  of  regional  marginalisation  and  underdevelopment, 
resource  scarcity  exacerbated  by  environmental  deterioration,  and  the  cynical 
manipulation of ethnic identities by various interests, including successive regimes in 
Khartoum,  as  being  the  underlying  causes  of  the  armed  uprising  by  the  Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement in early 2003.  
The chapter then examines in greater detail the particular counter-insurgency 
strategy that the Sudanese government pursued in response, characterising it as a 
campaign  of  violence  —  constituted  by  elements  of  war  crimes,  crimes  against 
humanity,  ethnic  cleansing,  and  genocide  —  aimed  directly  at  the  murder  and 
terrorisation of Darfurian groups identified as non-Arab, which were considered by 
Khartoum to be the kin of, and sympathetic to, the rebels. Citing the findings of a 
number  of  authoritative  investigations,  particularly  the  Council–mandated 
International  Commission  of  Inquiry  on  Darfur  (COI),  the  chapter  highlights 
compelling evidence of direct Sudanese government involvement in orchestrating 
and  then,  through  a  combination  of  deploying  the  Sudan  Armed  Forces  and   6 
employing local allied militia, conducting brutal and criminal attacks on non-Arab 
towns and villages in Darfur.  
The  final  section  of  Chapter  2  argues  that  the  Darfur  crisis  was  a 
quintessential  ‘extreme’  case  for  the  Council’s  fulfilment  of  its  posited 
‘responsibility to protect’ because: (i) of the acute and pervasive insecurity in the 
region. As such, conditions in Darfur clearly met the ‘just cause’ criteria outlined by 
the ICISS and, importantly, the qualifying circumstances endorsed by UN member 
states to justify and prescribe coercive UN intervention; (ii) public evidence was 
presented  of  Sudanese  government  involvement  in  atrocities,  demonstrating  that 
Sudan had failed its primary sovereign responsibility to protect its own citizens. This 
made persuasive the argument that Khartoum should not have been enabled to retain 
control  over  security  in  Darfur,  and  that  the  Sudanese  government’s  sovereign 
immunity should have been suspended through UN intervention; and (iii) by mid-
2006 at the latest, it was clear that various non-military measures had failed to create 
security for civilians and failed to end the conflict. Completing Part I of the thesis, 
this discussion concludes that there was a compelling moral, normative and legal-
institutional case for Council-authorised military intervention in Darfur.  
Emerging from this context, Part II of the thesis analyses how and why the 
Security Council did not coercively deploy a military intervention in Darfur during 
the 2003-06 period of study. Chapter 3 presents a chronological examination of the 
development  of  the  Council’s  response  to  the  Darfur  crisis  from  the  eruption  of 
conflict in April 2003 until the end of 2006. Through detailed empirical research, the 
role of this chapter is to give an authoritative account of how and through what 
measures the Council reacted to the crisis in Darfur. Central to this is observing how, 
given that no coercive intervention was actually deployed, the Council responded to   7 
the increasingly evident necessity of UN intervention in Sudan to protect desperate 
civilians. As such, the chapter examines the numerous measures short of coercive 
military  intervention  taken  by  the  Council,  including  the  imposition  of  a  limited 
sanctions regime and arms embargo, the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry 
to investigate allegations of atrocities against civilians, and the referral of the Darfur 
case  to  the  prosecutor  of  the  International  Criminal  Court.  It  also  examines  the 
August  2006  authorisation  of  a  UN  peacekeeping  force  with  a  robust  civilian 
protection mandate, which, crucially, was not deployed in the face of opposition by 
the Sudanese government.  
What is apparent from this examination is that despite these measures short of 
military intervention (or perhaps because of them), the Council failed to protect the 
vulnerable  civilian  population  in  Darfur  from  continued  attacks  by  the  Sudanese 
military and its allied militias. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that the coercive 
deployment of a military intervention was not even a serious consideration of the 
Council, while a more consensual UN peacekeeping operation was not even on the 
table  until  early  2006,  despite  the  clear  inadequacy  of  non-military  measures.  In 
doing so, the Chapter reveals the voting records, various statements and deliberations 
of  Council  members  on  Sudan/Darfur  inside  the  Council,  which  are  central  to 
explaining  why  the  Council  did  not  coercively  intervene.  This  data  provides  an 
empirical  basis  that  is  then  critically  analysed  in  the  proceeding  two  chapters  to 
explain  the  various  positions  of  individual  Council  members  and  determine  why 
coercive intervention in Darfur was precluded. 
Chapter  4,  then,  examines  the  individual  and  collective  positions  on 
Sudan/Darfur of the three Western permanent members of the Council (the ‘P3’) — 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent, France. In light of their   8 
voting patterns on Council resolutions and public rhetoric on Darfur identified in the 
previous chapter, Chapter 4 analyses the national interests and political calculations 
of these Western governments in their approach to dealing with the crisis in Darfur 
and in their relations with the Sudanese government. The chapter argues that the P3, 
while likely genuinely concerned about the plight of Darfurian civilians and their 
treatment by Khartoum and under domestic pressure to ‘do something’ about the 
crisis, in fact calculated that their national interests were contrary to actions that 
would too heavily punish or coerce the Sudanese government, such as through any 
non-consensual deployment of UN troops in the country.  
I argue that, for the US in particular, the Sudanese government’s valuable 
post-9/11  intelligence  cooperation  in  regional  counter-terrorism  operations, 
particularly in Iraq and Somalia, and an American commitment to achieving and then 
consolidating peace between President Bashir’s National Congress Party and rebels 
in  south  Sudan  through  the  2005  Comprehensive  Peace  Agreement,  meant  that 
Washington became reluctant to sever what had actually become an important and 
useful  relationship  with  Khartoum.  In  addition,  for  Washington  and  London,  the 
politically consuming and damaging 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq had also 
significantly depreciated their international legitimacy and credibility in the debate 
over international intervention. Furthermore, due to the overstretch of their armed 
forces, Iraq also constrained their own abilities to project a convincing military threat 
or  deterrent  to  Sudan.  As  a  result,  the  Sudanese  government  was  able  to  easily 
deflect or discount Western rhetorical threats of action or posturing over Darfur. 
Following on from this analysis of the positions of the Western P3, and again 
based upon the voting patterns and public statements made by Council members 
detailed in Chapter 3, Chapter 5 turns to examine the national interests and political   9 
calculations  regarding  Sudan/Darfur  of  the  other  two,  non-Western  permanent 
members,  as  well  as  of  the  three  non-permanent  members  of  the  Council  that 
consistently acted to obstruct more coercive action against Khartoum. The chapter 
argues  that  Russian  and  particularly  Chinese  economic  relationships  with  the 
incumbent  Sudanese  regime  further  precluded  the  Council  from  coercively 
intervening in Darfur. The Chinese government is the largest foreign investor in the 
Sudanese oil industry and the African country’s largest oil importer. China was also 
a primary source of military equipment for Khartoum, trade in which Russia also 
participated  and  benefited.  The  desire  of  Beijing  and  Moscow  to  preserve  these 
economic  relationships  contributed  to  the  two  veto-wielding  countries’  general 
obstruction of punitive measures or coercive action against the Sudanese government 
inside the Council.  
In addition, the chapter argues that China and Russia were concerned more 
generally about the precedent of military intervention for humanitarian purposes — 
particularly when that intervention is based on the protection of a minority or ethnic 
group  from  the  state  itself  —  because  of  their  own  problems  with  international 
attention on disaffected populations in Chechnya, Tibet and Xinjiang, in particular. 
As such, despite their formal endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, 
China  and  Russia  have  a  continuing  history  of  attempting  to  preserve  the 
international norm of non-intervention and thus of limiting the political salience of 
‘humanitarian’ interventions. The chapter concludes by analysing more briefly the 
positions  of  Pakistan,  Qatar,  and  Algeria,  the  three  non-permanent  members 
consistently opposed to more coercive or punitive action on Sudan in the Council. It 
argues that inter-elite Arab and/or Islamic solidarity with the regime in Khartoum 
was their primary interest and motivation in acting to obstruct intervention in Sudan.   10 
The thesis concludes by discussing what the response of the UN Security 
Council to the Darfur crisis between 2003 and 2006 can tell us about humanitarian 
intervention in contemporary international society. In particular, it demonstrates that 
despite the apparent evolution of international norms of sovereignty and security, and 
the prominence of progressive concepts such as ‘human security’ and ‘responsible 
sovereignty’ in international discourse, regimes continue to murder and terrorise their 
own citizens for cynical political purposes as a matter of state policy. Moreover, 
however, it provides further evidence that powerful states, with legitimate decision-
making responsibility for international peace and security, continue to place their 
own narrowly-conceived national interests ahead of the direct provision of security 
for vulnerable civilians under circumstances in which the two policy outcomes clash.  
 
Theoretical Approach and Framework 
 
  The thesis takes a self-consciously normative ethical and theoretical approach 
within the discipline of International Relations (IR). For Andrew Hurrell, normative 
approaches  are  concerned  with  the  ‘historically  created  normative  practices 
embedded  within  the  institutions  of  international  and  global  society.’
4  Central  of 
which, I argue, are our understandings and practices of sovereignty, security, and 
intervention, and the role played in their constitution or development by the most 
powerful  contemporary  international  body,  the  UN  Security  Council.  Moreover, 
while mainstream IR theorising and foreign policymaking during the Cold War were 
largely devoid of ethical content outside of prescribing what measures contributed to 
‘national security’, Mark Hoffman argues that in the post-Cold War era, normative 
                                                        
4 Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations”, In Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons, 137-54 (London: Sage, 2002), 137.   11 
issues have become a central feature of IR, as ‘[q]uestions about the moral standing 
of states and the nature and extent of our obligations and responsibilities within, 
between and beyond individual states have taken on a new immediacy.’
5 This is no 
more evident than in the practical and normative challenges that internal conflicts 
and crises such as Darfur have placed upon the anachronistic security framework of 
the UN Charter, which was primarily designed to mitigate interstate wars, and by the 
ethical challenges posed by the notion that powerful and privileged states have a 
responsibility  to  protect  vulnerable  populations  from  the  extreme  criminality  or 
severe maladministration of their own governments. 
Within  ‘multifaceted’  normative  IR  theory,  Hurrell  distinguishes  between 
three  different  research  aims,  all  three  of  which,  to  different  extents,  this  thesis 
shares: first, one can ‘engage in rational moral debate as to the nature of ethical 
conduct’; second, one can look at the ‘role that normative ideas play in the practice 
of politics’; and third, one can examine the ‘extent to which moral behaviour is 
heavily constrained by the dynamics of political life’.
6 Regarding the first or ‘ethical’ 
form of normative theory, this thesis is self-consciously based upon a fundamental 
concern for the security of vulnerable civilians in Darfur. It is premised upon the 
liberal natural rights claim that, because of their common humanity, human beings 
have a set of basic universal rights regardless of where they reside, of which the most 
fundamental  are  the  right  to  life  and  the  right  to  physical  security.
7  Similarly,  it 
supports a positive rights claim and the ethical social principle that those whom are 
                                                        
5 Mark Hoffman, “Normative International Theory: Approaches and Issues.” In Contemporary 
International Relations: A Guide to Theory, ed. A. J. R. Groom & Margot Light, 27-44 (London: 
Pinter, 1994), 27. 
6 Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics”, 137. 
7 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Introduction: Human Rights and the Fifty Years’ Crisis”, In 
Human Rights and Global Politics, ed. T. Dunne & N. J. Wheeler, 1-28 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 4-5.   12 
able or powerful have a special obligation to help others in times of desperation and 
insecurity.  
Because of these ethical foundations, the thesis argues (set out most explicitly 
in Chapter 2) that the protection of such basic rights for people in Darfur required 
UN military intervention because the Sudanese government was directly targeting 
the civilian population; as a result, it became morally unacceptable and politically 
cynical for the Council to allow Khartoum to retain control of security in the region. 
Yet,  in  advocating  military  intervention  in  this  extreme  case,  the  thesis  also 
recognises the inherent ethical value of national self-determination and a pluralist 
international society of sovereign states in which diverse cultures can freely develop 
their  own  political  and  moral  systems  unhindered  by  external  intervention  and 
foreign interests. In this sense, ‘humanitarian’ interventions should only be justified 
in  extreme  cases,  and  must  be  conducted  by  legitimate  multilateral  bodies 
(particularly the UNSC) in order to distinguish them from forms of neo-colonial or 
imperial interventions, which are ethically unjustified on these terms. Darfur is one 
such exceptional case in which UN intervention would have been both necessary and 
justified ethical conduct, not least because expressions of pluralism and claims for 
more equitable social and cultural development by Darfurians were in fact the very 
forces that Khartoum was violently extinguishing. 
The  analytical  objective  of  the  thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  incorporates 
Hurrell’s latter two aims of normative IR theory concerning the tension between the 
self-interested pursuit of political gain and narrowly defined national interests by 
states, and the ability of international norms to constrain, enable, or otherwise shape 
that  behaviour.  Because  of  these  analytical  aims,  the  thesis  begins  from  the 
understanding, in contrast to the scepticism shown by mainstream neo-realist (and   13 
some neo-liberal) theorists, that international norms do have the ability to influence 
the  behaviour  and  even  interests  of  states.  The  importance  of  norms  in  shaping 
international behaviour is evident in Chapter 1 of the thesis, which traces the post-
Cold War evolution of international norms and practices of sovereignty and security, 
including  the  apparent  development  of  a  new  norm  permitting  ‘humanitarian’ 
intervention in extreme cases and the formal endorsement of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ by international society. In this context, however, the fact that the Security 
Council  did  not  coercively  deploy  a  military  intervention  in  Darfur  to  protect 
civilians in conformity with the prescriptions of the ‘responsibility to protect’ poses a 
direct challenge to this more optimistic view of the power of international social 
norms. 
Indeed, what the lack of prescribed intervention in Darfur suggests — turning 
to Hurrell’s final aim of normative IR theory — is that we need to examine the ways 
in which ‘political life’ impacts upon and constrains the pursuit of moral behaviour. 
As ‘moral behaviour’ is itself indeed inherently political in nature, it might be better 
to propose that we need to explore the ways in which the pursuit of self-interested 
behaviour (‘politics’, perhaps) constrains or conflicts with the pursuit of normative or 
altruistic objectives. In this thesis, then, the normative objective is the protection of 
Darfurian  civilians  from  their  own  government  and  its  allied  militias,  and  this 
objective is also argued to be an ethically necessary and justifiable act. The central 
analytical  question,  addressed  primarily  in  Chapters  4  and  5,  is:  what  were  the 
national interests or political calculations of the members of the UN Security Council 
that precluded the pursuit of this ethical and normative objective?  
In using a normative analytical approach, and exploring this tension between 
the pursuit of national interests and of normative or altruistic behaviour, the thesis is   14 
necessarily informed by elements of established International Relations theories. The 
debate  over  the  nature  and  relative  merits  of  norms  and  national  interests  in 
international relations is illustrated by the differing claims of International Society 
(or English School
8) theorists and constructivists on one hand, and (neo)realists on 
the other. Before discussing the particular application and utility of these theories to 
this  thesis,  it  first  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that,  in  its  attempts  to  uncover  the 
underlying interests of powerful actors, and to deconstruct the means by which such 
interests are pursued by juxtaposing the rhetoric and actions of Council members 
with regards to Darfur, the thesis also takes a broadly critical approach in its analysis.  
As a starting point for conceptualising international order, I am persuaded by 
the  central  argument  of  International  Society  theorists  that  contemporary  world 
politics is best characterised as an ‘anarchical society’ of sovereign states. As Hedley 
Bull has proposed, in an international environment lacking a central, overarching 
authority: 
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states,  conscious  of  certain  common  interests  and  common  values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound 
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share 
in the working of common institutions.
9 
 
According  to  Richard  Little,  proponents  of  this  approach  ‘consider 
themselves to be occupying the middle ground that keeps theorists who focus on the 
international system apart from theorists who are concerned with the creation of a 
                                                        
8 See Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (UK & New York: 
MacMillan and St. Martin's, 1998). Because of his status as the quintessential and arguably most 
influential International Society theorist, the work of Hedley Bull is primarily cited here. 
9 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2
nd ed (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1995[1977]), 13. Emphasis in original.   15 
world society.’
10 In this sense, the International Society approach differs from neo-
realist theory in that it places greater emphasis on the ways in which the social nature 
of  relations  between  states  affects  their  behaviour,  and  it  differs  from 
cosmopolitanism  in  that  it  does  not  (yet)  perceive  international  politics  to  have 
moved  beyond  its  rigid  pluralist  basis  consisting  of  states  as  sovereign  political 
communities. This approach clearly allows for the tension between ‘politics’ and the 
pursuit of moral behaviour, as identified by Hurrell, to be played out. It accepts that 
states are still the primary actors in world politics and that they can and do pursue 
policies  advancing  self-interest,  but  that  governments  are  also  influenced  by  the 
prevailing  norms  of  that  society,  including  broader  ethical  and  altruistic 
considerations. For International Society scholars, the question then becomes to what 
extent those norms can affect the behaviour of states in a society that is organised, at 
a  fundamental  level,  on  the  sovereignty  of  those  states  (hence  Bull’s  ‘anarchical 
society’). The debate over coercive intervention in Darfur is a clear example of this 
social tension between sovereignty, ethical behaviour, and self-interests. 
Even as the International Society approach bridges other theories of IR, there 
are  interesting  divisions  within  the  approach  itself.  Primarily,  this  is  between 
‘pluralists’ and ‘solidarists’.
11 The former view the social bonds between states as 
being essentially weak and limited to minimal institutions and rules that provide for 
orderly  coexistence,  such  as  sovereignty  and  the  norm  of  non-intervention.  They 
argue  that  the  pluralist  nature  of  the  society  prohibits  any  deeper  commonalities 
between its members, and that any attempts to promote such ‘universal’ standards or 
ideas,  such  as  intervention  in  the  name  of  human  security,  could  fundamentally 
                                                        
10 Richard Little, “The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations”, 
European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 3 (2000): 395-422, 396. 
11 See, for example, Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, “Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and 
Solidarism of the Will”, International Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996): 91-107.   16 
threaten  this  fragile  order.  In  this  view,  order  is  taken  to  be  the  most  important 
objective of the society.
12 This pluralist line of argument was advanced or implied by 
parties opposed to intervention in Darfur — such as China, Russia and Sudan itself 
—  claiming  that  such  an  intervention  would  be  counter  to  the  norm  of  non-
intervention and could have the potential to unravel the existing order based on a 
reciprocal respect for sovereignty.  
Solidarists, instead, try to push the boundaries of the pluralist order. They 
argue that there exists more room for common ideas and norms to be promoted, and 
that ideas about justice (in the sense of protecting civilian victims in Darfur, for 
example) should take precedence over conservative notions of order. According to 
Bull,  solidarism  is  based  on  the  claim  that  there  exists  ‘solidarity,  or  potential 
solidarity,  of  the  states  comprising  international  society,  with  respect  to  the 
enforcement of the law.’
13 The task for solidarists, then, is to persuade others how 
this should be done, and/or to provide evidence of how it is already being done. In 
this  context,  proponents  of  ‘humanitarian’  intervention  and  the  ‘responsibility  to 
protect’  represent  an  attempt  to  push  the  normative  boundaries  of  international 
society to the point at which the protection of civilians wherever they reside (such as 
in Sudan) from atrocities would become an accepted obligation for powerful states, 
particularly those on the Security Council. Thus, as Wheeler and Dunne contend, the 
‘reason for focusing on questions of intervention and human rights is that they pose 
the conflict between order and justice at its starkest.’
14  
                                                        
12 See for example, the argument made by Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in 
a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
13 Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society”, In Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. H. Butterfield & M. Wight, 51-73 (London: Allen 
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14 Wheeler and Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism’, 92.   17 
Similarly,  as  Christian  Reus-Smit  argues,  constructivist  theorists  view 
international relations as ‘deeply social, as a realm of action in which the identities 
and interests of states and other actors are discursively structured by intersubjective 
rules,  norms  and  institutions.’
15  According  to  Alex  Bellamy,  it  has  ‘become 
increasingly apparent that English School and constructivist writers [have] much in 
common, in particular their belief that states form an international society shaped by 
ideas,  values,  identities,  and  norms  that  are  —  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  — 
common  to  all.’
16  For  example,  as  Biersteker  and  Weber  have  argued,  state 
sovereignty, a central concept used in this thesis, is itself a social construct and does 
not make sense without accepting its intersubjective nature. They argue that:  
 
States’ claims to sovereignty construct a social environment in which 
they can interact as an international society of states, while at the same 
time the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is an important 
element in the construction of states themselves.
17  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the potential transformation of sovereignty norms 
from  implying  absolute  authority  and  immunity  from  external  interference  to 
meaning social and political responsibility is illustrative of this. Indeed, as Edward 
Newman argues, because states’ ‘behaviour, interests, and relationships are socially 
constructed [they] can therefore change.’
18 The crucial insight from constructivist 
theory in terms of the argument presented in this thesis, then, is that governments 
have the agency to enact change through social interaction in international relations. 
                                                        
15 Christian Reus-Smit, “Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School”, British Journal 
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This directly opposes the claims made by neo-realists that the rigid anarchic structure 
of international relations predetermines the types of interactions that can take place, 
and  the  identities  that  can  be  possible  (perceived  as  inherently  competitive  or 
conflictual).
19 It counters the claim that states should privilege narrow self-interests 
(such as counter-terrorism and profitable trade relationships, for example) in order to 
survive  in  a  posited  ‘self-help’  and  ‘zero-sum’  system.  Constructivists  suggest 
instead that there are alternatives to this logic, such as Alexander Wendt’s claim that 
‘anarchy is what states make of it.’
20 To the extent that such critiques undermine 
arguments  against  intervention  to  protect  Darfurians  (for  example,  because  such 
interventions might not be ‘in the national interest’) and contribute to support for 
such international protection, they are considered to be useful insights for this thesis. 
While these International Society and constructivist insights are useful and 
indeed  important  to  the  argument  in  this  thesis  because  they  help  to  explain  the 
apparent evolution in international norms, and the roles that norms play in shaping 
state  behaviour  and  interests,  and  the  agency  of  policymakers,  they  do  not  by 
themselves  explain  the  Council’s  failure  to  intervene  in  Darfur.  Even  if 
constructivists and others can persuasively discredit neorealist logic, in which states 
must pursue national interests as a means to survival in an anarchical world, it is still 
the case that, in practice, states do pursue narrowly defined national interests as a 
matter of foreign policy priority often in the face of prevailing norms, such as the 
‘responsibility  to  protect’.  Indeed,  as  Chapter  1  discusses,  the  structure  of  the 
Security Council, including the power of veto, was deliberately designed in such a 
way as to accommodate the national interests of the permanent members.  
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This  is  not  to  suggest  that  states  should  not  pursue  national  interests,  as 
clearly  it  is  one  of  the  central  roles  of  government  to  advance  the  security  and 
prosperity of their nation and citizens. For example, the Chinese government pursues 
trade  and  investment  in  Sudanese  oil  for  the  purpose  of  economic  growth.  The 
United States engages in counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum with the aim 
of  protecting  America  and  its  allies  and  other  interests  from  potential  terrorist 
attacks.  Prima  facie,  these  are  legitimate  functions  and  pursuits  of  government. 
However,  when  the  pursuit  of  these  interests  comes  at  the  direct  expense  of  the 
interests  (including  physical  security)  of  other  nations  or  people,  particularly 
vulnerable civilians, then a moral and political tension emerges between the pursuit 
of national interests and the pursuit of normative, altruistic or more broadly ethical 
foreign policy.  
While  the  underlying  ethical  claim  made  in  this  thesis  is  that,  in  such 
circumstances, states should privilege the protection of civilians or at least pursue 
national  interests  in  such  a  way  as  to  not  undermine  the  security  of  others,  the 
politically and analytically interesting empirical question is: which prevails when the 
preservation of national interests clashes with the pursuit of normative or altruistic 
behaviour? In this regard, S. Neil MacFarlane claims that intervention ‘remains a 
fundamentally political form of behaviour’ and is sceptical of the ability of norms to 
exert more influence on foreign policymaking than national interests: 
 
the  displacement  of  raison  d’état  by  international  norms  is  more 
apparent than real. Intervention in the 1990s and at the beginning of 
the  new  century  continues  to  be  motivated  substantially  by 
considerations of state and alliance interest. Where such interest is not 
perceived to be present, intervention tends not to occur, whatever the 
prevailing humanitarian situation.
21 
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This is an interesting observation in the context of the relationship between 
norms, interests and intervention. MacFarlane refers to two types of circumstances. 
The first are interventions that occur for self-interested reasons with questionable 
humanitarian motives (such as the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, perhaps), but this 
does not lend itself to an explanation of non-intervention in Darfur. The second type 
involves a lack of humanitarian intervention because of apathy or the absence of 
national interests by the major powers in the target theatre (such as Rwanda in 1994). 
This could potentially explain the lack of intervention by the major powers in Darfur, 
but the examination in this thesis suggests otherwise. In particular, as detailed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the major powers all had considerable interests in Sudan during the 
period of study. Moreover, in contrast to the failure to intervene to stop the Rwandan 
Genocide a decade earlier, it would have been difficult for governments, particularly 
those in Washington, London and Paris, to remain apathetic (or claim ignorance) in 
the face of the highly vocal and visible international advocacy campaign to ‘save 
Darfur’ through UN intervention.
22  
Additionally, Thomas Weiss explains the inconsistent nature of humanitarian 
intervention  using  the  notion  of  the  ‘humanitarian  impulse’,  which  is  the 
‘understandable human desire to help those in life-threatening distress resulting from 
armed conflict.’
23 While this impulse was evident in the Council’s deliberations and 
responses  to  humanitarian  crises  and  atrocities  during  the  1990s,  illustrating  a 
‘fundamental  increase  in  the  relevance  of  humanitarian  values  in  relationship  to 
                                                        
22 See Linda Melvern, “Rwanda and Darfur: The Media and the Security Council”, International 
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narrowly  defined  vital  interests’,  it  did  not  always  lead  to  intervention.
24  Weiss 
argues  that  although  ‘[h]umanitarians  often  lament  that  national  interests  are 
obstacles  to  achieving  their  objectives’,  the  truth  is  that  ‘calculations  about  vital 
interests by governmental decisionmakers explain intervention.’
25  Weiss concludes 
that it is only when ‘humanitarian and strategic interests coincide [that] a window of 
opportunity  opens  for  those  seeking  to  act  on  the  humanitarian  impulse  in  the 
Security Council.’
26 However, unlike the case of NATO member states’ intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999, for example, in Darfur there was no coincidence of humanitarian 
and strategic interests for the major powers. Rather, there was a clash between them, 
and  as  a  result  the  ‘humanitarian  impulse’  did  not  lead  to  a  coercive  military 
intervention. 
Therefore, extending MacFarlane and Weiss’ logic concerning the privileging 
of national interests over international norms by policymakers, the findings in this 
thesis provide evidence for a fourth type of circumstance, namely that humanitarian 
interventions will likely not occur when they directly clash with the national interests 
of the major powers. I do not propose that this is anything unexpected. However, it 
does  convincingly  explain  why,  despite  the  ‘humanitarian  impulse’,  despite  the 
permissive and even prescriptive normative environment, and despite the persuasive 
moral  and  legal-institutional  case  for  a  UN  intervention  in  Darfur,  such  an 
intervention was not even a serious consideration of the Council during 2003-06.  
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Techniques of Analysis and Data Collection 
 
The  final  task  of  this  introduction  is  to  briefly  outline  the  techniques  of 
analysis used in the thesis, including data collection. Because it examines norms, 
rules,  institutions  and  other  intersubjective  aspects  of  international  society, 
interpretive methods are the most useful techniques of analysis. According to Bevir 
and  Rhodes,  interpretive  approaches  ‘concentrate  on  meanings,  beliefs,  and 
discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or 
deductive  models.’
27  I  employ  interpretive  techniques  in  this  thesis  because  the 
underlying analytical aim is to understand why certain actors have formulated certain 
policies, and not others, in their response to the Darfur crisis. The thesis attempts to 
understand the normative context within which these actors are operating — how do 
shared understandings about international society having a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
civilians at risk from genocide or other crimes against humanity shape the identities 
and interests, and hence behaviour, of those actors? How do self or national interests 
shape the policies of governments? The types of phenomena with which this study is 
concerned  —  norms,  ethics,  and  interests  —  cannot  easily  be  examined  using 
positivist  predictive  theories  or  mathematical  formulas  because  of  the  inherently 
indeterminate nature of social life and because of the agency of actors under study to 
construct their own meanings.
28 
  The thesis uses a combination of primary sources, published academic works, 
and news-media items as data collected for analysis. The former largely consist of 
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28 Michael Nicholson and Peter Bennett, “The Epistemology of International Relations”, In 
Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, ed. A.J.R. Groom and M. Light, 197-205 
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publicly available UN (and African Union) documents. These include reports and 
statistics from UN humanitarian agencies working on the ground in the wider Darfur 
region and reports of other UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council. They also 
include numerous documents of the UN Security Council itself, namely transcripts of 
Council meetings, texts of Council resolutions, presidential statements, communiqué, 
and reports by and to the Council by actors such as the UN Secretary-General and his 
Special Representatives, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, and the 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
The  published  scholarly  sources  are  used  primarily  in  Chapter  1,  in  the 
discussion of the structures and processes of the Security Council and of normative 
evolution in sovereignty, security and intervention; and in Chapter 2, where historical 
work is used in conjunction with contemporary academic analysis of the Sudanese 
polity and the conflict in Darfur. In addition, items from primarily electronic news-
media, including the official UN News Centre, will also be used in Part II of the 
thesis  in  the  examination  of  the  Council’s  response  to  Darfur  as  well  as  in  the 
analysis of the various interests and political calculations of Council members.   24 
Part I 
 
 
 
Context  
 
The Case for UN Military Intervention in Darfur  25 
Chapter 1 
 
 
The UN Security Council and its ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  This chapter establishes a relevant context against which the UN Security 
Council’s response to the Darfur crisis can be critically examined and explained. It 
identifies  compelling  legal-institutional  and  normative  arguments  for  coercive 
Council  intervention  to  protect  abused  or  vulnerable  civilians  residing  within 
nominally sovereign states. In doing so, it makes the case that Council intervention 
for  human  protection  purposes  in  extreme  circumstances  has  a  firm  basis  in 
international law and the UN Charter, and that the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ is emerging as a prescribed behavioural norm in contemporary international 
society after its unanimous formal endorsement by UN member states. 
  To accomplish these tasks, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The 
first  part  outlines  the  formal  structure  and  relevant  functions  and  powers  of  the 
Security Council under the UN Charter. In doing so, it makes clear the Council’s pre-
eminent position atop the post-WWII international legal and political framework in 
its role as the authoritative decision making body on matters of ‘international peace 
and security’. Of central relevance to this thesis is the Council’s legal authority and 
mandatory power to intervene in conflicts internal to a UN member state, although 
historically this has been (and remains) contested. In the context of the Council’s 
institutional framework, the chapter examines the central and privileged positions of 
the  Permanent  Five  (‘P5’)  members  and,  correspondingly,  their  implied 
responsibilities as ‘Great Powers’.    26 
Crucially, building on the discussion in the thesis Introduction, it illustrates 
how Council deliberations and resolutions have the inherent potential to be — and 
often  are  —  held  hostage  by  the  narrowly  defined  and  self-interested  political 
calculations of the P5, particularly through their powers of agenda-setting and veto. 
Indeed, according to Mark Imber, the ‘political significance of membership of the 
Security  Council  is  startlingly  clear:  the  opportunity  to  confer  or  to  withhold 
approval of acts of violence, including one’s own and those of one’s allies.’
29 As 
such,  the  chapter  highlights  the  political  machinations  and  national  interests  that 
determine the extent and even existence of actual Council interventions within the 
established legal-institutional framework. 
  Second, the chapter discusses the continuing evolution of international norms 
pertaining to two crucial practices in international society, sovereignty and security; 
an evolution that has been particularly evident in the post-Cold War era. Here I 
identify how new ideas, critiques and conceptualisations of existing practices have 
gradually been incorporated into international theorising, discourse and, eventually 
(although  inconsistently),  into  policymaking.  In  a  basic  sense,  these  normative 
debates have challenged traditional conceptions of the just and proper relationship 
between citizens, governments, and international society by questioning underlying 
notions of authority, responsibility, obligation, and ethical behaviour.  
One crucial outcome of this process (and indeed a driver of it) is the notion of 
external, coercive, and military-based ‘humanitarian’ interventions by the Council to 
protect vulnerable or abused civilians living inside sovereign states (when certain 
criteria have been met). I discuss how this idea has been incorporated into the more 
recent discourse and doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’, which has gained 
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important formal endorsement in international society. It is against this emerging 
normative context that the Council’s response to the crisis in Darfur — characterised 
by a distinct lack of coercive military intervention — is examined and explained in 
Part II of the thesis.  
  Finally,  in  discussing  international  normative  change,  the  chapter  also 
illustrates how the Council itself has evolved in the post-Cold War era, particularly 
by (somewhat controversially) self-expanding its own mandate to less ambiguously 
include matters that hitherto were considered to be within the sole jurisdiction of 
individual  UN  member  states  —  namely,  their  ‘domestic  affairs’.  As  such,  the 
chapter  presents  the  argument  that  there  is  a  compelling  legal-institutional  and 
normative case for coercive Council-authorised military intervention into sovereign 
states  for  civilian  protection  purposes.  In  this  context,  the  question  of  why  the 
Council  did  not  coercively  intervene  in  Darfur  between  2003-06  needs  to  be 
explained. 
 
The United Nations Security Council 
 
  Many of the central issues in the study of International Relations concern the 
nature, authority, and legitimacy of decision-making power in a highly pluralist and 
relatively decentralised international order that is organised politically into sovereign 
states.  This  is  particularly  evident  when  it  comes  to  the  sensitive  questions 
surrounding the authorisation of war or military intervention — including those for 
civilian protection purposes — within the borders of a particular state. Before the 
advent of the modern sovereign state system, powerful actors made decisions about 
when  they  would  go  to  war  relatively  unfettered  by  external  legal  or  normative 
challenges to their authority or legitimacy. Over time, the institution of sovereignty   28 
and  its  corollary  norm  of  non-intervention  were  developed  in  Europe  to  reduce 
warfare,  create  order,  and  enhance  security.  In  turn,  international  institutions 
comprised of sovereign states — such as the Concert of Europe and the League of 
Nations — were later designed to imbue any decisions about war and maintaining 
order  with  a  more  collective,  and  thus  both  more  restrictive  and  legitimised, 
character.  
  Notions of legality, legitimacy and authority became increasingly important 
in both the pursuit of, and conduct in, war (including intervention) as new legal and 
normative regimes emerged bounding actors together in international society based 
on some degree of commonly accepted principles.
30 Reflecting a desire to further 
centralise and control decision making on war and peace after the horrors of WWII, 
the post-war era saw the creation of a new and strengthened international collective 
security regime under the United Nations. Most importantly, the Security Council 
was placed atop this new framework as the most authoritative and powerful body 
mandated to ‘maintain international peace and security’.  
For this reason, and because the UNSC continues to play this preeminent 
decision making role in the twenty-first century, its actions — as a collective as well 
as those of its individual members — are of most significance when analysing the 
international response to one of the most pressing contemporary ‘security’ issues: the 
Darfur crisis.
31 Indeed, because of its legal-institutional role, when it comes to the 
responsibility for dealing with issues of war, peace and security, the Council ‘is the 
proper locus of authorising and legitimising the creation, deployment and use of 
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31 While the thesis examines the response of the Security Council to Darfur, it also acknowledges the 
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military  force  under  international  auspices.’
32  Moreover,  the  International 
Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty  (ICISS),  a  panel  of  experts 
examining the role of the Council in potential ‘humanitarian’ interventions, argued in 
2001 that: 
 
there is no better or more appropriate body than the Security Council 
to  deal  with  military  intervention  issues  for  human  protection 
purposes. It is the Security Council which should be making the hard 
decisions in the hard cases about overriding state sovereignty … The 
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of 
authority, but to make the Security Council work much better than it 
has.
33 
 
  The Security Council is thus a powerful and legitimate entity and yet, as 
noted by the ICISS above and elaborated below, an inherently problematic body. 
Before I return to this discussion, it is first necessary to establish the composition of 
the  Council  and  its  functions,  powers  and  mandate  under  the  UN  Charter.  In 
addition, the role of the Council’s privileged Permanent Five members and their 
national interests needs to be outlined. Understanding these important formal aspects 
is the sine qua non of explaining the Council’s non-intervention in Darfur. 
 
Formal structure, functions and powers 
 
  Towards the end of WWII, a central aim of post-war planners was to bring 
together the major powers (initially just the victorious allies) under the multilateral 
legal regime of a strengthened international organisation — the UN — rather than to 
risk leaving them alone to pursue aggressive unilateral foreign policies. Further to 
this, the model proposed that any threats to the system would be deterred, and if 
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deterrence  failed,  acted  upon,  by  a  powerful  collective  of  other  members  of 
international  society.
34  Because  of  this,  the  Security  Council,  as  the  new 
organisation’s most powerful body in this collective security system, was designed 
around an ‘elite pact’ between the major allied powers.
35 At the formation of the UN, 
the Council’s ‘main function appeared to be the institutionalisation of a concert of 
powers, legitimising the great power status of the P-5 and ensuring that the UN did 
not undertake a collision course with any one of them.’
36 Put differently, through the 
UN the international community ‘was determined to put in place an effective system 
for  preventing  and  suppressing  armed  conflict  that  would  rely  on  both  legal 
principles and the power of the major Allied nations.’
37  
  These underlying principles were elaborated and crafted into the UN Charter, 
which was ratified by the requisite number of member states on October 24, 1945, 
formally  bringing  the  world  body  into  existence.  The  UN  was  organised 
institutionally into six principle organs, the most powerful of which was the Security 
Council.
38 Seeking to improve on the interwar institutional structure, the UNSC’s 
design was made similar yet different in important respects to its predecessor, the 
League  Council,  as  the  UN’s  founders  ‘reconstructed  the  League’s  unworkable 
unanimity procedures around a more vigorous recognition and deference to the great 
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powers’  roles.’
39  Thus,  in  designing  the  UN  around  the  primacy  of  the  Security 
Council, the allied powers ensured that their own positions of authority within the 
organisation — and in the post-war international legal and political framework more 
generally — would be secure.  
  Hence,  as  set  out  in  the  Charter,
40  the  UNSC  is  structured  by  15  (of  the 
current total of 192) UN members at any one time. Of the 15, five are permanent 
members: the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and France. As their 
title suggests, these five have been ever-present (in one form or another) on the 
Council since 1945.
41 The other 10 members of the Council are elected annually onto 
rotating seats by the General Assembly (five per year). These seats, distinguished as 
‘non-permanent’, are for a term of two years and are staggered to ensure that some 
continuity outside of the P5 is maintained, while a serving member cannot apply for 
immediate re-election.
42  
The  non-permanent  seats  are  available  for  contestation  by  all  other  UN 
members but are distributed on a regional basis (conventionally, according to UN 
Regional Groups) to afford a measure of ‘equitable geographic representation’: five 
shared between Africa and Asian states, two to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
two to the Western European and Other State group, and the final seat to a state from 
Eastern Europe. In addition to equitable geographic representation, potential non-
permanent members are nominally required to meet an ambiguously defined criterion 
based on their ‘contribution to international peace and security’. The result is that the 
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Council’s structure ‘confer[s] effective decision-making power on a small minority 
of the member-states, partly elected and partly self-selected.’
43  
  To illustrate this structure, during the 2003-06 period of study in this thesis, 
in addition to the P5, the states that served on the UNSC as non-permanent members 
were (in alphabetical order): Algeria (2004-05), Angola (2003-04), Argentina (2005-
06), Benin (2004-05), Brazil (2004-05), Bulgaria (2002-03), Cameroon (2002-03), 
Chile (2003-04), Congo, Republic of the (2006-07), Denmark (2005-06), Germany 
(2003-04), Ghana (2006-07), Greece (2005-06), Guinea (2002-03), Japan (2005-06), 
Mexico (2002-03), Pakistan (2003-04), Peru (2006-07), Philippines (2004-05), Qatar 
(2006-07), Romania (2004-05), Slovakia (2006-07), Spain (2003-04), Syria (2002-
03), and Tanzania (2005-06).
44  
  In addition to its structural composition, the formal functions and powers of 
the Council are also set out in Chapter V of the Charter. Most crucially, establishing 
its role as the preeminent UN decision making body and setting out its mandatory 
power, Article 25 states that all UN Members ‘agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions  of  the  Security  Council  in  accordance  with  the  present  Charter’,  while 
Article 24(1) provides that:  
 
In  order  to  ensure  the  prompt  and  effective  action  by  the  United 
Nations,  its  Members  confer  on  the  Security  Council  primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
Security Council acts on their behalf.  
 
  Thus, in order for a state to join, or have joined, the UN, it must first have 
fully accepted the mandate and position of the Council and the inherent obligations 
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this creates for its own actions, including certain legal restrictions on its freedom of 
action. This is one of the few explicit restrictions that the Charter places upon the 
sovereignty of its member states and it is a central component of the UN’s collective 
security system.
45 Delineating the powers of the UNSC, Article 24(2) states that in 
discharging its duties the Council must act in accordance with the basic purposes and 
principles of the United Nations as set out in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Most 
importantly, illustrated in Article 1(1), the primary purpose of the organisation is: 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity  with  the  principles  of  justice  and  international  law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
  Of the seven primary principles or basic norms upon which the UN and its 
member states must act, as set out in Article 2, the most significant for this analysis 
are that the organisation is ‘based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its 
Members’ (2(1)), which means in practice that member states are accorded equal 
legal rights in the organisation regardless of size, population or GDP (the important 
exception being the P5); that all members ‘shall refrain in their international relations 
from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political 
independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent’  with  the  UN’s 
purposes (2(4)); and finally, and most importantly, Article 2(7) states that: 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations  to  intervene  in  matters  which  are  essentially  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  any  state  or  shall  require  the  Members  to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
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principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
 
  Article 2(7) is crucial to the debate over intervention generally, and Darfur 
particularly,  because  it  grants  the  Council  the  authority  to  intervene  within  the 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a state if it passes a resolution under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. Yet, due to its somewhat ambiguous wording, interpretation of Article 2(7) 
has been the subject of ‘considerable controversy about how far this permits the 
Council  to  authorise  intervention  to  stop  humanitarian  emergencies  taking  place 
inside state borders’.
46 Nevertheless, in his comprehensive legal analysis, Michael 
Matheson argues convincingly that, under Article 2(7): 
 
if the Council determines that an internal situation (such as a conflict 
against domestic insurgents or internal ethnic violence) constitutes a 
threat to the peace, then the international community — through the 
Council — has the power to intervene dramatically and powerfully, if 
necessary, though sanctions or the use of force. In such a case, national 
sovereignty gives way to international authority in the most direct and 
forceful way.
47 
 
  Fundamental to this argument, however, are the questions of what constitutes 
a threat to or breach of the peace and what constitutes ‘international’, because they 
determine  ‘to  a  large  extent  the  boundary  between  national  sovereignty  and 
international jurisdiction under the Charter system’
48 The ways in which the Council 
has self-expanded the interpretation of its own mandate in the post-Cold War era — 
specifically, towards dealing with matters formally considered to be ‘internal’ to a 
sovereign  state  —  has  meant  that  Article  2(7)  is  now  further  weighted  towards 
Council authority for internal intervention (see discussion below). As such, it gives 
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the Council the authority to intervene, for example, in Sudan — within the borders of 
the nominally sovereign Sudanese state — to protect civilians from acute violence. 
However, as will be examined in Part II of the thesis, while the Council did indeed 
authorise robust civilian protection in Darfur under Chapter VII in Resolution 1706, 
the deployment of that operation did not occur. This development is indeed crucial, 
because it demonstrates vividly that political — and not legal — obstacles were 
central to explaining the Council’s non-intervention. 
  While the Council must act in accordance with the broader principles and 
purposes of the UN, its more specific powers are delineated in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII,  and  XII.  Chapter  VI,  ‘Pacific  Settlement  of  Disputes’,  sets  out  the  non-
mandatory measures that the UNSC can take in response to a dispute. Under Article 
33, the Council should in the first instance facilitate parties to a dispute to ‘seek a 
solution  by  negotiation,  enquiry,  mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration,  judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of 
their own choice’. Under Article 34, the Council may ‘investigate any dispute, or any 
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order 
to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security’, and, under Article 36, may 
‘recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.’  
However,  under  Chapter  VI  resolutions,  such  recommendations  are  only 
advisory and require the consent of the parties involved in the dispute. Regarding 
Darfur, there were numerous instances over the period of study in which the Council 
passed resolutions or initiated actions that fell within the remit of Chapter VI, and the 
Council clearly attempted a variety a ‘non-military’ and cooperative measures to   36 
resolve the conflict.
49 Yet, despite the efforts of the Council and other international 
actors to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, such measures were unsuccessful and 
ultimately inadequate; this necessitated a more coercive approach. 
  Indeed, the aforementioned Chapter VII of the Charter, ‘Action with Respect 
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’, establishes 
the Council’s powers for dealing more coercively with issues when more peaceful 
means have failed or are deemed inappropriate. As has already been established, 
Chapter VII resolutions authorised by the UNSC are ‘binding on states and override 
other obligations.’
50 Article 39 states that the Council ‘shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations,  or  decide  what  measures  shall  be  taken  in  accordance  with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.’  
Thus, under Article 41, the Council ‘may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions’ and may 
call upon UN members to apply such measures. These may include ‘complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’, 
commonly  known  as  the  sanctions  provision.  Sanctions,  primarily  economic  and 
travel-related, and an arms embargo were also enacted by the Council in its efforts to 
compel belligerent parties to resolve the Darfur conflict, but, as Chapter 3 of the 
thesis details, these too proved to be an insufficient deterrent. Crucially, then, when 
sanctions fail or are ineffective, Article 42 goes one step further: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
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may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
 
  The ‘other operations’ provisions of Article 42 are clearly highly coercive in 
nature  and  may  ultimately  involve  the  use  of  military  force  and  intervention  to 
achieve the Council’s objectives. This thesis argues that due to the failure of less 
coercive methods to resolve the Darfur conflict and protect vulnerable civilians, and 
due to legal mandate of the Council under Article 42 to use military force in such 
circumstances where measures short of war have proven inadequate, a robust and 
coercive military intervention authorised by the Council under Chapter VII became 
the only measure that would have been effective in protecting Darfurian civilians. 
Yet,  between  2003-06,  when  hundreds  of  thousands  of  civilians  died,  no  such 
intervention occurred. 
  Indeed, rather than being confrontational, much of the Council’s deliberations 
on,  and  dialogue  with,  Sudan  over  Darfur  emphasised  cooperation  and  the 
consensual  deployment  of  UN  ‘peacekeeping’  forces.  While  not  written  into  the 
Charter, the Council has developed a niche role for ‘peacekeeping’ forces, authorised 
under  either  Chapter  VI  or  VII  resolutions.  ‘Traditional’  peacekeeping  missions, 
authorised  under  Chapter  VI,  need  the  consent  of  belligerent  parties,  should  be 
impartial, and should essentially monitor violations of a peace that had already been 
made.
51  The  deployment  of  10,000  UN  troops  in  south  Sudan,  which  Khartoum 
accepted as part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM/A, 
was an example of this type of consensual deployment of peacekeepers. Yet, it is 
important  to  make  the  distinction  here  between  this  traditional,  impartial 
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peacekeeping, and coercive intervention (or ‘peace-enforcement’), which must be 
authorised under Chapter VII. It is the latter, I argue, which was required in Darfur, 
particularly after the Sudanese government’s role in the violence was revealed and 
indeed after it had rejected the consensual deployment of UN troops in Darfur. 
  Ultimately, however, whichever type of resolution is used to authorise the 
force, the ‘chief determinant of failure and success [of a Council peace operation] 
will be the quality of decisions made by member states in the UNSC, led by the 
P5.’
52 It is imperative to appreciate the political nature of Council decision making 
and  the  political  calculations,  national  interests,  and  compromises  that  go  into 
creating the mandate for a peacekeeping mission or more coercive intervention. Key 
here is the observation that although the Council has a legal-institutional capacity to 
authorise  coercive  force  to  protect  civilians  at  risk,  as  a  collective  it  continually 
decided against coercively deploying a robust military intervention in Darfur. 
  A final area of potential Council action relates to Chapter VIII of the Charter, 
which sets out the relationship between the Council and regional intergovernmental 
organisations.  This  is  particularly  relevant  regarding  Darfur  because  of  the  close 
cooperative  relationship  established  between  the  Council  and  the  African  Union. 
Article  53  states  that  the  Council  ‘shall,  where  appropriate,  utilize  such  regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority’, but that no 
such  enforcement  action  would  be  taken  by  a  regional  body  without  Council 
authorization  (again  reinforcing  the  Council’s  preeminent  status).  The  AU  was 
authorised by the Council to establish a limited military observer mission in Darfur 
from  mid-2004,  although  this  operation  was  ultimately  inadequately  resourced, 
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politically compromised, and thus largely ineffective in providing security on the 
ground.
53  
 
The Permanent Five: Great Powers, national interests, and the veto 
 
  While the above discussion has delineated the membership structure of the 
UNSC, and its formal functions and powers under the UN Charter, more attention 
needs to be paid to the role of the P5, particularly to the ways in which they retain 
effective control over the Council’s agenda-setting and decision-making processes, 
as well as to their nominal responsibility as ‘Great Powers’ to manage issues of 
peace and security in international society. Because the Great Powers were given 
special  privileges  ‘in  recognition  of  their  special  role  and  responsibility  in 
underwriting  world  order  and  collective  security,’
54  an  appreciation  of  the  P5’s 
exceptional role in the Council is critical to understanding how the body acts, why it 
adopts or does not adopt resolutions, and which issues gain its greatest attention. 
These questions are indeed of primary relevance for this thesis because the Council’s 
lack of robust military intervention to protect vulnerable civilians in Darfur between 
2003-06 can be explained by the pursuit of contrasting policies and national interests 
amongst the P5.  
  At the heart of P5 privilege is the voting arrangement in the Council, which 
comes in addition to their permanency. To comply with Article 27, for a substantive 
Council resolution to pass — such as Resolution 1706 (2006) on Darfur, for example 
— it must attract a majority of at least nine affirmative votes from its 15 voting 
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members. However, in addition to requiring nine affirmative votes, for a particular 
resolution to pass, each of the P5 governments must individually either support the 
resolution  (by  voting  ‘yes’)  or  abstain  from  voting  (which  is  not  considered  a 
negative  vote).  In  this  sense,  if  any  of  the  P5  were  to  vote  ‘no’,  they  would 
effectively  block  or  ‘veto’  the  passage  of  a  UNSC  resolution,  ensuring  that  no 
decisions made by the Council will be contrary to the interests or preferences of any 
of the P5.
55 Referring again to Resolution 1706, the successful resolution received 12 
affirmative  votes,  zero  negative  votes,  and  three  abstentions  (China,  Russia  and 
Qatar).
56 Conversely, to use an example from a different conflict in which a veto was 
actually  cast,  in  November  2006  the  Council  failed  to  adopt  a  draft  resolution 
‘condemning Israeli military operations in Gaza’ because the United States voted 
against it (the resolution also received 10 affirmative votes, with four abstentions).
57 
  Why were five members of the UN granted permanent seats and exclusive 
voting privileges in the Council? While it may seem undemocratic and a violation of 
the ‘sovereign equality’ principle, as outlined above, the particular structures that 
were created reflect the nature of power relations at the end of World War II. As Paul 
Kennedy argues: 
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to any reasonable person nowadays, it is outrageous that a mere 5 of 
the 191 sovereign states that make up the United Nations have special 
powers and privileges … Upon what they do, or decide not to do, and 
upon what they agree to, or veto, lies the fate of efforts to achieve 
peace  through  international  covenants.  Even  more  amazing  and 
disturbing  is  that  any  single  one  of  the  Permanent  Five,  were  its 
national government determined upon it, can paralyse Security Council 
action; moreover, it would be fully within its charter rights to do so.
58 
 
  Yet,  the  veto  power  and  privileges  granted  to  the  P5  ‘were  designed  to 
remedy the main weakness of the first half of the twentieth century: the failure to 
anchor  the  major  powers  in  a  collective  security  system  and  to  ensure  that  no 
decisions were taken that went against their interests’,
59 which is arguably a major 
structural flaw in the international system that facilitated WWII. In a similar vein, 
Kennedy argues that what ‘some critics saw as a terrible weakness in the system 
could be viewed by realists as a redeeming feature, affirming in fact that it was better 
to  have  the  larger  nations  inside  the  UN  system  rather  than  on  the  outside.’
60 
According to Wallensteen and Johansson, the Council was therefore established in an 
‘atmosphere of major power cooperation’ and its structure ‘assumed that the leading 
actors  in  world  affairs  would  have  to  cooperate  with  each  other  and,  with  the 
introduction of the veto, even be inclined to do so.’
61  
  In essence, according to this view, the major powers decided to enshrine their 
own  privileges  in  the  new  post-war  institutional  structure  of  global  governance, 
while a number of other states at the time reluctantly accepted this as the ‘lesser of 
two evils’ and joined the UN themselves. Consequently, as Mahbubani notes, the 
‘record since the UN’s founding in 1945 shows that the veto has accomplished the 
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purpose of achieving great power commitment’ to the UN; none of the P5 have 
withdrawn from the world body because they recognise that their privileges give 
them ‘significant control over a powerful global institution.’
62 As such, it could be 
argued, according to this logic, that by not coercively intervening in Darfur in order 
to preserve the national interests of the P5, the Council was operating exactly as was 
planned by the framers of the Charter. 
  However, a key additional element to the granting of special privileges in 
international  society  is  a  corresponding  responsibility  nominally  accepted  by  the 
major  powers  for  preserving  and  defending  that  system  and  dealing  with  vital 
security  issues  that  arise  within  it.  As  Hedley  Bull  has  argued,  Great  Power 
management of both their own relations and of the international system more broadly 
is one of the fundamental institutions comprising international society.
63 Similarly, 
Thakur argues that, in a general sense, powerful countries ‘claim and are granted the 
right to a determining role in issues of world peace and security; but also they are 
burdened  by  the  corresponding  duty  to  modify  national  policies  in  the  light  of 
international  managerial  responsibilities.’  More  specifically,  he  contends  that 
permanent seats on the Security Council: 
 
consecrated the special position of the five major powers in the UN 
scheme of helping to shape and safeguard international peace. The veto 
clause  conferred  the  further  competence  upon  the  great  powers  to 
protect international encroachments upon their own vital interests. In 
return, as part of the obligations towards a responsible management of 
international order, the great powers agreed to eschew unilateral resort 
to force in favour of concerted action through the UN system.
64 
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  Leaving aside the issue of reducing interstate war between the major powers, 
which  nevertheless  seems  less  likely  in  the  present  era,
65  more  relevant  for  the 
argument in this thesis is Bull’s claim that a Great Power ‘hoping to be accepted as a 
legitimate managerial power’ cannot ignore or contradict certain demands for justice 
from  lesser  powers  or  peoples  around  the  world  in  the  ways  in  which  less-
aspirational  states  can,  because  its  “freedom  of  manoeuvre  is  circumscribed  by 
‘responsibility.’”
66 As will be discussed below, due to evolving international norms 
this  notion  of  ‘responsibility’,  particularly  for  the  P5,  now  arguably  extends  to 
protecting vulnerable civilians from abuse inside their own states. 
  Despite these arguments that P5 privileges were crucial to the early success 
of the UN and the stability of the immediate post-war era, or that the Great Powers 
are justifiably granted special powers and status because of their exceptional role as 
mangers of the international system, there have been a variety of criticisms of such 
privilege, particularly of the veto power and the fact that it is still available today. 
Because of the ability to veto, it becomes apparent that the Council is to a large 
extent run according to either the individual national interests of P5 members or to 
the  collective  preferences  of  this  exclusive  clique.  Although  the  fact  that  any 
resolution must gain the affirmative votes of at least nine members to pass (including 
no P5 vetoes) means that Council action still ‘requires substantial support across 
regional or political lines’,
67 it is the problem of obstructing potential resolutions 
which is of more relevance to the body’s response to Darfur. 
  Moreover, the veto power means that the P5 ‘not only … have the ability to 
veto action: but that the simple existence of the veto, even if not formally exercised, 
                                                        
65 See Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21
st Century 
(New York & London, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
66 Bull. The Anarchical Society, 222. 
67 Matheson, Council Unbound, 22.   44 
gives the permanent members the ability to control the Council’s agenda.’
68 In this 
sense, it is important to recognise the process that takes place in behind-the-scenes 
Council negotiations, where compromises are often made informally and privately, 
and draft resolutions are modified in order to prevent a permanent member having to 
formally (and somewhat embarrassingly) veto a draft resolution if they oppose it.
69 
Mahbubani notes that the P5 members, while reluctant to use their veto publicly, are 
‘allowed to use their veto implicitly in many closed-door consultations.’
70 In terms of 
Council  procedure  and  agenda-setting,  the  non-permanent  members  are  therefore 
disadvantaged because standing rules of procedure and precedent in the Council are 
already established (primarily) by the permanent members, while elected members 
lack the ‘institutional memory’ that comes with an ever-present seat at the table.
71 
Such pre-vote negotiations and compromises amongst the P5 were indeed central to 
the  Council  avoiding  a  formal  Chinese  veto  on  any  resolution  concerning 
Sudan/Darfur, with the result that more coercive actions were precluded. 
  Building  on  the  theoretical  discussion  in  the  thesis  Introduction,  it  is 
apparent, therefore, that the Security Council has the inherent potential to be — and 
often is — held hostage by the particular national interests and political calculations 
of its permanent members. Rosemary Durward cites how the Council can ‘suffer 
from a malaise of disinterest or be immobilized by a veto or threatened veto because 
of vested interests.’
72 This has particularly significant ramifications for victims of 
brutal conflicts that require urgent Council intervention, such as in Darfur. On this 
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point,  the  ICISS  reported  that  during  its  global  consultations  on  the  role  of  the 
Council in responding to humanitarian crises, it encountered the attitude that the:  
 
capricious use of the veto, or threat of its use [was] likely to be the 
principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick 
and  decisive  action  is  needed  to  stop  or  avert  a  significant 
humanitarian  crisis  …  Of  particular  concern  is  the  possibility  that 
needed action will be held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or 
more of the permanent members — a situation that has too frequently 
occurred in the past.
73  
 
  Indeed, highlighting how the legal framework established by the UN Charter 
for  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security,  with  the  Council  at  the 
centre, has all the authority to be effective, Matheson argues that ‘[n]onetheless, the 
system  depends  in  the  end  on  the  ability  of  the  Council  to  act  promptly  and 
decisively. The basic prerequisite for this ability has been and will always be the 
development of political consensus, particularly among the permanent members, on 
the course to be taken.’ To do so requires ‘both leadership and compromise by the 
United States and other major players.’
74 The result, as Virgil Hawkins concludes in 
his study of the relative ‘silence’ of the Council on the conflicts and potential peace 
operations during the 1990s, is that the body: 
 
has  had  a  tendency  to  largely  ignore  most  of  the  world’s  major 
conflicts,  dealing  with  only  a  small  number  of  conflicts  (often 
relatively minor ones), and authorising peace enforcement in only a 
few  select  cases.  Where  the  Council  did  chose  to  authorise  peace 
enforcement operations, the means and mandates adopted were often 
ill-suited  for  dealing  with  the  situation  on  the  ground.  Political 
considerations, rather than humanitarian ones, were the prime factors 
behind  both  the  decisions  to  (or  not  to)  create  peace  enforcement 
operations and the mandates for operations on the ground.
75 
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  As this thesis demonstrates, despite the important role that the Council has 
played in recasting practices of sovereignty and security, such political machinations 
and  individual  national  interests  continue  to  shape  Council  decision  making 
processes in the new millennium, and this is nowhere more evident that in the body’s 
response to the Darfur crisis. As may also be concluded, the subject of restructuring 
the Council along more democratic, representative and transparent lines in order to 
mitigate the narrow protection of national interests is a matter of ongoing, if not 
intractable, debate within UN fora.
76 
 
The Normative Evolution of Sovereignty and Security 
 
  As  discussed  above,  International  Society  scholars  argue  that  order  is 
maintained in international relations through the observance and practice of basic 
shared  norms.  These  norms  are  commonly  agreed-upon  standards  of  behaviour 
expected of particular actors — which in international relations remain primarily 
states — and form a set of fundamental rules and institutions that constitute the 
society itself.
77 The most basic constitutive institution in international society has 
been state sovereignty and its corollary norm has traditionally been ‘non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs’ of those states. The initial aim of sovereignty was to create 
peace  and  order t hrough  a  reciprocal  respect  for  difference.  Furthermore,  it  was 
thought that security would best be achieved by protecting the state from external 
attack (as well as by promoting a norm of non-intervention).  
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  The acute norm-violations of WWII served to strengthen statist conceptions 
and practices of sovereignty and security in post-war international society. This was 
evident and codified in the UN Charter, was a product of the strong defence by 
newly sovereign former colonies of their nascent independence, and, despite actually 
leading to numerous interventions in the developing world, was further inspired by 
realist  Cold  War  security  logic,  which  centred  upon  survival  and  protecting  the 
national interest. Yet, over time, challenges were posed to such traditional forms and 
norms of international society by critics who argued that such arrangements did not 
adequately provide peace or security for people across the globe. In fact, many critics 
argue that such conceptions privilege certain powerful actors and interests at the 
expense  of  —  or  often  directly  contradict  —  those  that  are  marginalised  or  less 
powerful. I here demonstrate how, as international norms, sovereignty and security 
have been recast over time, most apparently after the end of the Cold War. One 
crucial outcome of such change that is central to the argument in this thesis is the 
emerging  permissibility  of  limited  ‘humanitarian’  interventions  in  international 
society, most notably through the formal endorsement by UN member states of a 
version  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  doctrine,  and  including  the  Security 
Council’s own role in driving international normative change. 
 
Traditional forms of sovereignty and security 
 
In  1648,  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  ‘constituted  for  the  first  time  an 
international  society  in  which  the  criss-crossing  relations  between  diverse  feudal 
conflict-units and the hierarchical claims of Empire and Papacy were, at least in   48 
Europe,  superseded  by  formal  relations  between  modern  sovereign  states.’
78 
Emerging from this crucial historical juncture (and transforming from dynastic to 
more modern democratic and secular forms
79), the concept of state sovereignty was 
understood to mean that a government of a state had both internal (or empirical) 
control  over  population,  territory  and  resources  as  well  as  external  (or  juridical) 
recognition by other states of its territorial authority, invoking a reciprocated right of 
non-intervention.
80 These two aspects of sovereignty pertain to different elements: 
the former focuses on the relationship between the government and citizens of the 
state,  while  the  latter  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  states  in  international 
society. This is important because an emphasis on or ignorance of either of these 
aspects of sovereignty can have very different consequences for international society 
and for the citizens of states. For example, Dunne and Wheeler observe how the 
Peace of Westphalia established a normative regime in which: 
 
the  domestic  practices  of  governments  were  not  a  subject  of 
international  concern.  According  to  the  Westphalian  conception  of 
legitimacy, a government’s claim to be recognised as sovereign [by 
other members of international society] was not dependent upon how it 
behaved towards its own citizens.
81 
 
By  the  time  of  the  UN’s  founding  —  the  end  of  the  horrific  and 
unprecedentedly  costly  WWII  —  the  primary  aim  of  the  new  international 
organisation was to maintain international peace and security by preventing future 
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wars between states.
82 Based on the experiences of the first half of the twentieth 
century, the strategy for achieving this was to enshrine in the UN Charter sovereign 
state equality (Article 2(1)) and to outlaw the ‘threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence’ (Article 2(4)) and intervention in the 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ (Article 2(7)) of all states. Therefore, war and intervention 
were banned under international law (except as authorised by the Security Council, 
or in self-defence under Article 51) and the protection of juridical forms of state 
sovereignty and the promotion of the non-intervention norm were designed to be the 
cornerstones of a pluralist, rule-bound, and more peaceful international order.  
  Further strengthening the primacy of juridical aspects of sovereignty and the 
non-intervention norm was the process of former European colonies achieving self-
determination, sovereign statehood and UN membership over the first two decades of 
the post-war era. With their historical experience of intervention, occupation and in 
most  cases  exploitation  by  external  powers,  these  newly-independent  states  were 
understandably staunch defenders of the sovereign rights of states and in particular 
their right to be free from external interference. This was notably evidenced by the 
December 1960 ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and people’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514), which proclaimed that ‘all 
peoples’  have  an  ‘inalienable  right  to  complete  freedom,  the  exercise  of  their 
sovereignty  and  the  integrity  of  their  national  territory’,  and  ‘the  right  to  self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely  pursue  their  economic,  social  and  cultural  development’.  As  such,  the 
resolution declared that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity’ of a country would be ‘incompatible’ with 
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the UN Charter and asserted that henceforward international relations should based 
upon ‘equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for 
the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.’
83  
Over  the  next  two  decades,  a  number  of  additional  (and  unambiguously 
titled)  General  Assembly  resolutions,  although  non-binding,  reiterated  or  further 
strengthened non-intervention as a fundamental norm of international society and 
clearly  illustrated  that  the  emphasis  of  sovereignty  during  that  era  was  on  the 
peaceful relations between states rather than on the internal relationship between 
governments  and  their  citizens.  For  example,  the  1965  ‘Declaration  on  the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their  Independence  and  Sovereignty’  (UN  General  Assembly  Resolution  2131) 
proclaimed that: 
 
No  State  has  the  right  to  intervene,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  any 
reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference 
or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.
84 
 
This  normative  prescription  was  reaffirmed  by  the  1970  ‘Declaration  on 
Principles  of  International  Law  Concerning  Friendly  Relations  and  Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (Resolution 
2625)
85;  and  the  1981  ‘Declaration  on  the  Inadmissibility  of  Intervention  and 
Interference  in  the  Internal  Affairs  of  States’  (Resolution  36/103).
86  It  was  clear, 
then, that even though the Security Council was granted the authority under Article 
2(7) to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in order to maintain 
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international peace and security (an exception that was explicitly recognised in the 
latter three General Assembly resolutions above), in the emerging and expanding 
post-war international society this was not a practice that had widespread support 
among states.
87  
  What is so significant about this particular form of normative arrangement 
has been its impact upon the (in)security of millions of people: as a result of statist 
conceptions  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention,  certain  governments  remained 
largely unhindered in pursuing their own repressive internal measures as long as they 
refrained  from  pursuing  aggressive  foreign  relations,  the  latter  of  which  were 
considered to be of primary importance for international society. As Ramesh Thakur 
argues,  through  the  process  of  decolonisation  ‘many  states  emerged  lacking  the 
capacity to assure their citizens’ security or exert authority over the resources which 
were often then captured by predatory groups who used the principle of sovereignty 
and  the  norm  of  non-intervention  to  shield  themselves  from  external  pressure.’
88 
Mayall  has  similarly  observed  that  the  political  and  legal  consequences  of  this 
arrangement were that ordinary people were excluded from democratic participation 
in  national  life  and  became  subjects  of  new  forms  of  oppression,  while  external 
actors remained unable to legitimately interfere: 
 
What happened in many parts of the Third World once power was 
transferred is known: elections took place only once. Opposition was 
denounced as a luxury that governments involved in nation-building 
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and rapid economic development could not afford. One-party states 
emerged  in  many  non-aligned  as  well  as  communist  countries,  and 
power was frequently concentrated in a president who was empowered 
for life. These developments, however, had no formal implications for 
international  society  because  autocratic  as  well  as  democratic 
governments are formally protected from interference in their internal 
affairs by the UN Charter.
89 
 
Exacerbating this problem, most newly-independent governments inherited 
old  colonial  borders  (under  the  principle  of  uti  possidetis  juris),  which  usually 
ignored  and  superseded  diverse  (and  often  conflictual)  local  ethnic  and  cultural 
geographical  distributions,  meaning  that  new  states  —  including  Sudan  —  were 
proclaimed with borders that often bore little resemblance to societal and political 
realities on the ground.
90 Inevitably, this meant that the struggle for control of the 
new sovereign entity was often brutal and bloody and raised difficult questions about 
whether  territorial  integrity  or  self-determination  (however  defined)  should  take 
precedence.
91  For  this  reason,  and  others,  the  strong  emphasis  on  juridical 
sovereignty and non-intervention can be seen to be overly statist in conception and 
consequence. What is important for the analysis in this thesis is that such attitudes 
within international society afforded little concern for individuals or groups suffering 
acute abuse within the borders of their own state, and de-legitimised the argument 
that  international  society  should  intervene  militarily  to  protect  civilians  when 
extreme cases of atrocities (similar in scale and nature to in Darfur, for example) 
were being committed.  
In  parallel  to  this  particular  focus  on  juridical  sovereignty  and  the  non-
intervention  norm,  the  concept  of  ‘security’  has  traditionally  been  conceived  as 
                                                        
89 James Mayall, “Nationalism and International Security After the Cold War”, Survival 34, no. 1 
(1992): 19-35, 26. 
90 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility, 6. 
91 Griffiths, “Self-determination”, 33-35.    53 
pertaining to the protection of the state from direct military attack by other states. In 
this somewhat abstract sense, the state, or the sovereignty of the state, was the main 
referent for security, the primary object to be secured, and as such ‘international 
security’ has similarly been highly statist in orientation.
92 As the Commission on 
Global Governance argued, international society since the Peace of Westphalia has 
been: 
 
defined almost entirely in terms of national survival needs. Security 
has  meant  the  protection  of  the  state  —  its  boundaries,  people 
institutions, and values — from external attack. This concept is deeply 
embedded in international tradition. It is the reason the United Nations 
and  other  international  institutions  emphasised  the  inviolability  of 
territorial boundaries and the prohibition of external interference in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states.
93 
 
  While liberal internationalists may have sought to prevent war and secure 
states though collective security systems, such as the UN Charter, the emergence of 
the Cold War between the United States-led Western bloc and the Soviet Union-led 
Eastern  bloc  followed  (and  perpetuated)  realist  diagnoses  and  prescriptions  for 
international order. In both of these traditional IR theories the state has been central 
to the notion of security and of insecurity. In short, for realists, state sovereignty by 
definition excludes any higher form of control or authority over the state. Because of 
this,  states  are  said  to  exist  in  a  structure  of  anarchy,  where  the  absence  of  an 
overarching authority results in the constant potential for war between states. In this 
sense, states can only rely on, and help, themselves, and the best way to do this is to 
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obtain  relative  power  (primarily  military  power).
94  Security  is  thus  defined  as 
‘national security’, or the protection of the state from external military attack by 
other states.
95  
One important manifestation of this view is that states are reified to the point 
at which civilians are considered to be secure if their state is secure, or at least the 
security of citizens living within states was not considered to be distinct from the 
security of their state from external attack. During the Cold War, then, the realist 
emphasis on ‘national security’ combined with the focus upon juridical aspects of 
sovereignty and the non-intervention norm to further reify ‘the state’. In practice, of 
course, the Cold War led to a number of violations of the non-intervention norm 
through ideologically- and materially-inspired interventions and wars. However, it is 
crucial that during this period such interventions were justified on the basis of aiding 
local allies (under various guises) and as such it was claimed that they did not violate 
state sovereignty or the norm of non-intervention.  
Importantly, then, as a result of such traditional, state-centric conceptions and 
practices of security and sovereignty in international society, it was evident during 
the post-war/Cold War era that the Security Council’s role in protecting civilians: 
 
was strongly circumscribed not only by division within it but also by 
the narrowness of their definition of threats to international peace and 
security. Intrusion into the jurisdiction of states by the council was 
limited to a number of cases of decolonisation … anomalies arising 
from  the  mandate  and  trusteeship  system  …  and  apartheid.  None 
involved  the  use  of  force  to  promote  the  security  of  individuals  or 
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groups within the states in question. There was little consideration of 
protection of civilians in mandates of peacekeeping forces.
96 
 
Towards ‘responsible sovereignty’ and ‘human security’ 
 
  By  the  1990s,  however,  the  dominance  of  state-centric  theories  had  been 
challenged  by  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  by  the  arguments  for  more  critical 
approaches to the study and practice of international relations and security. Interstate 
war was no longer the exclusive focus for IR, as the end of rigid bipolar Cold War 
alliance  structures  collapsed  and  created  new  forms  of  conflict  while  the  rapid 
advancement  of  globalisation  brought  new  types  of  threats  and  opportunities  for 
cooperation.  Attention  turned  to  the  developing  world  where  state  failure  and 
repression became recognised as the primary causes of insecurity and human rights 
abuses.
97  Paul  Kennedy  describes  this  post-Cold  War  security  environment  as  a 
‘sheer explosion of civil wars, ethnic and religious violence, massive violations of 
human rights, breakdowns of authority, and humanitarian emergencies.’
98 Moreover, 
in characterising the shift in international security thinking after the Cold War and 
into  the  new  millennium,  the  UN  High-Level  Panel  on  Threats,  Challenges  and 
Change argued in 2004 that while the UN was initially designed to prevent major 
wars between aggressive states: 
 
Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats 
we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging 
aggressive  war.  They  extend  to  poverty,  infectious  disease  and 
environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread 
and  possible  use  of  nuclear,  radiological,  chemical  and  biological 
weapons; terrorism; and transnational organised crime. The threats are 
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from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well 
as State security.
99  
 
  As such, central to attempts to create international normative change was a 
re-conceptualisation  of  sovereignty  from  its  traditional,  state-centric  foundations. 
The recognition and defence of human rights over notions of state rights is crucial to 
this process, while one of the ‘key factors in making human rights acceptable to most 
governments  as  an  inherent  element  of  the  Council’s  outlook  was  the  gradual 
abandonment  —  over  a  decade  or  so  —  of  the  absolutist  approach  to  state 
sovereignty.’
100 Similarly, Thakur has observed that, in the post-Cold War era, the 
‘doctrine of national sovereignty in its absolute and unqualified form, which gave 
rulers  protection  against  attack  from  without  while  engaged  in  the  most  brutal 
repression within, has gone with the wind.’
101 This is inherently good, he claims, 
because sovereignty was originally developed as a means for providing security, but 
it is not an end in itself: ‘[i]f sovereignty becomes an obstacle to the realisation of 
freedom, then it can, should and must be discarded.’
102  
Particularly after Cold War, then, there has been a reassertion of the earlier 
democratic notion that sovereignty should be popular, that is, that the citizens of a 
state should hold sovereignty while governments only serve their people. This view 
is summarized in the report of the Commission on Global Governance, which argued 
that sovereignty ‘ultimately derives from the people. It is a power to be exercised by, 
for,  and  on  behalf  of  the  people  of  a  state.’
103  According  to  this  argument, 
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governments should not act contrary to the wishes of the majority of people living 
within  their  borders,  as  governments  do  not  hold  sovereignty  at  the  expense  of 
citizens.  An  important  aspect  of  this  idea  was  that  the  relationship  between 
governments  and  citizens  —  empirical  sovereignty  —  should  be  continually 
questioned rather than ignored, as the traditional emphasis on juridical sovereignty 
had the effect of doing. Governments not only had to have control over their people, 
territory  and  resources,  but  that  control  must  be  perceived  as  legitimate  and  not 
exploitative by the local population. It certainly should be questioned in cases where 
the government has claimed sovereignty for itself at the expense of its citizenry, 
often through employing violence, such as in Sudan. Indeed, clearly evident in the 
Sudanese  government’s  reaction  to  criticism  of  its  actions  in  Darfur,  repressive 
governments  often  attempt  to  reaffirm  their  sovereignty  in  the  face  of  mounting 
international scrutiny:  
 
Governments that are threatened by the erosion of narrow concepts of 
sovereignty and are defensively trying to reassert it use the argument 
of  cultural  relativity  and  characterise  the  universality  concept  as  a 
Western ploy to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Yet 
others invoke the need for unity as a national priority. Others simply 
assert national sovereignty as their shield.
104 
 
  As second strand of this argument is that sovereignty means not only control 
over territory, population and resources, but also responsibility for the lives of the 
people living within the borders of the state. According Francis Deng et al., the 
concept  and  practice  of  sovereignty  has  undergone  a  series  of  overlapping 
evolutions, culminating in the ‘contemporary pragmatic attempt at reconciling state 
sovereignty with responsibility.’
105 In this social-contract sense, governments rule on 
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behalf of the people and must do so in a responsible manner. Responsibility in this 
respect  would  mean  ensuring  the  livelihoods  and  security  of  citizens,  while  it  is 
antithetical to the notion of regimes abusing their citizens as a sovereign prerogative. 
In  the  face  of  emerging  arguments  for  external  intervention  to  protect  at-risk 
civilians,  then,  Deng  et  al.  argue  that  ‘[l]iving  up  to  the  responsibilities  of 
sovereignty becomes in effect the best guarantee for sovereignty.’
106  
  In  addition  to  this  critique  of  traditional  conceptions  and  practices  of 
sovereignty, the notion of security has also undergone a series of challenges and re-
conceptualisations  away  from  its  traditional  state-centric  and  military/defence 
emphases. In international fora, the redefinition of security emerged simultaneously 
to the new post-Cold War political environment. As a prominent example of this, in 
1992 while discussing the ‘responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance 
of international peace and security’ at the first Summit Meeting of the Council, heads 
of state and government agreed that: 
 
The  absence  of  war  and  military  conflicts  amongst  States  does  not 
itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources 
of  instability  in  the  economic,  social,  humanitarian  and  ecological 
fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations 
membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs 
to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.
107  
 
 In his direct response to the Summit deliberations, then Secretary-General 
Boutros  Boutros-Ghali  published  his  report  An  Agenda  for  Peace  in  June  1992, 
making reference to ‘new dimension[s] of insecurity’ brought about by changing 
geopolitical  circumstances  and  technological  change,  alongside  existing  crises  in 
poverty,  disease  famine,  oppression,  inequality  and  environmental  depletion. 
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Recognising the potential for a reconstituted post-Cold War normative environment, 
Boutros-Ghali argued that ‘at this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the 
[UN] to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military 
threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterised the 
past.’ As such, he asserted that each of the main organs of the UN, including the 
Security  Council,  had  a  ‘special  and  indispensable  role  to  play  in  an  integrated 
approach to human security.’
108 
Elaborating  on  this  theme,  the  UN  Development  Programme’s  Human 
Development  Report  1994:  New  Dimensions  of  Human  Security  argued  that  the 
‘concept  of  security  has  for  too  long  been  interpreted  narrowly:  as  security  of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign 
policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related 
more  to  nation-states  than  to  people.’
109  Because  of  this,  the  report  argued  that 
‘[f]orgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in 
their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolised protection from the threat of 
disease,  hunger,  unemployment,  crime,  social  conflict,  political  repression  and 
environmental  hazards.’
110  A  year  later,  in  1995,  the  Commission  on  Global 
Governance  explored  the  ‘changed  nature  of  global  security’  in  its  report,  Our 
Global  Neighbourhood.
111  Noting  the  traditional  state-centric  formulation  of  the 
concept and practice of security, the Commission argued that: 
 
in  many  countries  the  security  of  people  has  been  violated  on  a 
horrendous scale without any external aggression or external threat to 
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territorial  integrity  or  state  sovereignty.  To  confine  the  concept  of 
security exclusively to the protection of states is to ignore the interests 
of  people  who  form  the  citizens  of  a  state  and  in  whose  name 
sovereignty is exercised. It can produce situations in which regimes in 
power  feel  they  have  the  unfettered  freedom  to  abuse  the  right  to 
security of their people…
112 
 
The evolving more ‘critical’ approach to the concept and practice of security 
further developed this trend away from narrow traditional constructions of security, 
which reified the state and privileged national security at the expense of a deeper 
examination of the varying human experiences of insecurity.
113 The critical approach 
thus  sought  to  question  or  problematise  key  assumptions  that  were  often  left 
unchallenged, such as: Who or what is to be secured? Against what are they to be 
secured? And through what methods should security be provided? An important and 
central concept that emerged from this re-conceptualisation of security (after having 
been introduced by Boutros-Ghali), and one which also encompasses a critique of 
traditional practices of sovereignty, is that of ‘human security’. 
According  to  Paul  Evans,  human  security  is  ‘based  on  the  idea  that  the 
individual or community must be at least one of the referent points in answering the 
eternal question of security for whom, from what, and by what means.’
 114 For Evans, 
human security is based upon three fundamental assumptions: First, the individual or 
individual  in  a  group  or  community  is  either  one  of,  or  the,  referent  point  for 
security. Second, that insecurity can be caused to the individual or group from a 
variety of threats, including but not limited to external military aggression (which is 
usually not the greatest threat). And third, there is a potential ‘tension’ between the 
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security of the individual and the security of the nation, state or regime.
115 Evans 
argues that when positioned in this way, human security: 
 
raises  a  challenge  to  traditional  conceptions  of  national  security  by 
changing  the  referent  point  and  introducing  issues  and  means  that 
extend  beyond  conventional  security  strategies.  Philosophically,  it 
raises  fundamental  issues  related  to  conscience,  obligations  beyond 
borders,  development,  and  domestic  legitimacy.  Politically,  it  raises 
questions  about  sovereignty,  intervention,  the  role  of  regional  and 
global institutions, and the relationship between state and citizen.
116 
 
Similarly, Newman argues that human security ‘seeks to place the individual 
— or people collectively — as the referent for security, rather than although not 
necessarily in opposition to, institutions such as territory and state sovereignty.’
117 
Newman argues that the ‘emergence of the concept of human security — as a broad, 
multifaceted, and evolving conception of security — reflects the impact of values 
and norms in international relations.’
118 A human rather than traditional approach to 
security is needed because, inter alia, for many people around the world “a greater 
threat  may  come  from  their  own  state  itself,  rather  than  from  an  ‘external’ 
adversary.”
119  Indeed,  the  “fundamental  components  of  human  security  —  the 
security of people against threats to personal safety and life — can be put at risk by 
external  aggression,  but  also  by  factors  within  a  country,  including  ‘security’ 
forces.”
120 This is in no location truer than in Darfur. Newman suggests that while 
states remain the most effective providers of security, they are not inherently so, and 
for this reason, we should not privilege the state over people.
121  
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  For the Human Security Centre, human security evolved from a concern with 
the relationship between the security of states or regimes and the security of citizens 
living within the borders of states. Because it observes that the security of regimes 
and the security of citizens are not always in harmony, the primary goal of human 
security should be the ‘protection of civilians’.
122 For Heinze, because (particularly 
developing) ‘states themselves are now increasingly becoming the major security 
threat to people’, and because today the ‘most deadly security threats to people come 
from within states, not from the military threats posed by rival states,’ the ‘movement 
of the referent object of security from states to individuals is not only justified on 
empirical grounds but is also desirable as a normative project that seeks to advance 
human values and needs.’
123 In addition, citing the changing nature of international 
relations and conflict after the Cold War, McDonald argues that human security: 
 
has been viewed as a potential response to the growing insecurity of 
security:  a  situation  wherein  the  continued  prioritisation  of  military 
concerns at the state level in traditional discourses and practices of 
security  has  served  to  further  individual  insecurity  and  failed  to 
respond  adequately  to  the  most  pressing  threats  to  individuals 
throughout the world.
124  
 
McDonald claims that human security ‘can be seen to be central to questions 
of  humanitarianism  in  the  international  system,  providing  a  conceptualisation  of 
security which allows for issues such as humanitarian intervention, human rights, 
refugee movements, structural economic inequality, and environmental change to be 
included in a new security rubric.’
125 He concludes that all proponents of human 
                                                        
122 Human Security Centre, “Human Security Report 2005”, VIII. 
123 Eric A. Heinze, “Maximizing Human Security: A Utilitarian Argument for Humanitarian 
Intervention”, Journal of Human Rights, 5, no. 3 (2006): 283-302, 285. Emphasis in original. 
124 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security”, Global Society 16, no. 3 
(2002): 277-295, 277. 
125 McDonald, “Human Security”, 278.   63 
security ‘recognise the importance of orienting security away from the traditional 
and exclusive concern with armed conflict; thus all constitute an inherent critique of 
traditional, Realist conceptions and practices of security.’
 126 
More  recently,  reflecting  the  deepening  critique  of  traditional  security 
practices,  the  Commission  on  Human  Security  argued  in  its  2003  report  Human 
Security Now that while ‘the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security…it 
often fails to fulfill its security obligations — and at times has even become a source 
of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of 
the state to the security of the people — to human security.’
127 Furthermore, the 
Commission argued that human security: 
 
complements  state  security,  enhances  human  rights  and  strengthens 
human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of 
threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them 
to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to forge a global alliance to 
strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state—
and the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together 
the human elements of security, of rights, of development.
128 
 
 
  While such arguments provide an important and persuasive conceptual and 
political critique, what impact have they had on the practice of policymakers and 
governments? For Thakur, the challenge provided to traditional practices of security 
by critical approaches ‘has profound consequences for how we see the world, how 
we organise our political affairs, how we make choices in public and foreign policy, 
and  how  we  relate  to  fellow  human  beings  from  many  different  countries  and 
civilisations.
129  For  Paul  Heinbecker,  human  security  ‘is  becoming  a  new  central 
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organising principle of international relations.’
130 Indeed, the ICISS argued that the 
‘growing recognition worldwide that concepts of security must include people as 
well as states has marked an important shift in international thinking during the past 
decade.’
131  
  Speaking  of  the  East  Asian  region  in  particular,  although  it  could  more 
broadly  be  applied  across  the  developing  world,  Evans  argues  that,  as  of  2004, 
certain states as well as regional intergovernmental organisations ‘remain hesitant to 
embrace human security, but the concept is affecting state practice and playing a 
catalytic role in changing the normative framework related to state obligations and 
the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-interference.’
132  According  to  Oberleitner, 
human  security  ‘has  become  a  catchphrase  in  the  global  debate  on  the  changing 
meaning of security. Over a period of ten years, the concept of human security has 
begun visibly to influence, change, and challenge global politics, institutions and 
governance.’
133  Indeed,  as  a  concrete  and  highly  relevant  example,  the  Canadian 
government has argued that ‘when conditions warrant, vigorous action in defence of 
human security objectives will be necessary. Ensuring human security can involve 
the use of coercive measures, including sanctions and military force, as in Bosnia 
and Kosovo.’
 134 Linking the concept of human security with such coercive measures 
to  provide  it,  for  the  Security  Council,  ‘[t]aking  the  human  security  approach 
seriously will thus inevitably have an impact on the ongoing discussion to establish 
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principles  for  humanitarian  interventions.  Humanitarian  intervention  has  already 
been described as the most extreme form of promoting human security’.
135 
 
Towards ‘humanitarian’ intervention and the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
 
  One of most important results of the normative evolution in sovereignty and 
security  has  been  to  challenge  the  assumptions  upon  which  the  practice  of  non-
intervention has traditionally rested. In particular, this has come from supporters of 
the concept of ‘humanitarian’ intervention, which is the ‘threat or use of force across 
state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread 
and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its 
own  citizens,  without  the  permission  of  the  state  within  whose  territory  force  is 
applied.’
136 According to DiPrizio, ‘[f]or an action to be considered an intervention, 
coercion  must  be  involved;  that  is,  the  use  or  threatened  use  of  force  must 
accompany  an  action.’
137  He  suggests  that  ‘an  intervention  that  either  is  driven 
largely by humanitarian concerns or consciously promotes humanitarian outcomes 
can be described as a humanitarian intervention.’
138  
  Discussing the context out of which humanitarian intervention has emerged, 
Thakur has argued that the “terrain on which the conceptual and policy contest over 
‘humanitarian  intervention’  has  been  fought  is  essentially  normative.  It  takes  the 
form  of  norm  displacement,  from  the  established  norm  of  non-intervention  to  a 
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claimed emerging new norm of ‘humanitarian intervention’”.
139 Similarly, the ICISS 
argued that the debate during the 1990s on humanitarian intervention ‘takes place in 
a historical, political and legal context of evolving international standards of conduct 
for states and individuals, including the development of new and stronger norms and 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights.’
140  
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink provide a useful constructivist model 
to  explain  how  normative  contestation  and  development  occurs  in  international 
society,  which  can  be  applied  to  the  practice  of  humanitarian  intervention.
141 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that there is a three-stage ‘life cycle’ that potential 
norms  undergo  if  they  are  to  become  accepted  as  standards  of  behaviour  for 
particular actors within a society. The first stage is ‘norm emergence’, in which norm 
‘entrepreneurs’  (such  as  human  rights  activists)  advocate  a  particular  action 
(humanitarian intervention) and seek to recruit supporters to their cause. To get to the 
second stage, ‘norm cascade’, support for that particular action must reach a ‘tipping 
point’, at which enough critical actors (in this case governments) support it for it to 
rapidly advance among other potential supporters. If this is successful (which is an 
empirical question), that particular action will become a new norm, and at its greatest 
extent may become internalised by relevant actors. At this final stage, internalisation, 
the action may become so ‘normal’ as to not be fundamentally questioned — that is, 
until a new norm, beginning at stage one, is promoted to challenge it. 
Indeed, as Nicholas Wheeler has argued convincingly, while during the Cold 
War  intervention  for  human  protection  purposes  was  generally  rejected  by 
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international society as an illegitimate challenge to the norm of non-intervention, ‘a 
new norm of Security Council-authorised humanitarian intervention has developed at 
the beginning of the new century’.
142 Similarly, Finnemore elsewhere contends that a 
lack of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War ‘suggests that sovereignty and 
self-determination  norms  trumped  humanitarian  claims  …  a  relationship  that  no 
longer holds with consistency.’
143 She argues that after the Cold War ‘states have 
increasingly come under pressure to intervene militarily and, in fact, have intervened 
militarily to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian disasters.’
  144  
For example, the international responses to the various political and humanitarian 
crises in the Balkans and Africa during the 1990s ‘illustrate the growing resolve of 
the  international  community  to  override  sovereignty  in  support  of  international 
human rights and humanitarian intervention.’
145  
   Yet,  the  morality,  utility,  legitimacy  and  desirability  of  humanitarian 
interventions  inside  sovereign  states  have  been  highly  contentious  issues  in 
international debate. Pluralists, such as Robert Jackson,
146 have questioned whether 
the  suspension  of  sovereign  rights  in  certain  cases  would  lead  to  a  complete 
breakdown  of  fragile  and  hard-won  international  order.  The  arguments  of  other 
critics, such as Mohamed Ayoob and Mahmood Mamdani, reflect an influential view 
in  the  developing  world  that  the  motives  of  intervening  powers  were  more  self-
interested and neo-colonial than humanitarian.
147 In addition, according to the UN 
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High-level Panel, the UNSC itself ‘so far has been neither very consistent nor very 
effective in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not 
at all.’
148  
NATO’s  intervention  in  Kosovo  in  1999  without  prior  Security  Council 
authorisation brought the issue to a head. This crisis in the international political and 
legal  framework  led  then  UN  Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan  to  call  upon  the 
international  community  to  find  a  conceptual  and  practical  solution  to  the 
sovereignty-intervention  dilemma.  In  front  of  the  1999  UN  General  Assembly 
plenary debate, Annan starkly posed the question: ‘if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, 
to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect 
every precept of our humanity?’
149 
  The Canadian government responded most proactively to Annan’s challenge 
by establishing the aforementioned International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. The ICISS was co-chaired by former Australian 
Foreign  Minister  Gareth  Evans  and  former  Algerian  diplomat  and  UN  official 
Mohamed Sahnoun, along with ten other world notables, and delivered its report 
entitled  The  Responsibility  to  Protect  in  late  2001  after  a  series  of  global 
consultations with various sectors of international society.
150 By its own admission, 
the ICISS aimed to take the messy, contentious and somewhat deadlocked debate 
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over humanitarian intervention that had characterised the 1990s and make both a 
clear moral case for the need of international intervention in extreme cases of civilian 
abuse  as  well  as  to  set  out  a  number  of  criteria  that  would  ensure  that  such 
interventions  were  accountable,  would  gain  broad  legitimacy,  and  would  be 
operationally sound. Importantly, the ICISS also sought to transform the intervention 
discourse from the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention to language imbued 
with the concept of ‘responsibility’, which it argued would be much less contentious 
and would focus attention away from the prerogatives of the intervenors and towards 
the victims of abuses.
151  
  Building on the notion of responsible sovereignty developed by Deng et al., 
the ICISS drew upon a number of other sources for its basic principles: First, it drew 
upon ‘obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty’ Second, and as discussed 
above,  it  drew  upon  the  responsibility  of  the  UNSC  for  the  maintenance  of 
international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter. Third, it drew 
upon  ‘specific  legal  obligations  under  human  rights  and  human  protection 
declarations,  covenants  and  treaties,  international  humanitarian  law  and  national 
law.’  And  finally,  it  drew  upon  the  ‘developing  practice’  of  states,  regional 
organizations  as  well  as  the  Security  Council  itself,
152  such  as  those  actions 
undertaken  during  the  1990s  in  response  to  various  human  security  crises  in  the 
Balkans,  Africa,  and  elsewhere.  From  such  foundations  in  international  law  and 
custom, the ICISS advanced the following basic principles upon which the debate on 
intervention should rest: 
 
A.  State  sovereignty  implies  responsibility,  and  the  primary 
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.  
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B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.
153 
 
  There  are  a  number  of  important  elements  inherent  in  such  a  re-
conceptualisation  of  sovereignty.  First,  sovereignty  becomes  conditional  on 
upholding minimal levels of human security. In this sense, the emphasis is upon 
empirical/popular sovereignty or the relationship between governments and citizens 
within  a  state.  Second,  the  non-intervention  principle  is  still  the  general  norm 
underpinning international order. It is only suspended in extreme exceptions of gross 
violations of human security. Third, states retain their sovereign rights until proven 
guilty. Part A of the ICISS basic principles, and the fact that it is part A and not B, 
clearly gives states the primary responsibility, or first opportunity, to protect their 
own citizens. If they do so — and do not abuse their citizens — then they should not 
be the subjects of any legitimate intervention.  
  Finally, the formulation gives the international community, acting primarily 
through the Security Council, the authority to provide secondary or ‘backup’ security 
for vulnerable civilians if their own government fails to do so. This gives further 
weight to the UNSC’s expanded role after the Cold War, and goes some way to 
clarifying the Council’s contested mandate under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter to 
intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states if it finds a threat to peace and 
security (see below). According to this proposal, then, the Council does have a clear 
mandate to authorise such interventions. MacFarlane and Khong argue that the ICISS 
formulation  ‘sought  not  to  diminish  sovereignty  as  a  constitutive  principle  of 
international relations but to reconcile that principle with the solidarist imperative of 
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protecting human beings at risk in conflict.’
154 Similarly, Thomas Weiss argues that 
state sovereignty, under the ICISS model, ‘is not challenged but reinforced’: 
 
However, if a state is unwilling or unable to protect the rights of its 
own  citizens,  it  temporarily  forfeits  a  moral  claim  to  be  treated  as 
legitimate. Its sovereignty, as well as its right to non-intervention, are 
suspended, and a residual responsibility necessitates vigorous action by 
outsiders to protect populations at risk. In brief, the three traditional 
characteristics  of  a  state  in  the  Westphalian  system  —  territory, 
authority, and population — are supplemented by a fourth: respect for 
human rights.
155 
 
  Applied  to  the  Darfur  crisis,  the  ICISS  logic  would  entail,  first,  that  the 
government of Sudan is a sovereign entity. Recognition of Sudanese sovereignty by 
international  society  is  contingent  upon  the  government  accepting  and  practicing 
certain  responsibilities.  In  particular,  the  Sudanese  government  has  the  primary 
responsibility for protecting its civilians, whether in Khartoum, Juba, or El Fasher. 
As long as the government upholds this responsibility then it continues to be treated 
as an independent sovereign entity, with full rights of non-intervention. Any attempts 
to intervene in Sudan are considered to be illegitimate and illegal under international 
law. However, since 2003 the government of Sudan has been unwilling to protect its 
citizens  living  in  the  Darfur  region,  and  has  indeed  been  actively  engaged  in 
undermining  the  security  of  Darfurians  through  direct  military  attacks  and 
sponsorship  of  murderous  militias.  Because  of  the  Sudanese  government’s 
‘irresponsible’  actions,  its  rights  to  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  should  be 
suspended by the Council and Sudan could become the legitimate target of military 
intervention  (after  other  less-coercive  measures  proved  inadequate).  Through 
military  intervention  the  Council  would  assume  the  secondary  or  backup 
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responsibility  for  protecting  vulnerable  civilians  in  Darfur.
156  Despite  this  logic, 
however,  this  thesis  makes  clear  that  the  Council  did  not  assume  this  secondary 
responsibility as it did not coercively intervene in Sudan. 
  At the operational level, the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine involves three 
phases of action, from preventing a conflict or crisis, reacting to its outbreak, and 
then rebuilding the society after conflict has receded. Prevention is argued to be the 
most  important  of  the  phases,  but  the  reaction  phase  is  potentially  the  most 
controversial because it involves the possible use of external military force. Focusing 
on the reaction or intervention stage, which is the most relevant to the analysis in this 
thesis,  the  ICISS  put  forward  a  number  of  strict  criteria  that  should  be  met  if 
potential military intervention it to be accountable, gain broad legitimacy, and be 
operationally viable. These are, first, the ‘Just Cause Threshold’, in which large-scale 
loss  of  life  or  large-scale  ethnic  cleansing  has  occurred,  or  is  likely  to  occur, 
including through genocides and other deliberate acts, or through state failure and 
anarchy.  Second,  the  ‘Precautionary  Principles’,  including:  right  intention  (the 
primary purpose of intervention must be to protect vulnerable civilians); last resort 
(every non-military option must have been explored, and reasonably considered to be 
inadequate); proportional means (scale, duration, and intensity of intervention must 
be minimum necessary to secure defined humanitarian objective); and reasonable 
prospects (the intervention must have reasonable chance of success, and must not 
cause more harm than good).
157  
  The third criterion is ‘Right Authority’: according to the proposal, the UNSC 
is the best body to authorise interventions and should always be consulted prior to 
                                                        
156 The argument that Darfur represented a quintessential case for the Council to fulfil its posited 
‘responsibility to protect’ is elaborated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
157 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, XII.   73 
actions, but it needs to work better. In this sense, the Council should act promptly in 
investigating crises and establishing any need for intervention, while, importantly, 
the veto should not be used in humanitarian cases. Furthermore, if the Council fails 
to act, the General Assembly should take up the issue under a ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
resolution,  or  a  regional  organisation  should  take  up  responsibility  after  gaining 
Council authorisation. Importantly, the ICISS warned the Council that its failure to 
act in the face of atrocities could affect its credibility and will lead actors to operate 
outside of its structures (although this did not happen in Darfur). The fourth criterion 
is  ‘Operational  Principles’:  there  must  be  clear  objectives  with  a  clear  and 
unambiguous  mandate,  and  any  intervention  should  be  properly  resourced.  A 
common military approach with unity of command, clear communications and chain 
of command is essential. Further, acceptance of limitations, and an incremental and 
gradual application of force is recommended, while the Rules of Engagement must 
fit the concept of operations, are precise, are proportional, and adhere to international 
humanitarian law. Troop contributors must accept that force protection cannot be the 
principle objective, and finally, there must be maximum possible coordination with 
humanitarian organisations.
158 
  Therefore,  the  reaction  phase  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  doctrine 
provides a comprehensive framework to guide potential humanitarian interventions 
in cases of extreme abuse of civilians within the borders of a nominally sovereign 
state. The ICISS report was the most rigorous and widely consultative attempt to 
reconceptualise  and  formulate  principles  to  tackle  the  sovereignty-intervention 
problem. But how was it received by UN Member States? Is there evidence that 
suggests  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  will  continue  the  post-Cold  War  trend  of 
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recasting  state-centric  practices  of  sovereignty  and  security?  Returning  the 
Finnemore  and  Sikkink’s  ‘norm  life-cycle’  model,  is  there  evidence  that  the 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine has reached the cascade phase of development to 
emerge  as  a  new  international  norm? Or  has  the  doctrine  been  unable  to  escape 
earlier  arguments  about  the  inherent  dangers  of  humanitarian  intervention  for 
international order, or about the dubious motives of potential intervening powers, or 
the self-interested politics of the Security Council?
159  
  One immediate problem, discussed further in Chapter 4, was that the ICISS 
report  was  delivered  only  shortly  after  the  extraordinary  terrorist  attacks  on  the 
United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11). As a result, the principal moral claim 
put  forward  by  the  ICISS  —  that  states  in  international  society  should  take 
responsibility for the security of vulnerable or victimised individuals living in other 
states — was relegated by a return in the West to more traditional concerns with 
national security and the protection of state borders from external attack, concerns 
which  non-Western  societies  were  more  reluctant  to  recast  in  the  first  place.
160 
Reflecting  the  post-9/11  fears  of  advocates  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’, 
MacFarlane and Khong argue: 
 
That further progress on the responsibility to protect remains stalled is 
a  product  in  part  of  historical  circumstance,  notably  the  attacks  of 
September 11, 2001, on the United States. It also reflects profound 
continuing  resistance  among  states  to  the  attenuation  of  sovereign 
rights. This should not be taken as evidence of failure. Changing ideas 
is a long a long and complex process.
161 
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  Despite such concerns for the political salience of the responsibility to protect 
concept  in  a  new  century  dominated  initially  by  Western-led  counter-terrorism 
operations and the perceived threats of weapons of mass destruction, in addition to 
the vigorous defence of hard-won sovereign rights in the developing world, it came 
as a surprise to many analysts that the ‘responsibility to protect’ began to build a 
solid coalition of supporters — both non-governmental, and, crucially, governmental 
— over a period of five years after the ICISS report was released.
162 In 2004, the 
influential UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change ‘endorse[d] the 
emerging  norm  that  there  is  a  collective  international  responsibility  to  protect, 
exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, 
in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations  of  international  humanitarian  law  which  sovereign  Governments  have 
proved  powerless  or  unwilling  to  prevent.’
163  Furthermore,  in  his  comprehensive 
March 2005 blueprint for UN reform, Annan stated that he ‘strongly agree[d]’ with 
the  ICISS  approach  to  the  sovereignty-intervention  question  that  he  had  initially 
posed years earlier, arguing: ‘I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to 
protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it.’
164  
Most significantly and seemingly remarkable given the contentious nature of 
the humanitarian intervention issue, member states at the 2005 UN World Summit 
unanimously endorsed the responsibility to protect doctrine, albeit in a form modified 
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from the initial proposals of the ICISS in 2001.
165 As such, the Summit Outcome 
Document contained the following unprecedented agreement: 
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from  genocide,  war  crimes,  ethnic  cleansing  and  crimes  against 
humanity.  This  responsibility  entails  the  prevention  of  such  crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it … The 
international  community,  through  the  United  Nations,  also  has  the 
responsibility  to  use  appropriate  diplomatic,  humanitarian  and  other 
peaceful  means,  in  accordance  with  Chapters  VI  and  VIII  of  the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing  and  crimes  against  humanity.  In  this  context,  we  are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through  the  Security  Council,  in  accordance  with  the  Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations…
166 
 
  Through this landmark endorsement, the General Assembly had accepted the 
notion,  in-principle  at  least,  that  states  have  the  responsibility  to  protect  their 
citizens, and moreover that the Security Council had the authority and responsibility 
to intervene militarily inside the borders of an ‘irresponsible’ sovereign state if any 
of the listed types of atrocities were found to have been committed. According to one 
analyst, while little else of substance was achieved, the ‘recognition by world leaders 
… of an international collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity was one of the significant 
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achievements of the World Summit.’
167 Indeed, the adoption by consensus of the key 
responsibility to protect principles is even more remarkable given that the Summit 
was for the most part sharply divided — particularly on the issue of Security Council 
reform — along global north-south lines.
168 According to Zifcak, this general lack of 
agreement between developed and developing blocs leading up to and at the Summit 
‘related  not  just  to  the  substance  of  changes  being  considered  but  also  to  much 
deeper cleavages of opinion between these protagonists as to the broader direction 
and affiliation of the world body itself.’
169  
While James Traub’s insider’s account of pre-Summit negotiations reveals 
that consensus on the responsibility to protect was not easily achieved and involved a 
degree of political-trade-offs with less than supportive states,
170 the fact that there 
was eventual consensus illustrates the potential of the responsibility to protect as an 
emerging  international  norm,  and  perhaps  provides  evidence  of  it  ‘cascading’ 
through international society. Reflecting on this apparent acceptance, in-principle at 
least, as well as lamenting the apparent lack of priority generally afforded to the 
prevention  of  genocide  and  crimes  against  humanity  on  the  crowded  agendas  of 
world leaders, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans argued in 2006 that: 
 
The  good  news  is  that  the  international  community,  after  years  of 
wrangling, has more or less agreed on basic principles. We have seen 
over the last five years the emergence of a new international norm — 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ — of really quite fundamental ethical 
importance and novelty in the international system, and which may 
ultimately become a new rule of customary international law … This 
formal embrace by the international community of the new concept of 
‘the  responsibility  to  protect’  —  moving  away  from  the  incredibly 
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divisive contest between those for and against a ‘right of humanitarian 
intervention’ — has been a major breakthrough…
171 
 
  Moreover, further codifying this apparently nascent international norm,
172 the 
Security Council itself unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 in April 2006 (on the 
protection  of  civilians  in  armed  conflict),  which  reaffirmed  the  World  Summit 
endorsement of the responsibility to protect and thus unambiguously adopted it as a 
basis for potential UNSC action in future instances of atrocities internal to a state.
173 
Reflecting its changing role and self-expanded mandate in the post-Cold War era, the 
Council’s  endorsement  of  new  understandings  of  sovereignty  and  security  is 
potentially crucial, not least because it could now be reasonable to expect that the 
Council, when faced with cases such as those described above (including Darfur), 
would authorise an effective and adequate international response — including, if 
necessary,  coercive  military  intervention  —  in  order  to  assume  its  stated 
responsibility  to  protect  vulnerable  civilians.  However,  despite  this  emerging 
normative  context  prescribing  humanitarian  intervention  in  extreme  cases,  the 
investigation  this  thesis  suggests  instead  that  the  national  interests  and  political 
calculations  of  the  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  continue  to 
determine whether or not the body intervenes in such circumstances. 
 
The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
  The Security Council’s formal endorsement of the responsibility to protect 
concept is a significant example of how the Council has contributed to international 
normative change. But has the Council played a more general role in transforming 
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international  politics  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  from  a  state-  to  human-centric 
conception  of  sovereignty  and  security?  For  MacFarlane  and  Khong,  the  UN 
organisation as a whole has ‘served as a forum where changing understandings of 
security could be articulated by states and, with the passage of time, by non-state 
actors  as  well.  The  evolving  discussion  of  human  rights  in  the  UN  system,  for 
example, was significant in the questioning of the primacy of the state. The Security 
Council  played  an  increasingly  important  role  in  this  regard  in  the  1990s.’
174 
Similarly, as Malone argues, ‘[m]uch has changed’ for the Council since the end of 
the Cold War: 
 
Its decisions — largely improvised and inconsistent though they may 
be  —  have,  for  good  and  ill,  profoundly  affected  international 
relations.  Among  other  things,  the  Council’s  decisions  have  eroded 
conceptions  of  state  sovereignty  firmly  held  during  the  Cold  War 
years,  altering  the  way  in  which  many  of  us  see  the  relationship 
between state and citizen the world over.
175 
 
  This was made possible in large part by the increased cooperation between 
former Cold War adversaries in the Council, most importantly within the P5 itself. 
Malone  argues  that  such  détente  in  the  Council  was  visible  from  1986  and  was 
greatly  enhanced  (although  somewhat  exaggerated)  by  the  successful  Council 
cooperation  to  eject  Saddam  Hussein  from  Kuwait  in  1990-91.
176  According  to 
Malone, this emerging period of greater P5 cooperation saw a reduction of the use of 
the  veto  as  well  as  a  more  general  assumption  of  control  of  the  Council  by  the 
permanent members (particularly by the United States) at the expense of the elected 
ones.  According  another  analysis,  the  Council’s  voting  record  (in  terms  of  total 
resolutions passed, Chapter VII resolutions, and vetoes) demonstrates that a ‘new’ 
                                                        
174 MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security, 9. 
175 David M. Malone, “Introduction”, In The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21
st 
Century, ed. D. Malone, 1-15 (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 1. 
176 Malone, “Introduction”, 4.   80 
Council has emerged after the Cold War stalemate which is ‘more cooperative, it is 
making serious decisions, and it is more deeply involved in the issues on its agenda. 
This has enhanced the standing of the Security Council, reinventing it as the key 
organ of the UN on issues of peace and security.’
177 Moreover, after the Cold War: 
 
For perhaps the first time since the UN was established, there is now a 
genuine prospect of the Security Council fulfilling the role envisioned 
for it in the UN Charter. Despite some notable setbacks, the capacity 
for  common  action  by  the  Security  Council  was  shown  during  the 
1990s to be real, with the authorization by the Council of nearly 40 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations over the last decade.
178  
 
  Indeed, since the end of the Cold War the Council ‘proved highly innovative 
in shaping norms and stimulated legal developments … And the most severe and 
intense kind of intervention, the use of deadly force by outside militaries, constituted 
a most notable story of the 1990s.’
179 On changing norms of sovereignty and security, 
MacFarlane  and  Khong  argue  that,  after  the  Cold  War  there  appeared  to  be  a 
‘substantial  shift’  in  the  Council’s  view  of  security  towards  the  human  security 
approach. They claim while it is not unusual that non-state actors have sought to 
push for such changes because ‘their position [is] not at stake’, it is significant that 
for a ‘body composed of states and dominated by the great powers to take this route, 
however hesitantly, suggests that many states themselves perceived a need to qualify 
sovereignty in matters of human security.’
180 Similarly, Malone argues that: 
 
The ebb and flow of Council business has tended to obscure the extent 
to which its decisions cumulatively since 1990 have undermined rigid 
conceptions  of  state  sovereignty  and  eroded  the  position  of 
governments  claiming  the  sovereign  right  to  conduct  themselves  at 
home  free  of  international  interference,  even  on  matters  that  could 
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undermine  domestic  security  and  the  stability  not  only  of  the  own 
countries  but  eventually  of  neighboring  ones  (for  example,  by 
massively abusing human rights or engaging in ethnic engineering or 
cleansing).
181 
 
  On this central issue of interference and intervention into sovereign states, it 
is  of  fundamental  significance  that  the  Council  has  made  a  self-expanded 
interpretation of its mandate under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. According to 
Matheson, in the post-Cold War era ‘the basis for international intervention under 
Chapter VII was vastly expanded, not only to encompass all sorts of ongoing internal 
armed  conflicts,  but  also  to  deal  with  internal  problems  that  could  lead  to  such 
conflicts in the future, such as humanitarian disasters, internal repression, and threats 
to democracy.’
182 Reflecting on the dynamics at play between Council decisions and 
broader normative changes in international society, Matheson contends that it is:  
 
not  surprising  that  this  question  of  the  legitimate  scope  of  the 
Council’s jurisdiction under Chapter VII, and in particular the extent of 
its right to treat an internal situation as a threat to the peace, has been 
an important element in defining the relationship between international 
and national authority in the post-Cold War period. This development 
has occurred at the same time that the international community has 
begun to take a much more restrictive view of the scope of matters that 
are reserved to the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of states, as is evidenced by 
the very considerable increase in UN human rights activities aimed at 
scrutinizing and reforming the treatment by governments of their own 
nationals.
183 
 
  MacFarlane and Khong cite the Council’s (inconsistent) responses to crises in 
northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda as examples of how the Council has 
broadened its definition of ‘threats to international peace and security’, generally 
sought  to  find  ways  of  protecting  civilians  in  situations  of  armed  conflict,  and 
attempted to implement mechanisms for bringing perpetrators of such violence to 
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justice. They conclude that the 1990s ‘show reasonably clear movement towards 
privileging  the  individual  and  his  or  her  security  over  that  of  the  state  and  its 
security.’
184 The ICISS commissioners made similar observations. Noting that the 
term  ‘international’  has  traditionally  been  understood  to  mean  ‘cross-border’,  it 
became evident that the Council during the 1990s had started to deal with conflicts 
and other security issues that were primarily contained within the borders of a single 
state. They argue that while the Council’s authority to intervene in domestic conflicts 
was ‘interpreted narrowly’ during the Cold War, in the 1990s the Council had ‘taken 
a very expansive view as to what constitutes ‘international peace and security’ for 
this purpose’, and the result was that ‘in practice an authorization by the Security 
Council has almost invariably been universally accepted as conferring international 
legality on an action.’
185  
  Therefore, it is arguable that the Council has expanded its own mandate to 
cover certain ‘domestic issues’ and this had been accepted in international society as 
a  legitimate  function  of  the  Council’s  authority.  Such  acceptance  is  problematic, 
however,  because  ‘there  is  no  provision  for  judicial  review  of  Security  Council 
decisions, and therefore no way that a dispute over Charter interpretation can be 
resolved [and thus it] appears that the Council will continue to have considerable 
latitude to define the scope of what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.’
186  
Returning to the central tension between norms, interests and intervention, 
Nasu argues that such evolution of international norms and the Council’s mandate 
have ‘arguably been fostering legitimate expectations that the Security Council will 
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take necessary action when it is expected to do so, and that it would be otherwise 
failing  to  discharge  its  responsibility.’
187  Yet  despite  this,  the  Council  has  only 
selectively used its mandate to authorise robust interventions under Chapter VII.
 For 
example, the Council ‘lost its impetus for vigorous Chapter VII action in Somalia 
after U.S. forces suffered significant casualties in Mogadishu. It intervened too late 
in  Rwanda,  and  was  painfully  slow  in  using  its  Chapter  VII  authority  in  Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, the Congo, Burundi, and Sudan.’
188 For Voeten, this post-Cold War 
‘spurt in activity does not simply reflect a newfound harmony in the preferences of 
the five veto powers.’ He notes that China and Russia often abstained from Council 
votes and ‘accompanied their abstentions with statements of discontent’, such that 
finding agreement often involved ‘difficult compromises that had a noticeable impact 
on the implementation of operations.’
189  
  An analysis of the Council’s response to the Darfur crisis between 2003-06 
indeed  reveals  that  the  body  was  at  once  both  more  open  to  cooperation  and 
humanitarian claims, but also remained hostage to the national interests and political 
calculations of the P5. As Matheson concludes, ‘[n]o source of legal authority is 
effective when there is no political will to use it, but the Council’s actions in Africa 
during the past decade show the scope of jurisdiction that the Council has available 
to it when that political will exists.’
190  
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Conclusion 
 
  This chapter has established that the UN Security Council is the preeminent 
body mandated under international law to maintain international peace and security, 
which it can pursue through a variety of means ranging from mediation, to sanctions, 
to  ultimately  authorising  coercive  military  force.  If  passed  under  Chapter  VII, 
Council resolutions are mandatory for all UN members. Most significantly for this 
thesis, Article 2(7) of the Charter authorises the Council to override the general norm 
of non-intervention if it finds a threat to international peace and security, a definition 
of which the Council has self-expanded after the Cold War to more clearly enable it 
to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state for human protection purposes. 
Yet, despite the extensive legal-institutional capacities of the Council, its resolutions 
are in large-part determined by the national interests of its privileged Permanent Five 
members, which can explain the extent or even existence of particular interventions. 
  Furthermore,  the  chapter  has  discussed  how  norms  of  sovereignty  and 
security have evolved in important ways, most notably after the end of the Cold War. 
In  particular,  proponents  of  ‘responsible  sovereignty’  and  ‘human  security’  have 
sought to recast the relationship between citizens, governments, and international 
society, arguing that individuals should be privileged over abstract entities such as 
the state, or over self-interested elites. As a result, the idea of Council-authorised 
humanitarian intervention into sovereign states has gained widespread in-principle 
acceptance in international society in extreme cases of civilian abuse, evidenced by 
the response to the various humanitarian and security crises during the 1990s and 
early  twenty-first  century.  UN  member  states  and  the  Council  itself  formally 
endorsed this idea — in the form of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine — in 
September  2005  and  April  2006  respectively,  giving  it  the  arguable  status  of  an   85 
(emerging)  international  norm  prescribing  intervention  when  certain  criteria  have 
been met. 
  It is against these compelling legal-institutional and normative contexts that 
the  examination  and  explanation  of  the  Council’s  response  to  the  Darfur  crisis 
between 2003-06 is set, based upon the argument, elaborated in Chapter 2 below, 
that  Darfur  presented  a  quintessential  case  for  the  Council  to  fulfil  its  posited 
‘responsibility to protect’ by coercively deploying a military intervention in Sudan to 
protect  the  vulnerable  civilian  population.  The  task  of  Part  II  of  the  thesis  is  to 
explain why the Council, with all of its evident legal-institutional and normative 
authority to act, did not deploy such an intervention in Sudan.   86 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Crisis in Darfur and the Case for UN Military Intervention 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  The previous chapter argued that, in a generic sense, there has emerged in the 
post-Cold War era a compelling legal-institutional and normative case for Council-
authorised  ‘humanitarian  interventions’  to  protect  civilian  populations  which  are 
vulnerable to, or victims of, atrocities within their own state. Against this context, 
Chapter 2 here argues that, in a specific sense, the nature and scale of the conflict and 
crimes committed in Darfur between 2003-06 indeed clearly met both the ‘just cause 
threshold’ identified by the ICISS and constituted the types of atrocities identified by 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council itself to justify and prescribe the 
coercive deployment by the Council of a military intervention in Darfur. Moreover, 
compelling evidence presented by a number of authoritative sources revealing the 
Sudanese  government’s  role  in  orchestrating  and  directly  participating  in  attacks 
against the civilian population of Darfur meant that it would be morally unacceptable 
and politically cynical for the Council to allow Khartoum to remain in control of 
security in the country’s western region. As such, in the face of claims of ‘sovereign 
immunity’ by the Sudanese government, there was a persuasive moral case for the 
Council  to  fulfil  its  own  responsibility  to  protect  the  population  of  Darfur  by 
coercively deploying a military intervention inside Sudan. 
  To make this case, the chapter is divided into three parts. For the important 
purpose of historical context, the first part briefly outlines Darfur’s relationship to 
the development of the modern Sudanese state. As such, it focuses upon how Darfur   87 
— forcibly annexed to colonial Sudan by Britain — has remained largely excluded 
from the benefits of economic development and has been marginalised from national 
political  life  by  the  retention  of  state  power  by  a  small  clique  of  Arab  tribes 
(including the incumbent regime of President Omar al-Bashir) from in and around 
the capital, Khartoum, a region which had also received the majority of public and 
private  investment.  This  classic  centre-periphery  inequality,  combined  with 
environmental deterioration, acute natural resource scarcity, and manipulated ethnic 
tensions, fostered the armed uprising against the Sudanese state by disaffected Darfur 
rebels in early 2003. 
In greater detail, the second part of the chapter then examines the particular 
response of the Sudanese government to this insurgency in Darfur. Using evidence 
from  a  number  of  authoritative  official  and  independent  reports  and  academic 
sources — as well as examples of victims’ testimonies — it is demonstrated that 
Khartoum’s counter-insurgency strategy was constituted by the deliberate targeting, 
killing and terrorisation of Darfur’s non-Arab civilian population. As such, it became 
public knowledge that the Sudanese government was responsible for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, and other observers have 
argued  that  the  government’s  underlying  motivations  were  genocide,  regime 
survival, or both.  
A central and brutally effective operational element of Khartoum’s strategy in 
Darfur was to arm, finance, train and direct local Arab militias  — the Janjaweed — 
to attack non-Arab towns and villages as well as the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) camps to which survivors of initial attacks fled. Moreover, in joint operations, 
the  Sudan  Armed  Forces  and  government–sponsored  militias  targeted  fellow 
Sudanese citizens en masse in land and air attacks with the objective of punishing   88 
alleged rebel sympathisers (namely, the non-Arab population of Darfur), deterring 
any further support for the insurgency in Darfur or other regions of the country, 
decimating the rebels’ capacity to continue their uprising, as well as to decisively 
alter  the  local  resource  and  population  distribution  in  Darfur  in  favour  of  Arab-
identifying groups. 
  The chapter concludes by summarising why the situation in Darfur from 2003 
presented a quintessential case for the fulfilment of the ‘responsibility to protect’ by 
the Security Council, considering that authorising humanitarian intervention is within 
the Council’s legal authority and in conformity with emerging international norms. 
As  such,  a  coercive  UN  military  intervention  to  protect  civilians  in  Darfur, 
specifically, was necessary and justified because of the following three reasons:  
(i) Because of the impact upon the human security of Darfur’s population: as 
noted above, the UN estimated that during the four-year period of study in this thesis 
over  200,000  people  died  either  directly  from  violence  or  from  conflict-induced 
disease and malnutrition. Furthermore, of the four million people affected by the 
conflict  in  the  region  (two-thirds  of  Darfur’s  pre-conflict  population),  over  two 
million had fled from their homes in fear to arrive in refugee camps in neighbouring 
Chad, IDP camps elsewhere inside Darfur, or simply into the inhospitable wilderness 
— often to be subjected to follow up attacks. This is comparable in scale and severity 
to other modern conflicts and humanitarian crises that elicited some form of Council 
interventionary action. As such, circumstances in Darfur clearly met the ‘just cause 
threshold’ proposed by the ICISS and conformed to the types of crimes identified in 
2005 by the UN General Assembly as potentially warranting external intervention. 
(ii)  Because  of  the  central  role  played  by  the  Sudanese  state:  credible 
evidence was presented of direct government involvement in the orchestration and   89 
commission  of  attacks  deliberately  targeting  the  civilian  population  of  Darfur. 
Khartoum thus clearly failed in its primary ‘responsibility to protect’ its own citizens 
— indeed, it was instead the primary cause of their insecurity — and therefore the 
government’s posited right to sovereign immunity should have been suspended by 
the Council and an intervention deployed to remove Khartoum’s control of security 
in the region. 
(iii) Because the Council attempted — and failed — to implement a number 
of  measures  short  of  military  intervention  to  create  security  on  the  ground  (as 
outlined in Chapter 3). Indeed, more coercive measures were particularly necessary 
because, as reported by the UN Secretary-General and other observers, the Sudanese 
government continued to commit atrocities and obstruct international efforts to assist 
vulnerable civilians during the prolonged period of Council engagement with the 
crisis.  
 
Darfur and the Sudanese state: from exclusion to rebellion 
 
Darfur, meaning homeland of the Fur ethnic group, is a vast and mostly arid 
region comprising three states (North, South and West Darfur) in the western portion 
of  the  modern  state  of  Sudan  —  Africa’s  largest  country  by  area.  Reflecting  its 
isolation  and  harsh  environment,  Darfur  has  been  described  as  a  ‘backwater,  a 
prisoner  of  geography’
191  and,  until  the  recent  crisis,  as  ‘one  of  the  least  known 
places in the world. Poor, remote, landlocked, and sparsely populated, it was obscure 
even  to  the  rest  of  Sudan’.
192  Yet,  despite  having  been  “grossly  neglected  in  the 
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‘Nilocentric’ historiography” of the country,
193 Darfur is home to an ethnically and 
culturally  diverse  population  which  emerged  from  centuries  of  migration, 
cohabitation, and intermarriage between black Africans, Arabs, and other groups: 
like  a  majority  of  Sudanese,  most  Darfurians  adhere  to  Islam,  while  Arabic, 
indigenous languages and some English are all spoken.  
In early 2003, members of the two most prominent of the newly organising 
rebel groups in Darfur — the secular Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
and  the  Islamist-leaning  Justice  and  Equality  Movement  (JEM)  —  commenced 
armed attacks against local organs of the Sudanese state, including most notably the 
military garrison at El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, on 25 April. According to one 
account, the seven-hour attack left a number of government Antonov aircraft and 
helicopter gunships destroyed, saw 75 Sudanese military personnel killed and 32 
captured,  including  the  local  commander,  while  the  rebels  suffered  only  nine 
casualties.
194 This brazen assault, although not the first in a series of smaller-scale 
uprisings and intermittent tribal violence in western Sudan over two decades, was 
certainly the most provocative to date and triggered the brutal counter-insurgency 
operation by the Sudanese government. While a direct challenge to the sovereign 
authority and legitimacy of the incumbent regime in Khartoum, the armed rebellion 
by the SLM/A and JEM was indeed a product of long-standing historical grievances 
over  Darfur’s  national  political  marginalisation  and  severe  economic 
underdevelopment, combined with increasing resource scarcity, inter-ethnic tensions, 
and general insecurity in the region.  
                                                        
193 Alex de Waal, “Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External 
Engagement”, African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005): 181-205, 183. 
194 Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 99.   91 
Ruled  by  indigenous  non-Arab  tribes,  Darfur  emerged  as  an  independent 
Islamic sultanate in the mid-17th century in parallel to the more central activities of 
the Cairo–Khartoum axis along the Nile Valley, although Islam and Arabic culture 
were  earlier  disseminated  to  the  region  by  travelling  traders,  clerics,  and  Arab 
migrants. Darfur also largely avoided the early military incursions by Egypt, which 
brought much of the area of northern Sudan under Egyptian and later Ottoman rule, 
but all parties in the region, including Darfurians, did compete in the widespread 
trade of black African slaves, a practice that contributed to the conditions for later 
conflict between north and south Sudan. In 1874, the Darfur sultanate was eventually 
conquered by Arab slave raiders, however the Mahdist uprising soon after briefly 
curtailed Sudan’s foreign rule.
195  
Darfur was then forcibly annexed to the new Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
in  Sudan  in  1916  after  Britain  recolonised  the  country  in  1898,  during  which  a 
system of ‘Native Administration’ was implemented granting local tribal leaders a 
degree of self-rule as long as they were largely compliant. According to Prunier, 
critics of this system argue that it was a ‘recipe for stagnation and for building a two-
tiered  society  in  which  the  natives,  on  the  pretext  of  cultural  integrity,  were 
marginalized from the benefits of the modern world which the colonialists could 
monopolize for their own advantage’.
196 As a result, Darfur was sorely neglected and 
underdeveloped during British rule, receiving little investment in health, education, 
infrastructure or agricultural production.  
With  Sudanese  independence  in  1956,  Darfurians  hoped  to  mitigate  their 
centre-periphery  marginalisation  by  playing  a  more  prominent  role  in  national 
                                                        
195 For an excellent and detailed account of Darfur’s history, see Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow. 
196 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 29.   92 
politics  and  achieving  greater  investment  in  regional  economic  and  social 
development. However, this has been obstructed by successive post-independence 
regimes — both civilian and military — which have been dominated by a small 
group of Arab tribes from north of the capital, resulting in power and state resources 
remaining  firmly  within  the  control  of  an  often  corrupt  clique.
197  As  such, 
development continued to focus on the Nile Valley region in and around Khartoum 
and thus Darfur and other outlying regions remained excluded.
198  
In addition, various national governments attempted to redefine multiethnic 
and multicultural Sudanese identity in Arab and Islamic terms. Most visibly, much of 
the  country’s  post-independence  history  has  involved  the  aforementioned  bloody 
civil war between Khartoum and non-Arab and Christian/animist southern Sudan. 
Indeed, ethnic and religious conflict was exacerbated by the 1989 military coup led 
by (now President) Omar al-Bashir, which brought to power the National Islamic 
Front  (NIF),  a  regime  characterised  by  radical  Islamism  and  Arab  supremacist 
tendencies.
199 The NIF created the loyalist paramilitary Popular Defence Forces and 
enlisted  other  Muslims,  including  from  Darfur,  to  assist  in  Khartoum’s  ‘jihad’ 
against dissenting Sudanese in the south, before turning its attention to those same — 
and now also disaffected — non-Arab Muslims in Darfur from 2003. 
In  Darfur,  in  addition  to  enduring  national  political  marginalisation  and 
economic underdevelopment, the radicalisation and manipulation of identity politics 
                                                        
197 Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 17-18; and Nelson Kasfir, “Sudan’s Darfur: Is it genocide?”, Current 
History 104, no. 682 (2005): 195–202, 198-9. 
198 Compare, for example, the social development data for Darfur relative to the areas around 
Khartoum. See Mika Vehnamaki, “Darfur Scorched: Looming Genocide in Western Sudan”, Journal 
of Genocide Research 8, no. 1 (2006): 51-82, 60-63; and Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, 178-81. 
199 The regime has since undergone a rebranding: from the NIF, to the National Congress Party (NCP) 
in the late 1990s, to the present Government of National Unity (GNU), the latter of which was formed 
after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM/A in south Sudan in 2005. 
However, despite these changes in name, President Bashir and his close allies have retained 
substantive power.   93 
has combined with deteriorating environmental conditions to fuel inter-ethnic tension 
and  competition  over  increasingly  scarce  natural  resources.  This  has  resulted  in 
sporadic local conflict and fostered the more organised armed rebellion against the 
state  by  non-Arab  groups.  Ethnic  identities  in  Darfur  are  complex;  commonly, 
distinctions  are  made  between  ‘Arabs’  and  ‘Africans’  (or  non-Arabs),  but  most 
Darfurians are dark-skinned.
200 Indigenous groups claiming black African heritage, 
such  as  the  Fur,  Massalit  and  Zaghawa,  were  joined  in  the  region  over  time  by 
migrating  Arab  groups,  such  as  the  Rizeigat  and  Juhayna,  but  centuries  of 
intermarriage  and  cohabitation  have  blurred  sharp  differences.  Compounding  this 
ambiguity, ethnic affiliations are often determined by livelihood: indigenous African 
tribes are traditionally sedentary farmers, and Arab groups nomadic pastoralists, but 
there are many exceptions to this rule, including the practice of families ‘switching 
ethnicities’ when changing modes of work. As a result, ‘[r]ather than by skin colour 
or  other  physical  traits,  Darfurians,  like  other  Sudanese,  have  always  identified 
themselves in ethnocultural or tribal terms’.
201  
Yet, part of the more recent ethnic conflict in Darfur stems from historical 
land ownership rights whereby Darfur sultans distributed allotments to certain groups 
but not others. Those that were sedentary farmers — generally non-Arabs — mostly 
received  hawakir  (‘enclosures’,  or  land  titles),  obtaining  ownership  over  specific 
areas within which their tribes could live and cultivate. Other groups, particularly 
Arab nomadic camel-herders (Abbala) such as the northern Rizeigat, were often not 
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granted such land rights in part due to their transient lifestyles.
202 This was less of a 
problem in the past as a traditional system of land sharing evolved in which nomadic 
herders  were  permitted  to  seasonally  traverse  cultivated  property.  Indeed,  during 
these historical times, arable land and water were more abundant and thus owners 
were less protective. However, over time, climate change and desertification have 
resulted  in  the  diminishing  availability  of  natural  resources,  including  the 
increasingly aridity of land and scarcity of water, creating tension between different 
types of land users.
203 Fuelling and manipulating these tensions — which had hitherto 
been mediated largely amicably at the local judicial level — were radical ideological 
notions of inherently antagonistic ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ identities, particularly those 
promoted by Khartoum and its regional allies in order to shore up their own Arab 
constituencies.  With  the  region  also  experiencing  acute  famine  and  an  influx  of 
cheap small arms, the result has been two decades of accelerating ethnic violence.  
Indeed, according to Assal, Darfur ‘best represents a case of neglected and 
protracted conflict over resources, which took the form of identity conflict’, however 
‘not all resource conflicts are based on a situation of resource scarcity, rather they are 
political  in  nature  and  have  to  do  with  the  workings  of  the  Sudanese  state’.
204 
Similarly, in Darfur ethnic identities were generally not a salient cause of conflict; it 
is  only  relatively  recently  that  Darfurians  have  been  ‘polarised  into  Arab  versus 
African identifications in response to deep political and ideological disputes in which 
state repression and economic under-development of the country’s marginal regions 
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have  played  a  significant  role’.
205  In  a  post-independence  national  context,  el-
Battahani concludes that:  
 
Successive  regimes  have  manipulated  administrative  structures  to 
undermine the control of local people and authorities over resources. 
Identity  and  ideology,  particular  Arab  nationalism  and  political 
Islamism, have been used to mobilize support to compensate for the 
governance  and  development  failings  of  state  policies.  Elites  have 
mastered  the  divide-and-rule  tactics  inherited  from  the  colonial  era 
through their territorial organization of the modern Sudanese state. The 
result has been underdevelopment, exclusion, and violent conflict.
206 
 
It is evident that the combination of these various grievances has fostered the 
armed rebellion against the Sudanese state by disaffected and increasingly insecure 
Darfurians. And, somewhat ironically, when Khartoum and the southern SPLM/A 
began negotiations over the eventual 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
— which would give the south a share of representation in the cabinet, an equitable 
distribution of oil revenue, and a referendum on the region’s secession in 2011 — it 
appeared as if Darfur would again be excluded from the opportunity to improve its 
own circumstances in the Sudanese polity. The CPA deal, for which the south had 
fought violently since independence, suggested to Darfurians that the only way to 
achieve political change in Sudan was through armed rebellion.  
While  appreciating  this  historical  context,  this  thesis  does  not  seek  to 
obfuscate  or  apologise  for  the  actions  of  the  Darfur  rebels;  indeed,  although  not 
conducted on a ‘systematic or widespread’ basis, a UN investigation found ‘credible 
evidence that rebel forces, namely members of the SLA and JEM … are responsible 
for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may 
amount  to  war  crimes.  In  particular,  these  violations  include  cases  of  murder  of 
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civilians and pillage’.
207 Instead, however, this chapter does argue the more important 
point that in response to this regional insurgency the Sudanese government enacted a 
counter-insurgency  strategy  that  deliberately  targeted  the  non-Arab  civilian 
population of Darfur. In doing so, the government abrogated its primary sovereign 
responsibility to protect its citizens. 
 
Khartoum’s Counter-insurgency Strategy 
 
  It  is  not  uncommon  for  governments  to  defend  themselves  and  state 
institutions militarily against armed rebellions or insurgencies, and this reaction may 
often be accepted as a necessary, legitimate, and legal exercise of national power, 
authority,  and  sovereignty;  this  is  indeed  the  argument  made  by  the  Sudanese 
government to justify its violent actions in response to the Darfur rebellion since 
2003. However, according to a number of authoritative accounts elaborated below, 
Khartoum’s  counter-insurgency  strategy  went  far  beyond  a  defensive  military 
operation; instead, Darfur’s non-Arab civilian population was the target of a regime 
of murder, rape and destruction orchestrated and implemented by their own state. As 
the UN-established International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (COI) concluded 
in its January 2005 report, the ‘most significant element of the conflict has been the 
attacks on civilians, which has led to the destruction and burning of entire villages, 
and the displacement of large parts of the civilian population’.
208  
The Sudanese government’s strategy for dealing with the Darfur rebellion 
involved instituting, as a first phase, a ‘campaign of repression’ in which a “state of 
emergency was declared as hundreds of alleged rebel sympathisers were arrested. 
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The governors of Northern and Western Darfur were dismissed. President Bashir 
appointed a ‘special task force’ of loyalists and old Darfur hands.” Then, in a move 
‘first viewed as conciliatory but in retrospect ominous of the reign of terror about to 
be unleashed’, the government abolished the special courts of summary justice in 
Darfur.
209  In  addition,  Khartoum  created  the  ‘Darfur  Security’  desk  headed  by 
Interior Minister Ahmed Harun as a powerful position to coordinate the regime’s 
plan of attack against the rebels and, importantly, against the ordinary citizens of 
Darfur. These initial bureaucratic measures were soon complimented by military and 
paramilitary operations. 
As  such,  the  second  phase  of  Khartoum’s  counter-insurgency  strategy 
involved  the  employment,  arming,  financing  and  training  of  groups  of  nomadic 
Arab-identifying  militias  from  across  western  Sudan  and  then  directing  them  to 
attack the rebels and destroy the non-Arab towns and villages in Darfur which were 
alleged to be the bases of SLM/A and JEM support. These local militias — popularly 
referred  to  as  Janjaweed  (‘devil-horsemen’)  —  held  sympathies  towards  Arabist 
Khartoum and had their own interests in local land and population redistribution, 
particularly  those  nomadic  groups  that  remained  outside  the  traditional  land 
ownership system.
210 Others were simply concerned with their own enrichment and 
exhibited an unconscionable disregard for the lives of their fellow Sudanese. This 
was a deliberate and calculated move by Khartoum: because the government was 
militarily unprepared and initially incapable of meeting the rebel threat in Darfur 
with national forces, it ‘exploited the existing tensions between different tribes’ by 
employing local Arab militias to engage the rebels.
211 
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Describing  this  divide-and-rule  strategy,  Collins  argues  that  as  the  ‘most 
unpopular regime in the history of independent Sudan’, al-Bashir’s government “was 
now able to weaken any potential opposition by exploiting ethnic divisions [and] 
branding  the  insurgency  as  an  African  attempt  to  rid  Darfur  of  the  ‘Arab  race’, 
whose  dominance  was  the  very  foundation  of  the  Islamist  government  and  its 
extremist  groups.”
212  As  a  result,  the  conflict  in  Darfur  quickly  morphed  from  a 
centre-periphery rebellion to one imbued with the dangerous characteristics of ethnic 
violence that had been witnessed previously in other African countries and in the 
Balkans  during  the  1990s,  for  example.  Indeed,  the  Janjaweed  did  not  primarily 
engage the rebels; civilians were targeted in attacks aimed at the purging of Darfur’s 
non-Arab population: 
 
the  mounted  Janjaweed  commandos,  usually  comprised  of  one 
hundred warriors, would sweep down on a village just before dawn. 
The pattern of destruction was the same. The men were killed, often 
mutilated, the women raped, and the children sometimes abducted. The 
village  was  burnt,  the  livestock  seized,  the  fields  torched,  and  the 
infrastructure  —  wells,  irrigation  works,  schools,  clinics  — 
methodologically  destroyed  in  a  systematic  scheme  to  drive  the 
African population from their ancestral holdings.
213 
 
While it soon became evident to the international community that the militias 
were responsible for committing such atrocities on the ground in Darfur, it was not 
until much later that their direct relationship to the Sudanese government and to its 
broader  counter-insurgency  strategy  in  Darfur  became  widely  acknowledged 
(although the Security Council resisted making direct linkages). This patron-client 
relationship  alone  was  clear  evidence  of  the  Sudanese  government  sponsoring 
militias  to  commit  violence  against  civilians  on  its  behalf.  However,  providing 
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further weight to arguments for coercive international intervention, the COI found 
that Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service played a ‘central role and is 
responsible for the design, planning and implementation of policies associated with 
the conflict … its influence appears to reach the highest levels of authority.’  
Indeed,  and  moreover,  the  third  element  of  Sudan’s  counter-insurgency 
strategy was to compliment the government’s concealed support for the Janjaweed 
with  the  deployment  of  the  Sudanese  military,  paramilitary,  and  other  ‘security’ 
services in direct attacks on civilians in Darfur.
214 As such, the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF)  and  Janjaweed  operated  in a   close  and  brutally  effective  operational 
partnership against Darfur’s non-Arab population: 
 
Improvised bombs of “explosives and metallic debris” dumped out of 
the  doors  of  Russian  transport  aircraft  were  followed  closely  by 
successive raids by attack helicopters and fighter-bombers. Janjaweed 
militia  on  camel  and  horseback,  sometimes  assisted  by  army  units, 
swept in to finish the job, by burning villages, killing principally young 
men,  and  forcing  survivors  to  flee.  The  displaced  fled  to  areas 
sometimes protected by the Sudanese police. Janjaweed patrolled the 
perimeters, however, attacking women and girls who left.
215 
 
This cooperative relationship between organs of the SAF and government-
allied militias resulted in widespread and pervasive attacks on Darfur by land and by 
air. Reaching similar conclusions, the COI found that in Darfur ‘[s]everal of the 
attacks on villages were carried out with the support of Government of the Sudan 
including the air force, involving air bombardments and regular aerial surveillance.’ 
As  such,  there  was  ‘credible  evidence  of  the  use  of  Mi-8  helicopters,  Mi-24 
helicopters  and  Antonov  aircraft  during  air  attacks  on  villages.  Ground  attacks 
frequently  were  preceded  by  the  presence  of  aircraft  near  or  directly  above  the 
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villages, which would either bomb the village or surrounding areas, or circle over the 
village and then retreat’.
216  
According  to  another  account  by  Reeves,  ‘[f]ollowing  early  morning 
bombing  attacks  on  targeted  villages,  attacks  which  dispersed  the  terrified 
inhabitants, the Janjaweed would sweep in, shooting all in their sight. Very often 
they would be accompanied by regular SAF forces in trucks, armoured personnel 
carriers, and other vehicles.’ Furthermore, after this, ‘[d]eadly helicopter gunships 
would  also  be  deployed,  killing  fleeing  civilians  and  any  who  might  chose  to 
resist’.
217 Indeed, the improvised use of the national air force illustrates in vivid terms 
Khartoum’s indiscriminate killing of Sudanese civilians in Darfur:  
 
Attacks  on  African  villages  typically  began  with  aerial  attacks  by 
Antonov ‘bombers.’ In fact, the Antonov is not a bomber by design, 
but rather a retrofitted Russian cargo plane from which crude barrel 
bombs are simply rolled out the back cargo bay … Bombs dropped 
from Antonovs are far too imprecise to be used against military targets. 
To avoid ground fire, Antonovs typically fly at altitudes over 15,000 
feet. But such bombs are exquisitely suited as instruments of civilian 
terror.
218 
 
This type of campaign by powerful state institutions and their local proxies 
against  unarmed  civilians  had  clear  and  predictable  results.  Compellingly,  the 
testimonies of victims and witnesses to such attacks reveal the nature and magnitude 
of experiences of violence and terror in Darfur. For example, in May 2004, Amnesty 
International  interviewed  a  number  of  Darfurian  refugees  living  in  camps  inside 
Chad. Describing one such joint assault by the Sudanese army and its allied militia, 
the following testimony was given by ‘N’, a 30-year-old Darfurian woman from Um 
Baru, living in the Konoungou camp: 
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“The  attack  took  place  at  8am  on  29  February  2004  when  soldiers 
arrived by car, camels and horses. The Janjawid were inside the houses 
and the soldiers outside. Some 15 women and girls who had not fled 
quickly  enough  were  raped  in  different  huts  in  the  village.  The 
Janjawid broke the limbs (arms or legs) of some women and girls to 
prevent them from escaping. The Janjawid remained in the village for 
six or seven days. After the rapes, the Janjawid looted the houses.”
219 
 
Similarly, recounted in another Amnesty International interview in the Mile 
refugee camp in Chad, an unnamed 25-year-old Darfurian woman from Abu Jidad 
village, in the Abu Gamra region, explained how her village was attacked on 28 June 
2003: 
 
“men on horses and camels and in cars came in and surrounded the 
village at midday. The Janjawid were accompanied by soldiers of the 
government, the latter using cars. Two hours later, an Antonov plane 
and  two  helicopters  flew  over  the  village  and  shot  rockets.  The 
attackers came into the houses and shot my mother and grandfather, 
without any word. Most of the inhabitants had stayed in their houses. 
The attack lasted for two hours and everything was burnt down in the 
village.”
220 
 
The  Coalition  for  International  Justice  and  the  US  State  Department’s 
Atrocities Documentation Project collected further harrowing testimonies, including 
how a ‘Massalit woman in West Darfur (near El Geneina) in February 2004 saw 
[Sudanese government] soldiers catch sixteen women with babies. They broke the 
baby boys’ necks in front of the mothers and beat mothers with their own babies like 
whips until the babies died’.
221 In another example: 
 
In western Darfur (near Foro Borunga) in June 2003, a Fur man said 
his  wife  was  raped  by  seven  [Sudanese  government]  soldiers,  and 
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thirteen  other  women  were  also  raped  during  the  attack.  He  saw 
horsemen take a baby from a woman’s back, tear of its clothes and 
slice its stomach; another woman’s baby daughter was smashed against 
a tree and killed. He witnessed approximately twenty male and seven 
female babies being killed.
222 
 
As  a  result  of  evidence  of  attacks  like  these,  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
concluded  in  its  authoritative  and  revealing  January  2005  report  that  both  the 
Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were ‘responsible for serious violations of 
international  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  amounting  to  crimes  under 
international law.’
223 More specifically, noting that the majority of victims of such 
violence were from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and “other so-called 
‘African’ tribes”, the COI found that Sudanese government forces and their allied 
militias conducted: 
 
indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These 
acts  were  conducted  on  a  widespread  and  systematic  basis,  and 
therefore  may  amount  to  crimes  against  humanity.  The  extensive 
destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and 
means of survival for countless women, men and children. In addition 
to  the  large  scale  attacks,  many  people  have  been  arrested  and 
detained,  and  many  have  been  held  incommunicado  for  prolonged 
periods and tortured.
224 
 
Such  ‘indiscriminate  attacks’,  in  which  civilians  are  killed,  are  prohibited 
under  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention,  which  requires  belligerents  to  distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants during armed conflict and to protect the 
latter  group  from  harm.  Yet,  again  adding  further  weight  to  calls  for  coercive 
Council  intervention,  earlier  reports  were  confirmed  by  the  COI  that  innocent 
Darfurian civilians were not merely ‘collateral damage’ or unintentional victims of 
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the conflict: while Sudanese government officials had protested to the COI that their 
use of force was for legitimate military purposes as part of what they claimed to be a 
necessary  counter-insurgency  campaign  against  the  SLA  and  JEM  rebels,  the 
Commission of Inquiry instead made it clear that ‘most attacks were deliberately and 
indiscriminately directed against civilians.’
225 As such, large-scale murder in Darfur 
it was a matter of government policy.  
On this basis of such findings, and because of the evident ethnic dimension of 
the violence, a number of observers have persuasively argued that genocide was 
intended and committed in Darfur. For Erin Patrick, for example, the actions and 
intentions of the Janjaweed were genocidal in nature because the militias had done 
‘everything possible not only to force civilians to flee their land and villages, but to 
prevent them from being able to come home any time soon and to rebuild their lives 
even upon return’.
226 Because of this, ‘[n]ot only have villages been attacked, looted 
and burned to the ground, but the Janjaweed have thrown dead bodies into wells to 
poison them and systematically destroyed fields, seeds and agricultural implements 
— elements critical to the survival of a population dependent on farming for its 
livelihood. Men have been killed and women raped and branded to ostracise them 
from  society.’
227  Power  similarly  argues  that  both  the  Sudanese  government  and 
Janjaweed  committed  genocide  by  ‘systematically  expelling  Darfur’s  non-Arab 
population, murdering tens of thousands and permitting widespread gang-rape — to 
make sure what they say will be lighter-skinned babies and ensure that the non-Arab 
tribes  will  be  too  degraded  to  return  to  their  homes.’
228  According  to  Reeves, 
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Khartoum’s ‘comprehensive destruction, clearly animated by a desire to destroy the 
Fur,  Massaleit,  and  Zaghawa  people  as  such,  constituted  genocide  —  as  did  the 
direct, ethnically-targeted murder of these people.’
229 
These  arguments  were  supported  by  an  official  finding  by  the  US 
government.  After  a  comprehensive  US  State  Department  investigation,
230  then 
Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the US Congress in September 2004 
that: ‘we concluded — I concluded — that genocide has been committed in Darfur 
and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and that 
genocide may still be occurring.’
231 Significantly, President Bush publicly endorsed 
the genocide charge; the first time a US president had done so while that particular 
crime  was  ongoing.
232  While  other  governments  were  reluctant  to  characterise 
Sudan’s  actions  as  genocide  and  the  COI  itself  did  not  support  the  finding  of 
genocide — because the ‘crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, 
as least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned’
233 — it was also 
made clear by the COI that a non-determination of genocide ‘should not be taken in 
any  way  as  detracting  from  the  gravity  of  the  crimes  perpetrated  in  that  region. 
International offenses such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have 
been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.’
234 
In  this  context,  Kasfir  observes  that  the  debate  over  characterising 
Khartoum’s motivations in Darfur has been over whether the Sudanese government 
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has ‘adopted a policy of cultural annihilation [or] decided to crush a rebellion to 
protect  its  dominance’.
235  However,  I  would  argue  that  these  categories  are  not 
mutually  exclusive  and,  rather,  elements  of  both  are  evident  in  the  actions  and 
intentions of the al-Bashir regime. The arguments supporting the finding of genocide 
to characterise the Sudanese government’s motivations are compelling in light of the 
available evidence. Yet, if the act of genocide in Darfur was based upon underlying 
elements  of  ethnic  animosity,  it  was  also  highly  political  in  nature,  pertaining, 
fundamentally, to power and control over the state. In the context of this thesis, the 
nature and effects of such state-directed violence on the civilian population are far 
more important that the characterisation of those acts in terms of the argument that 
international  intervention  was  necessary  and  justified  (particularly  as  the  Bush 
administration  had  rejected  the  legal  obligation  to  act  on  an  official  finding  of 
genocide).  
In any case, Khartoum had a clear strategy to not only defeat the rebels in 
Darfur but to deter challenges to its sovereign authority from any other disaffected 
segments of the Sudanese population. Kasfir himself concludes that the government 
of  Sudan  ‘used  its  policy  of  Arabization  in  an  effort  to  bolster  or  restore  its 
hegemony’.
236 In this sense, Khartoum attempted to “‘drain the swamp’ by driving 
civilians  from  their  villages,  thereby  denying  the  rebels  sanctuary  in  much  of 
Darfur”.
237 Similarly, according the UN Human Rights Council, ‘[v]illages have been 
razed,  livestock  stolen  or  killed,  and  crops  destroyed,  and  whole  populations 
forcefully displaced, in part in an attempt to deprive rebel groups of support and 
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resources’.
238 Furthermore, the COI proposed that Khartoum’s motives for attacking 
Darfurian civilians were based on strategic political interests: in a ‘vast majority of 
cases,  victims  of  the  attacks  belonged  to  African  tribes,  in  particular  the  Fur, 
Masaalit and Zaghawa tribes, who were systematically targeted on political grounds 
in  the  context  of  the  counter-insurgency  policy  of  the  Government’,
239  while  ‘it 
would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the 
intent  to  drive  the  victims  from  their  homes,  primarily  for  purposes  of  counter-
insurgency warfare’.
240  
Khartoum, therefore, while supporting the interests of local Arab groups in 
the region — a key government constituency — pursued a campaign of violence 
against non-Arab civilians in Darfur to assert the control, and maintain the historical 
domination, of Arabist regimes in Sudan. This political objective of ‘regime security’ 
was achieved through the communicative act of instilling pervasive fear in a wider 
audience than just the immediate targets of the violence (in fact, a key constitutive 
element of ‘terrorism’).
241 As such, while targeting non-Arab Darfurians directly, the 
broader psychological aim of such violence was to terrorise the general population in 
order to deter further support to the rebels and thus strengthen Khartoum’s control. 
The Sudanese government was aware of its tenuous claims to legitimacy and fragile 
hold on national power: “having only recently entered into power-sharing talks with 
its long–term enemy [the SPLM/A in south Sudan] and aware of the unrest brewing 
in  many  other  of  its  so-called  ‘peripheral’  areas”,  Khartoum  ‘feared  that  being 
anything less than harsh with the Darfur rebels would invite similar uprisings in 
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other restive regions.’
242 Thus, in order to ‘prevent the emergence of simultaneous 
rebellions’, Khartoum was ‘sending a message to potential guerrillas everywhere that 
if they rebel, civilians in their region will face atrocities on a scale similar to those in 
Darfur.’
243 
A tactic of instilling fear was indeed central to the Sudanese government’s 
military strategy in Darfur. The ‘effect of the repeated attacks on villages and the 
manner in which they were carried out, including regular aerial surveillance at dawn, 
hovering of helicopter gun-ships and frequent bombing, was to terrorise civilians and 
force them to flee the villages’.
244 In one sense, this ‘state terrorism’ was successful, 
as those people who were fortunate to survive the initial attacks and find refuge in 
camps  ‘often  refused  to  return  to  their  villages  out  of  fear  of  further  attacks.’
245 
Overall,  however,  during  the  2003-06  period  of  study  the  Sudanese  government 
failed to militarily defeat the Darfur rebels. This suggests that, at great human cost to 
the  citizens  of  Darfur,  the  Sudanese  government’s  brutal  counter-insurgency  had 
succeeded only in creating further foundations for Sudanese disaffection with their 
state and undermining the regime’s own claims to sovereign legitimacy, both inside 
and  outside  the  country.  Nevertheless,  as  Part  II  of  the  thesis  demonstrates,  the 
Sudanese  government  was  indeed  highly  successful  politically  in  obstructing 
coercive military intervention by the Security Council over its actions in Darfur. 
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Conclusion: The Case for UN Military Intervention in Darfur 
 
  In  order  to  more  persuasively  assert  that  the  situation  in  Darfur  between 
2003-06  presented  a  quintessential  case  for  the  Council  to  fulfil  its  posited 
‘responsibility to protect’ it is necessary to juxtapose the nature and scale of the 
violence  and  its  effects  on  the  local  civilian  population,  the  identities  of  the 
perpetrators, and the actions short of military intervention already pursued by the 
Council  in  response,  against  the  criteria  first  proposed  by  the  ICISS  and  then 
modified  into  the  specific  endorsement  of  the  UN  World  Summit  in  2005  and 
explicit  re-endorsement  by  the  Security  Council  in  2006.  The  former  is  used  to 
highlight  how  the  Darfur  case  can  be  clearly  situated  within  the  conceptual 
framework  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  as  originally  elaborated.  The  latter 
represent contemporary intergovernmental consensus on the politically acceptable 
form of the ‘responsibility protect’ doctrine. 
The most primary of such criteria is the ‘just cause threshold’ contained in 
the  original  ICISS  framework.  The  ICISS  proposed  that  military  humanitarian 
interventions — of the type here argued to have been required in Darfur — are 
‘exceptional and extraordinary’ measures that could only be necessitated if there was 
‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to 
occur’, in either or both of the following ways. The first is ‘large scale loss of life’ 
that is ‘actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation’. 
The second is “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried 
out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”
246 
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  The situation in Darfur clearly met both elements of the ICISS just cause 
threshold.  First,  there  was  a  large-scale  loss  of  life  that  was  the  product  of  a 
deliberate  state  action:  as  a  result  of  the  pervasive  and  widespread  violence 
committed  by  the  Sudanese  government  and  government-allied  militias,  the  UN 
estimated that during the period of study at least 200,000 people in Darfur — mostly 
civilians — died either from direct violence or from conflict-induced effects. Of the 
latter,  the  complete  disruption  of  subsistence  agriculture  —  already  heavily 
constrained by resource scarcity — by violence, the destruction of property, and 
displacement  has  resulted  in  a  chronic  shortage  of  food  and  thus  widespread 
malnutrition amongst the Darfurian population. In addition, due to the scale of the 
displacement, insecurity, and difficult logistical environment for humanitarian relief 
operations, disease in IDP and refugee camps has claimed the lives of many of the 
survivors of the initial violence.
247 
  Second, because of the ethnic basis of the violence and because of the tactics 
of terrorisation that were evident in the counter-insurgency strategy of the Sudanese 
government and its allied militias, there was also large scale ethnic cleansing, actual 
and  apprehended,  that  was  carried  out  by  killing,  acts  of  terror,  and,  as  detailed 
above in victims’ testimonies, rape. Indeed, the apprehension and terror amongst, 
primarily, the region’s non-Arab groups was evident is the massive displacement of 
that cohort of Darfur’s population since 2003: the UN calculates that of the four 
million people in the wider region affected by the conflict (out of Darfur’s pre-2003 
population of about six million), over two million people fled from their homes in 
fear into IDP camps inside Darfur (the vast majority) or into refugee camps across 
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the  border  in  neighbouring  Chad  (about  250,000).
248  As  detailed  above,  because 
many of the non-Arab IDPs and refugees were too afraid to return to their homes and 
villages, it would be fair to conclude that the local population distribution had been 
substantially altered and that large areas of the region had thus been successfully 
‘ethnically cleansed’ by the Janjaweed and Arabist Khartoum. 
  Both the ICISS proposal and the UN World Summit commitment also assert 
that  governments  of  states  are  considered  to  have  the  first  duty  to  protect  their 
citizens  from  harm.  For  example,  the  ICISS  proposes  that  ‘[s]tate  sovereignty 
implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people 
lies with the state itself.’
249 Similarly, the World Summit Outcome states that ‘[e]ach 
individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’
250 In this sense, it is only 
because  of  Sudan’s  obvious  abrogation  of  its  own  sovereign  responsibility  that 
military intervention is even considered; thus, in accordance with the pluralist basis 
of international order, governments which fulfil their responsibility to protect should 
not be the subject of any legitimate external intervention.  
However, the ICISS proposes that ‘[w]here a population is suffering serious 
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state 
in  question  is  unwilling  or  unable  to  halt  or  avert  it’  then  a  Council  authorised 
military intervention can become justified. The World Summit accepted that Council 
military action is justified when ‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity’. Again, from the evidence presented above it is clear that the population in 
Darfur was suffering serious harm as a result of repression by Khartoum, through the 
SAF and Janjaweed, and that this occurred in the context of an internal war in which 
elements  of  each  of  genocide,  war  crimes,  ethnic  cleansing  and  crimes  against 
humanity had been committed against them. 
  Indeed, it was clear that in Darfur the national authorities were manifestly 
failing to protect the population and that Sudanese government was unwilling to 
avert  it.  In  this  sense,  the  Sudanese  government  not  only  failed  to  protect  the 
population of Darfur, it was in fact the primary cause of insecurity in the region 
because of the particular counter-insurgency strategy that it chose to pursue. This is a 
crucial  point;  because  the  Sudanese  government  was  actively  involved  in 
orchestrating and, in coordination with its allied militia, directly participating in the 
commission of atrocities, it would have been morally unacceptable and politically 
cynical of the Council to allow Khartoum to retain control of security in Darfur or to 
assume that local solutions to resolving the conflict or protecting civilians would 
have  been  appropriate.  As  a  result,  the  only  morally  acceptable  and  practically 
adequate action — if effective civilian protection was the primary objective — was 
for the deployment of a robust UN peace operation. The necessity for it to be a 
coercive deployment developed because of strong opposition to such a move by the 
Sudanese government. 
  On these ‘just cause threshold’ and ‘sovereign irresponsibility’ grounds alone 
there  is  a  persuasive  case  for  external  military  intervention  in  Darfur.  However, 
under a method and ethic of gradualism, with sensitive consideration for the fragile 
pluralist  foundations  of  international  order  and  in  due  recognition  of  the 
extraordinary nature of humanitarian intervention, both the ICISS and World Summit   112 
Outcome make clear that peaceful or cooperative solutions aimed at resolving the 
underlying conflict or at protecting vulnerable civilians should be attempted before 
any coercive military options; indeed, the language and sequencing of Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter are premised upon a similar logic. For the ICISS, as a 
‘precautionary principle’, military intervention should only be considered as a ‘last 
resort’: it is ‘only justified when every non-military option for the prevention or 
peaceful  resolution  of  the  crisis  has  been  explored,  with  reasonable  grounds  for 
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.’
251 For the World Summit, a 
military intervention can only be enacted ‘should peaceful means be inadequate’.
252  
In this context (as Chapter 3 of this thesis comprehensively examines), the 
development of the Council’s response to Darfur from 2003 was indeed constituted 
by attempts at a number of cooperative or ‘peaceful’ measures (or at least measures 
that  were  clearly  short  of  military  intervention):  these  included,  for  example, 
constant mediation and negotiation between the Council, the UN Secretariat, the AU 
and the Sudanese government; the facilitation of international funding to promote 
peace; the establishment of an in-principle ceasefire between the Darfur rebels and 
Khartoum and the endorsement of African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS] military 
observers to monitor it; attempts to commit Khartoum on paper to control and disarm 
the Janjaweed (through the Joint Communiqué); the attempted imposition of an arms 
embargo  and  limited  sanctions  regime  to  compel  compliance;  and  the  posited 
deterrent of the referral of the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court.  
In addition, for two years the Council actively supported the formal Darfur 
peace process convening in Abuja, Nigeria, under direct AU mediation, which led to 
the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 by the Minni Minawi 
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faction of the SLM/A (the largest rebel faction) and the Sudanese government. The 
Agreement  contained  certain  power  and  wealth-sharing  provisions,  security 
arrangements including the return of displaced persons, a regional inter-communal 
dialogue  process,  post-conflict  reconstruction,  and  provided  for  a  referendum  on 
Darfur’s status within Sudan.  
However, the Darfur Peace Agreement was a clear failure. According to the 
International  Crisis  Group  (ICG),  the  ‘document  has  serious  flaws’,
253  while  for 
others it was ‘stillborn’
254; fatally, both the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLM/A and 
the JEM refused to sign it, meaning that it was only a partial agreement. Additionally 
problematic, at Khartoum’s insistence the Agreement stipulated that the Sudanese 
government would retain responsibility for disarming the Janjaweed, while AMIS 
was  only  mandated  to  monitor  such  compliance.  Yet,  while  this  would  in  fact 
‘require robust monitoring’, AMIS had ‘too few troops, with too little mobility and 
firepower and inadequate intelligence capabilities, to do it properly.’
255 Moreover, the 
ICG observed that Khartoum ‘continue[d] to arm and recruit militias and support 
their operations even in the weeks since the signing of the DPA’, while it had broken 
five  previous  commitments  to  disarm  them,
256  to  say  nothing  of  the  direct 
participation of the SAF in attacking civilian targets. Furthermore, the post-DPA 
period: 
 
witnessed  a  sharp  deterioration  in  the  security  and  humanitarian 
situation, and in AMIS’ ability to implement its mandate. Starting in 
August 2006, the [Sudanese government] amassed thousands of troops 
and weaponry in the region to mount a campaign against the DPA non-
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signatories,  including  air  attacks.  [Khartoum]  also  continued  to  use 
janjaweed  militias  as  proxies  against  rebel  groups  and  to  terrorise 
civilian  populations.  The  surge  in  fighting  created  more  IDPs  and 
forced humanitarian agencies to withdraw from affected areas.
257  
 
In the face of the deficiencies of the Agreement and the evidently impossible 
mandate  it  extended  for  AMIS,  the  DPA  —  also  at  Khartoum’s  insistence  — 
specifically did not provide for the transition from AMIS to a more adequate UN 
force, which was ‘daily becoming more necessary. Khartoum continues to obstruct 
and  delay  the  planning  process  for  that  UN  mission.  If  AMIS  and  then  UN 
peacekeepers must ask the government’s permission at every step, they will not be 
able to create the confidence refugees and [IDPs] need to go home.’
258 Indeed, Sudan 
remained hostile to any deployment of UN troops in Darfur and actually threatened 
to attack any external force imposed against the government’s will (see below).  
Therefore, in the face of various ‘non-military’ measures attempted by the 
Council during the four-year period of study, the Sudanese government continued to 
orchestrate  attacks  its  own  citizens  in  Darfur,  obstructed  international  efforts  to 
alleviate the crisis and violated agreements (including a number of the Council’s own 
resolutions), and refused to accept the deployment of UN troops to provide necessary 
security  to  the  vulnerable  population  in  the  region,  particularly  those  that  were 
displaced and living in camps. As such, by mid-2006, it was clear that such measures 
short  of  military  intervention  —  including  the  flawed  DPA  —  had  failed  to 
fundamentally  resolve  the  conflict,  and,  more  significantly,  failed  to  provide 
adequate security for Darfur’s civilians. Because of this, I argue that by mid-2006 at 
the latest, the Council had ‘reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would 
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not  have  succeeded’  in  creating  security  on  the  ground,  and  thus  the  coercive 
deployment of a military intervention would have been a necessary and justified 
action by the body. The ICG made a similar argument in June 2006: 
 
The  Security  Council  should  authorise  deployment  of  a  robust  UN 
force,  starting  with  a  rapid  reaction  component,  to  take  over  from 
AMIS by 1 October 2006, with a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all 
necessary means to protect civilians and assist in the implementation 
of  the  DPA,  including  to  act  militarily  as  necessary  to  contain  of 
neutralise Janjaweed, rebel and hard-line government spoilers.
 259 
 
Despite this persuasive argument, such a deployment did not occur. The aim 
of the remainder of the thesis is to explain why it did not occur and to explain more 
broadly  why  coercive  military  intervention  in  Darfur  was  not  even  a  serious 
consideration of the Council. In the context of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, 
however, there is one explanation for non-intervention which must first be accounted 
for; the only element of the ICISS proposal which in my view could possibly militate 
against  the  coercive  deployment  of  UN  troops  is  the  final  of  the  ‘precautionary 
principles’; namely, ‘reasonable prospects’. As such, the ICISS warned that ‘[t]here 
must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has 
justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse that 
the  consequences  of  inaction.’
260  Notably,  as  mentioned  above  and  elaborated  in 
Chapter 3, the Sudanese government openly threatened to attack any UN troops that 
were  to  be  forcibly  deployed  by  the  Council  in  Darfur,  a  deployment  which 
Khartoum vehemently opposed. 
By definition, a coercive military intervention will certainly meet resistance 
in rhetoric; yet, it is not clear that such rhetoric necessarily translates into violent 
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opposition on the ground, particularly when it is UN troops that are being deployed 
(due  to  their  relatively  strong  international  legitimacy  and  the  deterrent  of  likely 
diplomatic and military consequences). Moreover, if it so decides, the Council has 
the ability to project overwhelming force and it is constituted by at least five of the 
world’s  most  powerful  military  forces.  Therefore,  if  the  potential  UN  peace 
operation  was  substantial  in  number,  had  superior  firepower,  and  had  a  robust 
mandate for both force and civilian protection — as indeed Resolution 1706 did 
authorise  for  UNMIS  in  Darfur  in  August  2006  (although  the  Council  fatally 
subjected  its  deployment  to  the  consent  of  Khartoum)  —  then  it  less  likely  that 
Khartoum would have made the potentially costly decision to attack UN troops.  
Nevertheless,  this  argument  against  intervention  is  most  unpersuasive 
because it belies the failure of the Council to present a united front against Khartoum 
and  thus  to  create  substantive  pressure  on  al-Bashir  to  submit  to  the  Council’s 
demands. In this sense, a united and clear Council policy of deploying UN troops 
would  have  weakened  Khartoum’s  ability  to  exploit  divergent  positions  in  the 
Council  to  its  own  advantage  and  thus  weaken  its  ability  to  oppose  a  UN 
deployment.
261 In any case, it is difficult to imagine how the coercive deployment of 
an overwhelming UN force would have caused any further harm to the desperate 
civilian population of Darfur, which, by 2006, had suffered three years of widespread 
and pervasive attacks by their own state and marauding government-allied militias. 
Because of these reasons, there was a compelling moral, normative and legal-
institutional case for the UN Security Council to override the claims of ‘sovereign 
immunity’ made by the Sudanese government as well as Khartoum’s protestations 
against the presence of UN troops inside its western region. Because the Sudanese 
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government had clearly failed in its primary responsibility to protect its own citizens 
in Darfur, there was by 2006 a highly persuasive case for the coercive deployment of 
a UN military intervention to protect vulnerable civilians, an act which, if carried out 
effectively,  would  have  seen  the  Security  Council  itself  fulfil  its  ‘secondary’ 
responsibility to protect a severely at-risk population residing inside the borders of a 
nominally  sovereign  UN  member  state.  This  is  a  responsibility  that  the  Council 
chose not to fulfil. 
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The Development of the Council’s Response to Darfur, 2003-06 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  In the context of pervasive crimes committed by the Sudanese military and 
government-allied  militia  against  Darfur’s  non-Arab  civilian  population  and  the 
perpetuation  of  acute  insecurity  in  the  region,  this  chapter  examines  the 
chronological development between 2003-06 of the Security Council’s response to 
the Darfur crisis, including the Council’s deliberations, resolutions, statements, and 
interactions  with  external  parties.  The  chapter  details  important  ‘non-military’ 
actions that the Council undertook during the period of study; most notably, the 
imposition  of  a  limited  sanctions  regime  and  arms  embargo  in  Sudan,  the 
establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate 
atrocities, and the referral of the Darfur case to the prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court. In addition, it reveals that the Council did authorise a peacekeeping 
force in Darfur with a robust civilian protection mandate in August 2006, however, 
fatally, the body made the actual deployment of this force subject to the consent of 
the  Sudanese  government,  which  was  not  forthcoming.  As  a  result  —  despite  a 
persuasive legal-institutional, normative, and moral case for doing so — the chapter 
illustrates that in the face of opposition by Khartoum the Council did not coercively 
deploy a military intervention in Darfur during this near four-year period. 
Because  there  was  no  coercive  military  intervention,  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  the  development  of  the  Council’s  response  to  Darfur  in  order  to  draw 
conclusions about the political dynamics inside the body (which are then the subject   120 
of critical analysis in the proceeding two chapters). First, this examination illustrates 
that the Council did become heavily engaged with the crisis in western Sudan, such 
that Darfur was eventually a recurrent, near-monthly item on the Council’s agenda. 
Second, and importantly, it illustrates that Council members were fully aware — 
certainly after the release of the COI’s report in early 2005 — of the nature and scale 
of  the  violence  and  terrorisation  of  civilians  in  the  region,  including  of  the  role 
played by the Sudanese government, and that members would have appreciated the 
impact that such acute insecurity was having upon the civilian population of Darfur. 
Third, and most tellingly, despite this public knowledge, despite the evident failure 
of such relatively non-coercive measures enacted by the body to create security on 
the ground, and despite the Council’s explicit invocation of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’  doctrine  in  resolutions  on  Darfur,  the  chapter  illustrates  that  a  coercive 
military intervention was not even a serious consideration of the Council during the 
period of study. 
Central  to  the  development  of  the  UNSC’s  response  to  Darfur,  and  to 
understanding why the Council failed to deploy a coercive military intervention, are 
the positions and actions of the Council’s members, particularly of the P5. Because 
of  this,  the  chapter  details  the  various  public  statements  of  members  during 
deliberations and debate on Darfur inside the Council, illustrating the arguments and 
rhetoric  used  to  either  support  or  obstruct  punitive  actions  against  the  Sudanese 
government, and the crucial voting patterns of both permanent and non-permanent 
members on key Darfur resolutions. In doing so, the chapter paints a picture of how 
the UNSC interacted with, and responded to, the crisis in Darfur over the four-year 
period, and hence illustrates the political dynamics inside the Council that worked to 
preclude the deployment of a coercive military intervention to protect vulnerable   121 
civilians. This present chapter, however, postpones critical analysis of why individual 
Council members made such decisions and took such actions and, moreover, did not 
enact more coercive actions. Instead, such analysis of national interests and political 
calculations — ‘explaining’ the Council’s non-intervention in Darfur — is addressed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2003-05: Coercive Intervention in Sudan Not Considered by Council 
 
The chapter first examines the period between April 2003 and the end of 
2005,  when  the  Council’s  response  to  Darfur  evolved  from  inaction,  to  initial 
engagement, to the passage of a number of resolutions, and then returned to a period 
of  relative  inaction.  During  this  time,  the  Council’s  attention  to  Sudan  was  also 
focused  upon  resolving  the  north-south  Sudan  conflict  and  securing  the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In the context of this thesis, what is most notable 
about  the  UNSC  during  this  initial  three-year  period  is  that  the  Council,  as  a 
collective body, did not seriously consider enacting its legal authority to threaten 
Sudan with a UN military intervention, let alone actually pursue the deployment of 
such a force to protect civilians in Darfur. It was not until early 2006 that a UN peace 
operation in Darfur was put on the table, and even then it was only in the form of a 
consensual deployment. 
 
Council ignores eruption of conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur: 
2003–early 2004 
 
  In addition to the privileged P5, the Council in 2003 was comprised of non-
permanent members Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Spain and Syria. After the eruption of violence in Darfur in early 2003, the 
early reporting of initial acts of displacement by a variety of UN agencies should   122 
have alerted the Council to at least the scale of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in 
the region, if not of the nature of the conflict itself, including that civilians were 
targeted and terrorised. However, despite these reports, the Council did not place 
Darfur on its agenda nor make any official statement about the situation in western 
Sudan during 2003. In fact, the Council held only one open meeting on Sudan during 
the whole of the year, on 10 October, which ignored Darfur and focused instead on 
the separate north-south Sudan peace process,
262 the latter in which the United States 
and Britain had invested significant political capital and were heavily involved. 
  By  late  2003,  the  regional  humanitarian  crisis  was  undeniable  to  anyone 
following the statements of UN agencies and aid organisations on the ground. For 
example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 
there were nearly 100,000 Darfurian refugees living in camps and in the desert in 
Chad, 25,000 of which had fled there in the month of December alone, and that a 
number  of  these  camps  had  had  to  be  moved  deeper  inside  Chad  away  from 
Janjaweed raids along the border region.
263 The World Food Program stated that it 
discovered during a recent assessment trip to South Darfur that 46 of the 62 villages 
it visited had been burned to the ground, while the remaining 16 had been looted. 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that new refugee arrivals in Chad 
“alleged that there has been aerial bombardment of villages and ‘ethnic cleansing’ by 
pro-government Arab militias”.
264 Due to the number and similarity of such reports 
from UN agencies in the field, among others, it had become clear that by the end of 
2003 there was a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and eastern Chad that had been 
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caused by brutal fighting and the targeting of civilians in the region: despite this, the 
Darfur case remained absent from the Council’s agenda. 
  In 2004, five new members — Algeria and Benin, Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Romania — assumed their elected non-permanent seats on the Council, replacing the 
outgoing Cameroon and Guinea, Mexico, Syria, and Bulgaria respectively. While the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur deepened in the early months of 2004, and despite the 
increasing number of reports from experts and other observers about the scale and 
nature  of  the  disaster  in  the  region,  including  suggestions  that  the  Sudanese 
government might be involved, the Council remained distinctly absent from efforts 
to address the conflict. For example, in March, UN Secretary-General Annan stated 
that he was ‘very disturbed by the events in Darfur where the continuing conflict is 
having  a  devastating  impact  on  the  lives  and  well-being  of  the  people.  Civilian 
casualties  and  serious  human  rights  violations  are  routinely  reported.  This  is 
unacceptable  and  must  stop.’
265  Furthermore,  a  group  of  UN  human  rights 
rapporteurs released a statement on their recent fact-finding mission to the region 
expressing that they were ‘gravely concerned at the scale of reported human rights 
abuses and at the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Darfur’ and citing reports that the: 
 
population  in  the  Darfur  region  —  mostly  from  the  Fur  ethnic 
communities of the Masalit, Dajo, Tunjur, Tama and Zaghawas — has 
been  the  victim  of  systematic  human  rights  violations,  committed 
mainly  by  Government-allied  militias  such  as  the  Janjaweed, 
Muraheleen  and  the  Popular  Defence  Forces.  The  Government  is 
allegedly encouraging the actions of the militias in order to pursue a 
strategy  of  forced  displacement  of  the  non-Arab  population  of  the 
region.
266 
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Council’s initial engagement with Darfur: April–June 2004 
 
  On  2  April,  in  its  first  serious  engagement  with  Darfur,  the  Council  was 
briefed on the crisis by Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Humanitarian Affairs, 
Jan Egeland, who, while declining to use the term ‘genocide’, claimed that ‘ethnic 
cleansing’  had  been  committed  in  the  region  through  an  ‘organized,  forced 
depopulation  of  entire  areas’  and  that  there  were  ‘daily  reports  of  widespread 
atrocities and grave violations of human rights’.
267 The USG explained to the Council 
that ‘most of the attacks … had targeted civilian populations. Entire villages had 
been  looted  and  burned  down,  and  large  numbers  of  civilians  had  been  raped, 
tortured and killed.’
268 Egeland concluded that Khartoum ‘could control and disarm 
the  Janjaweed  militia,  which  was  responsible  for  most  of  the  human  rights 
violations’, and that while ‘there was no reason to believe that the Government was 
actively planning the attacks’, there ‘was reason to say that far too little was being 
done to stop it. It seemed that the violence was being condoned.’ Finally, Egeland 
pushed for Darfur to be placed permanently on the Council’s agenda.
269 Importantly, 
this briefing illustrated that at least as early as April 2004 the Council was made 
directly aware of the scale and nature of violence and insecurity in Darfur. 
  Indeed, the Council, signalling that the situation in western Sudan was now 
on its agenda and representing its first official response to Darfur, issued a press 
statement  following  the  briefing  expressing  its  ‘deep  concern  about  the  massive 
humanitarian crisis’ and calling upon the belligerent parties to negotiate a ceasefire, 
find a political solution, facilitate humanitarian access, and to ‘ensure the protection’ 
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of civilians.
 270 Not surprisingly, at this relatively early stage in its engagement with 
Darfur (although a year after conflict had erupted), coercive military intervention 
was not yet being considered by the Council. However, in this respect, the Secretary-
General somewhat pre-empted the Council by arguing that if Khartoum obstructed a 
proposed  UN  high-level  investigatory  team  from  conducting  its  mission  on  the 
ground in Darfur, then the international community “must be prepared to take swift 
and appropriate action. By ‘action’ in such situations I mean a continuum of steps, 
which  may  include  military  action.  But  the  latter  should  always  be  seen  as  an 
extreme measure, to be used only in extreme cases.”
271 Yet, while this statement may 
have  raised  the  idea  of  UN  intervention,  such  action  remained  outside  the 
calculations of Council members. 
Providing  further  evidence  that  Council  members  had  been  made  directly 
aware  of  the  nature  and  scale  of  violence  in  Darfur  —  now  including  more 
authoritative claims about direct Sudanese government involvement in attacks on 
civilians — Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bernard Ramcharan, 
briefed the Council in early May on the report of the recently-completed high-level 
UN investigation into human rights abuses in Darfur, which concluded that while the 
rebels had initiated the eruption of violent conflict in the region, it was the ‘manner 
of the response’ by Khartoum that had exacerbated the crisis: 
 
the  Government  of  Sudan  appears  to  have  sponsored  a  militia 
comprised  of  a  loose  collection  of  fighters  of  apparently  Arab 
background, mainly from Darfur, known as the ‘Janjaweed’. In other 
words, and worryingly, what appears to have been an ethnically-based 
rebellion has been met with an ethnically-based response building in 
large  part  on  long-standing,  but  largely  hitherto  contained,  tribal 
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rivalries. In certain areas of Darfur, the Janjaweed have supported the 
regular  armed  forces  in  attacking  and  targeting  civilian  populations 
suspected  of  supporting  the  rebellion,  while  in  other  locations  it 
appears that the Janjaweed have played the primary role in such attacks 
with the military in support.
272 
 
  Because of such reports of atrocities in Darfur, and under public pressure to 
respond effectively, the Council on 25 May issued its first Presidential Statement on 
Darfur,  over  a  year  since  the  conflict  had  erupted.
273  Via  the  statement  — 
representing the consensus view of the Council members, but non-binding — the 
body expressed its ‘grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian and human 
rights situation’ in Darfur and noted that ‘hundreds of thousands have been killed 
and that hundreds of thousands of people are at risk of dying in the coming months’. 
Importantly,  confirming  its  members’  acknowledgment  of  atrocities,  the  Council 
expressed ‘deep concern’ at continuing reports of:  
 
large-scale  violations  of  human  rights  and  of  international 
humanitarian  law  …  including  indiscriminate  attacks  on  civilians, 
sexual violence, forced displacement and acts of violence, especially 
those with an ethnic dimension, and demands that those responsible be 
held  accountable.  The  Council  strongly  condemns  these  acts  which 
jeopardize a peaceful solution to the crisis, stresses that all parties to 
the  N’Djamena  humanitarian  ceasefire  agreement  committed 
themselves to refraining from any act of violence or any other abuse 
against civilian populations, in particular women and children, and that 
the  Government  of  Sudan  also  committed  itself  to  neutralizing  the 
armed Janjaweed militias, and urges all parties to take necessary steps 
to  put  an  end  to  violations  of  human  rights  and  international 
humanitarian law.
274 
 
  At this time, however, the Council was focused upon supporting the African 
Union  (AU)-mediated  humanitarian  ceasefire  in  Darfur,  which  was  finalised  by 
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Khartoum, the SLM/A and the JEM on 28 May after having being signed on 8 April 
in  N’Djamena,  Chad.  The  N’Djamena  Agreement  established  the  Ceasefire 
Commission  (CFC)  and  an  AU  monitoring  and  observer  mission  —  the  African 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) — which commenced deployment in El Fasher, North 
Darfur state, on 9 June.
275 This was the first deployment of external troops inside 
Darfur, but the mandate of AMIS was far from the type of robust military operation 
that the actions of the Sudanese government suggest would have been necessary to 
protect civilians. Nevertheless, Council members appeared satisfied that a regional 
observer mission represented progress in resolving the conflict, while Khartoum’s 
willing  consent  to  the  deployment  of  AMIS  avoided,  at  this  point,  any  hostile 
confrontation regarding a violation of Sudanese sovereignty.  
  On  11  June,  the  Council  unanimously  passed  Resolution  1547,  which 
although primarily focused upon the continuing negotiations to end the north-south 
Sudan civil war and on establishing an advance UN mission in the south (to support 
a potential peacekeeping force pending a peace agreement), also referred, for the first 
time, to the crisis in Darfur.
276 The draft resolution was sponsored by Britain and 
‘reaffirmed’ the Council’s ‘commitment to the sovereignty, independence and unity 
of Sudan’, before calling upon Khartoum and the SPLM/A to ‘use their influence’ to 
end the conflict in Darfur. It also urged the Sudanese government and the Darfur 
rebels to find a political solution to their conflict, welcomed AU monitoring and 
mediation efforts, and promoted ‘constant engagement’ and ‘extensive funding’ to 
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support peace in the country.
277 Even though no mandatory measures were imposed 
by  Resolution  1547,  statements  made  during  the  meeting,  at  which  Sudan’s 
representative was invited to sit but not vote, provide an initial insight into Council 
members’ respective positions on how the body should respond to Darfur, including 
their attitudes towards the Sudanese government. 
  For example, the UK argued that while the UN’s role in facilitating the north-
south peace deal was appropriate and welcome, it was also important to recognise the 
need to engage with other troubled areas in Sudan, particularly Darfur, to avert a 
humanitarian  disaster  there.  Despite  having  been  presented  with  reports  of 
Khartoum’s involvement in atrocities against civilians, the UK stated: ‘it is right that, 
in adopting this resolution, we should look to see similar progress throughout the 
Sudan, we should reinforce again the efforts of the Government of that country, 
which is responsible throughout the country for the well-being of its citizens, and we 
should pay particular attention to the situation in Darfur and ensure that all of us and 
the humanitarian agencies play our part to avert any humanitarian catastrophe in that 
area.’
278  
Non-permanent member Germany warned that ‘a lasting peaceful settlement 
for the whole of the Sudan will be possible only when all the conflicts in the country 
have been resolved. That includes an end to the sweeping and widespread human 
rights violations in the conflict regions in the Sudan.’
279. The US drew the Council’s 
attention to the 10 June statement of the G8 — of which five Council members were 
a party — which, according to Washington, welcomed the ceasefire agreement but 
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expressed ‘grave concern over the humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in 
Darfur’ and noted ‘continuing reports of gross violations of human rights, many with 
an ethnic dimension’. Furthermore, the G8 had ‘called especially’ on Khartoum to 
‘disarm the Janjaweed and other armed groups which are responsible for massive 
human rights violations’.
280 
  Algeria argued that the ‘challenges in other regions’ of Sudan deserved a 
‘comparable mobilization effort and the full attention of the international community 
and of the Sudanese parties involved.’
281 Finally, Pakistan noted that in Darfur there 
was  a  ‘humanitarian  crisis  initiated  by  an  armed  rebellion  and  escalated  by  the 
response.  What  is  important  now  is  for  the  international  community  to  respond 
generously to this humanitarian crisis. This response has been disappointing so far. 
Therefore,  we  welcome  the  reference  in  the  resolution  to  the  need  for  extensive 
funding in support of peace in the Sudan.’ Pakistan also asserted that, in accordance 
with  precedent,  Sudan  should  have  been  given  the  right  to  address  the  Council. 
Interestingly, however, foreshadowing future Council engagement with Sudan over 
Darfur, particularly the potential for coercive military intervention, Pakistan made 
clear its position that Sudan ‘is an important member’ of the AU, Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and UN, and that as a UN member: 
 
Sudan has all the rights and privileges incumbent under the United 
Nations  Charter,  including  to  sovereignty,  political  independence, 
unity and territorial integrity — the principles that form the basis of 
international relations. Long-term peace and stability and the unity of 
the Sudan are in the interests not only of its own people, but also of the 
international community. This should be the central objective of the 
Security Council.
282 
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  Pakistan  suggested  through  its  statement  and  tone  that  it  was  less  than 
sympathetic to criticism of the Sudanese government, a position that would become 
more evident and be shared by a number of other members as Council debate on 
responding to Darfur intensified. Three Western members of the Council, in contrast, 
appeared to take a more active interest in using the UNSC to highlight the nature of 
the myriad problems inside Sudan, including the commission of human rights abuses 
in Darfur, even if their primary focus was on securing the north-south agreement. It 
was also evident that, despite a number of alarming reports and briefings, they did 
not at this stage publicly accuse the Sudanese government of having orchestrated or 
participated directly in attacks on Darfurian civilians, laying the blame instead on the 
Janjaweed. The positions of other Council members on Darfur, including those of 
permanent members France, Russia and China, had not yet been revealed. 
 
Council considers imposing sanctions on Khartoum: July 2004 
 
On  3  July,  the  UN  and  the  Sudanese  government  signed  a  key  ‘Joint 
Communiqué’, which would form the basis for the Council’s approach to Darfur for 
the remainder of 2004 and provide a benchmark against which the body could assess 
Khartoum’s  actions.
283  Under  the  terms  of  the  Communiqué,  Sudan  ‘committed’ 
itself to a number of humanitarian, human rights, security and political measures, 
including a pledge to implement a moratorium on restricting humanitarian access; to 
undertake ‘concrete measures’ to end impunity for human rights violations, including 
by investigating reports of abuses, bringing perpetrators to justice, and allowing the 
deployment of monitors; to deploy a ‘strong, credible and respected’ police force in 
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IDP camps and other vulnerable regions, to train police in human rights law, ensure 
that Janjaweed are disarmed and do not enter IDP zones, and to ensure that any 
displaced people can return home only voluntarily; and finally, Khartoum agreed to 
resume political talks with the Darfur rebels to find a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the 
conflict.  
The Communiqué established a UN-Sudan Joint Implementation Mechanism 
(JIM) — headed by the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Jan Pronk, the UN 
Secretary-General’s  Special  Representative  (SRSG)  in  Sudan  —  to  monitor  and 
assess its implementation. While the Communiqué indicated UN engagement with 
Khartoum,  the  Council  was  coming  under  greater  pressure  to  hold  the  Sudanese 
government to account, particularly after more reports of direct government support 
for  the  militias.
284  Notably,  in  a  7  July  briefing  of  the  Council,  USG  Egeland 
explained that the stories of Darfur refugees and IDPs had been ‘very consistent’: 
‘there had been helicopter gunships, very often aeroplanes, that had bombed their 
villages and then these Janjaweed militias come in to complete the job through a 
scorched earth technique, where their villages were burned down, their wells were 
polluted and their irrigation systems were destroyed’.
285  
  Indeed, providing insight into the deliberations of the Council on Darfur at 
this juncture, the Romanian representative (as Council president) told the press after 
Egeland’s  briefing  that  the  body’s  members  ‘called  for  sustained  pressure’  on 
Khartoum in order to ‘promote progress’ and to find a solution to the humanitarian 
crisis.  He  said  that  the  Council  was  considering  a  draft  resolution  on  Darfur 
circulated by the US, but that any action would depend upon the ‘performance’ of 
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Khartoum in complying with the commitments its had made. He concluded that the 
Council should be ready to ‘monitor evolutions’ and to consider the best ways in 
which it ‘can live up to its responsibilities’ regarding Darfur.
286 The representatives 
of four Council members also revealed their governments’ positions on Sudan after 
the briefing, illustrating that the debate over Darfur in the Council was seemingly 
polarising as it intensified.  
  Pakistan,  reiterating  its  existing  position  that  was  sympathetic  to  the 
Sudanese  government,  argued  that  rather  than  imposing  harsher  measures  on 
Khartoum, such as sanctions, the Council should wait and evaluate the measures 
taken to conform to the recently signed Communiqué.
287 Islamabad felt that there was 
a ‘general sense’ that Khartoum ‘is at this time aware of the seriousness of the views 
in  the  international  community  and  therefore  maybe  willing  to  implement  those 
commitments.’  Pakistan,  its  representative  implied,  would  not  be  supportive  of 
harsher  measures  in  the  Council  and  instead  emphasised  the  need  for  the 
international community to more fully support the humanitarian relief effort.  
In contrast, Germany cautioned that Sudan had in the past not honoured the 
commitments  that  it  had  made  and  it  was  thus  important  for  the  Council’s 
‘credibility’ to keep pressure on Khartoum. Moreover, if Sudan did not comply with 
the Communiqué then Berlin would consider sanctions, including an arms embargo 
against the Janjaweed and ‘Sudan as a whole’.
288 Using similarly stern language, 
France  stated  that  Khartoum  must  implement  the  Communiqué  and  that  Council 
would judge the Sudanese government ‘by its action and performance’, while the 
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content  of  the  proposed  new  resolution  would  ‘depend  very  much  on  what  will 
happen now on the ground’ in Sudan.
 289 
  Continuing the position advanced by the two European members, the United 
States warned that it was important to examine what Khartoum actually did, not just 
what  it  had  committed  to  in  the  Communiqué,  and  that  the  world  was  now 
‘watching’ Sudan, which was ‘clearly on a short leash’.
290 Making even stronger 
claims,  the  US  representative  proposed  that  much  of  the  violence  in  Darfur  was 
being committed by militias that were supported by the Sudanese government, and 
warned that Khartoum was not going to gain its desired normalised relations with the 
international community by destroying Darfur. The US told Khartoum that it had just 
‘days’  to  fulfil  its  commitments  under  the  Communiqué  and  warned  against  any 
further  tactical  delays.  Washington  supported  sanctions  against  the  Janjaweed 
(which it had proposed in the draft resolution) and potentially against Khartoum if it 
did not demonstrate compliance within a 30-day period.  
A  pattern  was  now  appearing  in  the  UNSC  in  which  Western  members 
appeared  to  be  actively  pushing  for  scrutiny  of,  and  pressure  on,  the  Sudanese 
government over its role in the Darfur crisis, while Pakistan was publicly resisting 
such calls and had argued for a more balanced approach from the Council that was 
less confrontational with, and more sympathetic towards, Khartoum. The positions of 
other Council members on Sudan remained as yet unclear, including importantly, 
those  of  China  and  Russia.  At  this  point,  the  approach  taken  by  the  Council  in 
responding to the crisis in Darfur centred upon pressuring Khartoum to implement 
the provisions of the Communiqué. The Council was briefed on such progress the 
Council by SRSG Pronk on 21 July, who told reporters outside the Council chamber 
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that while there had been important improvements in humanitarian access in Darfur, 
crucially, there had been ‘no progress whatsoever’ on the improvement of security 
for vulnerable people in the region, including the disarming of the Janjaweed, and 
the security and relocation of the IDPs.
291 This clearly represented Khartoum’s failure 
to  comply;  yet  it  was  clear  that  the  Council  was  continuing  to  avoid  accusing 
Khartoum of a direct role in atrocities against civilians  
After  the  briefing,  the  UK  representative  spoke  of  the  Council’s  ‘deep 
concern’  about  the  security  situation,  upon  which  it  would  ‘maintain  the  closest 
scrutiny’, and that ‘grave abuses have been taking place and may still be taking 
place’,  while  Khartoum  should  ‘immediately’  fulfil  its  obligations  under  the 
Communiqué.
292  When  prompted,  the  British  representative  stated  that  sanctions 
should only be considered to the extent that they would facilitate security and relief 
on the ground inside Darfur, not just for their own sake, and that at this stage the UK 
was  persuaded  more  by  the  idea  of  an  arms  embargo  than  sanctions.  Indeed, 
tellingly, in response to a reporter’s question, the UK revealed that while there was a 
strong desire by some members of the Council to create security on the ground, at 
this stage, armed intervention ‘isn’t something which is on the agenda’.
293  
 
Council gives Khartoum timetable for compliance: Resolution 1556 
 
  In its first resolution to deal primarily with the crisis in Sudan’s west, the 
UNSC  passed  Resolution  1556  on  30  July  2004,
294  which  also  represented  the 
Council’s  first  use  of  its  mandatory  powers  under  Chapter  VII  in  responding  to 
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Darfur. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Chile, France, Germany, Romania, 
Spain, the UK, and the US. Significantly, however, while all other members voted in 
favour,  China  and  Pakistan  both  abstained  from  voting;  yet,  this  still  enabled 
successful thirteen to zero passage. Even though the resolution’s legal authority was 
binding, this lack of unanimity revealed divisions within the Council and resulted in 
a  weakening  of  the  its  moral  and  political  authority.  Clearly  demonstrating  the 
Council’s appreciation of the types of atrocities being committed inside Darfur, but 
also  omitting  accusations  of  direct  Sudanese  government  participation  in  them, 
Resolution 1556 ‘condemned’: 
 
All acts of violence and violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian  law  by  all  parties  to  the  crisis,  in  particular  by  the 
Janjaweed, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, rapes, forced 
displacements,  and  acts  of  violence  especially  those  with  an  ethnic 
dimension, and [expresses] its utmost concern at the consequences of 
the  conflict  in  Darfur  on  the  civilian  population,  including  women, 
children, internally displaced persons, and refugees[.]
295 
 
  The language of the resolution reflected the Council’s method of engagement 
with Sudan, despite increasing and public evidence of atrocities, pervasive violence, 
and widespread humanitarian suffering. For example, while claiming that there will 
be  ‘no  impunity  for  violators’,  the  Council  welcomed  the  ‘commitment  by  the 
Government of Sudan to investigate the atrocities and prosecute those responsible’, 
while also emphasising the ‘commitment of the Government of Sudan to mobilize 
the armed forces of Sudan immediately to disarm the Janjaweed militias’. Yet, the 
pressure for more coercive action by the Council was building and this was reflected 
in the mandatory measures that Resolution 1556 imposed upon Sudan, which were 
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enacted under Chapter VII after it was deemed that the crisis in Darfur ‘constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region’.  
Inter  alia,  the  UNSC  ‘called  on’  Khartoum  to  ‘fulfil  immediately’  its 
Communiqué commitments by facilitating international humanitarian relief, assisting 
with  UN  investigations  into  human  rights  abuses  and  violations  of  international 
humanitarian law, establishing ‘credible security conditions for the protection of the 
civilian population and humanitarian actors’, as well as resuming political talks with 
the rebels. The Council imposed an embargo on the ‘sale or supply’ of ‘arms and 
related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles 
and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts’ to ‘all non-governmental 
entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed’ operating in Darfur (but notably, 
not on the government of Sudan). Indeed, demonstrating the Council’s position at the 
time  that  the  Janjaweed  were  primarily  responsible  for  atrocities  —  and  that 
Khartoum had merely failed to control or stop them — but also signalling a more 
coercive  approach  towards  the  Sudanese  government,  including  the  threat  of 
sanctions, the resolution: 
 
Demands  that  the  Government  of  Sudan  fulfil  its  commitments  to 
disarm  the  Janjaweed  militias  and  apprehend  and  bring  to  justice 
Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried 
out  human  rights  and  international  humanitarian  law  violations  and 
other atrocities, and further requests the Secretary-General to report in 
30 days, and monthly thereafter, to the Council on the progress or lack 
thereof by the Government of Sudan on this matter and expresses its 
intention to consider further actions, including measures as provided 
for  in  Article  41  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  on  the 
Government of Sudan, in the event of non-compliance
296  
 
During the Council meeting a number of members made statements on the 
resolution  and  explained  their  particular  vote,  revealing  an  intensification  of  the 
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emerging  political  polarisation  in  which  a  majority  of  countries  advocated  that 
pressure be placed on Khartoum — with many Western members promoting the 
threat of sanctions — while Pakistan and now, crucially, permanent member China 
opposed  harsher  scrutiny  or  coercion  of  Sudan.  Indeed,  publicly  revealing  its 
position on Sudan for the first time in the Council, China claimed that Khartoum had 
‘taken a number of measures aimed at honouring the commitment it made’ in the 
Communiqué and that this had ‘resulted in the improvement of the humanitarian 
situation’  in  Darfur.
297  Furthermore,  Beijing  ‘hoped  and  believed’  that  Khartoum 
would ‘continue to actively honour its commitments, particularly its commitment to 
disarm the Janjaweed and other illegal groups, so as effectively and materially to 
improve the security situation’. For China, the Sudanese government ‘bears primary 
responsibility  for  resolving  the  Darfur  situation’  and  that  the  international 
community should assist Khartoum in this capacity.  
  China’s language and tone was revealing of its position of support for the 
Sudanese  government:  the  Council  ‘should  listen  attentively  to  the  voice  of  the 
African Union, and its actions should be conducive to securing the cooperation of the 
Sudanese government, facilitating the resolution of the problem and contributing to 
the  security  and  stability  of  the  Sudan.’  Moreover,  Beijing  was  against  the 
‘mandatory  measures’  placed  on  the  Sudanese  government  by  the  resolution, 
claiming  that  because  ‘all  the  parties  are  speeding  up  diplomatic  efforts,  such 
measures cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and may even further 
complicate it.’ Finally, in explaining its decision to abstain from voting on the draft 
resolution, China stated that, while some modifications to the draft had been made, it 
‘had hoped that the sponsors of the draft resolution would have taken seriously into 
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consideration  Beijing’s  concerns  and  made  the  appropriate  adjustments  so  as  to 
arrive  at  a  consensus’  in  the  Council,  but  ‘[r]egrettably,  that  proposal  was  not 
accommodated or responded to.’ 
Similarly, Pakistan, which had also abstained from voting, stated that it was 
‘as  concerned’  about  the  humanitarian  crisis  in  Darfur  as  other  members  of  the 
international community and ‘fully shares’ the humanitarian objectives of Resolution 
1556.
298 It also welcomed the Communiqué as the ‘best framework’ for resolving the 
crisis. However, Islamabad argued that the ‘cooperation’ of Khartoum was essential 
to  resolving  the  crisis,  and  that  the  Council’s  efforts  should  ‘encourage  that 
cooperation, not complicate it.’ Moreover, Pakistan ‘did not believe that the threat or 
imposition of sanctions’ against Khartoum ‘was advisable under this resolution’ and 
it  ‘trusts  that  the  Security  Council  will  not  need  to  take  such  further  measures’. 
Islamabad was looking forward to the Annan’s report in 30 days ‘which we hope will 
confirm that the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups are complying with their 
commitments  and  obligations.’  Finally,  having  called  for  a  ‘more  calibrated 
response’  by  the  Council  and  having  argued  against  the  ‘adoption  of  the  entire 
resolution under Chapter VII’, Pakistan claimed that the ‘final text still lacks the 
delicate  balance  that  this  complex  situation  requires’  and  therefore,  because  ‘no 
compromise  was  possible’,  it  could  not  support  the  resolution.  Despite  this, 
Islamabad  had  successfully  insisted  that  the  resolution  include  the  ‘principle  of 
preserving the territorial integrity of the Sudan. A solution to the Darfur crisis must 
be found within the unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan’, representing a direct 
challenge to any potential calls for coercive military intervention. 
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  Conversely, the UK argued that the resolution underlined the commitments 
Khartoum had made to the international community: ‘[t]hose commitments include 
the most basic of a Government’s obligations to its own people: the obligation to 
protect them’, something which Khartoum had ‘so far failed to do.’ While the rebels 
are partly to blame for the crisis and they to must meet their commitments, London 
agreed that the threat of sanctions was an option in the Council for further Sudanese 
non-compliance.
299 Going further, the United States claimed that after years of hard 
diplomatic work to create peace and foster development and investment in Sudan, 
the  ‘last  thing  we  wanted  to  do  was  lay  the  groundwork  for  sanctions.’
300  Yet, 
Khartoum ‘has left us no choice. It has done the unthinkable. It has fostered an 
armed attack on its own civilian population. It has created a humanitarian disaster. 
So, the resolution just adopted is our necessary response if we are to help save the 
people  of  Darfur.’  Washington  argued  that  because  it  had  failed  to  meet  the 
important security provisions of the Communiqué, Sudan should not have been given 
more  time  to  comply  before  the  resolution  was  adopted.  The  US  argued  that 
Resolution 1556 would now apply necessary pressure on Khartoum, including the 
threat of sanctions, and that it was ‘time to start the clock ticking’ on the Sudanese 
government. According to the US, the actions of Khartoum and its allied militias had 
‘led  to  30,000  deaths  in  Darfur  since  February  2003’  for  which  the  Sudanese 
government bears direct responsibility: 
 
To  suppress  a  rebel  uprising  begun  in  early  2003,  the  Government 
commenced  a  campaign  of  terror  against  innocent  civilians. 
Government  aircraft  bombed  villages.  Exploiting  an  ancient  rivalry 
between Arab African herdsmen and groups of largely black Africans 
who are farmers, the Government armed the Janjaweed militias and 
unleashed them against black civilians. The Janjaweed followed the 
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Government  aircraft,  burning  villages,  destroying  crops,  murdering 
men and raping women…
301 
 
  France,  argued  that  the  primary  goal  of  the  resolution  was  to  protect  the 
people  of  Darfur  and  that  the  international  community  could  ‘not  remain  on  the 
sidelines’ while the crisis continued.
302 Noting the commitments made by Khartoum, 
France warned that within thirty days, the Council would assess the implementation 
of such commitments. ‘Failing that implementation, the Council will have no other 
choice but to plan for other actions’, including sanctions. Meanwhile Russia, which 
similarly  supported  Resolution  1556,  also  revealed  its  position  on  the  Council’s 
response to Darfur for the first time. Moscow expressed concern at the humanitarian 
and security crises in Darfur before noting that while responsibility for security in the 
region lay primarily with the Sudanese government, the rebels also played a role.
303 
For Russia, the AU was making an important contribution and should be supported 
by the Council, and a political solution should be negotiated by the AU and UN. It 
warned that the Council ‘cannot remain passive in the face of the Darfur crisis’ and 
that the resolution should send a ‘clear signal’ to Khartoum and the rebels that they 
must  act  upon  their  commitments,  while  the  Council  was  going  to  monitor  that 
progress ‘carefully’. As will be demonstrated, Russia’s initial support here for tough 
Council engagement with Sudan was later tempered and even reversed.  
There  was  important  support  for  the  resolution  from  within  Africa,  too. 
Algeria — also speaking on behalf of Angola and Benin — stated that the three 
African  countries  were  ‘satisfied’  with  the  adoption  of  the  resolution  inter  alia 
because they believed that the international community, including African members, 
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‘cannot  be  passive  and  indifferent’  towards  the  crisis  in  Darfur  and  welcomed 
‘concern at the horrendous crimes committed against the civilian population’.
304 They 
were particular supportive of the AU’s leading role and because the resolution kept 
Khartoum ‘fully engaged’ in attempts to resolve the crisis. Algeria concluded that an 
assessment of whether the Council should ‘envisage other measures’ should only be 
made after progress on the ground had been measured. 
  Finally, Sudan was invited to respond to the passage of the resolution, stating 
that while it would inevitably comply, it vehemently rejected the allegations and 
claimed  that  those  who  had  passed  it,  particularly  the  US,  had  ulterior  political 
motives and were engaged in a conspiracy against Khartoum.
305 Sudan claimed it had 
met its obligations under the Communiqué and was working hard to resolve any 
outstanding issues, rejecting calls for sanctions, and suggested that the resolution had 
been  a  foregone  conclusion  that  was  not  actually  based  on  any  assessment  of 
Sudanese  compliance.  Despite  these  protestations,  through  Resolution  1556  the 
Council had taken concrete action to place pressure on the Sudanese government to 
comply or face the prospect of sanctions. The questions now had become whether or 
not Khartoum could, and would, demonstrate such compliance within the 30-day 
timetable. 
 
Council threatens sanctions and establishes inquiry: Resolution 1564 
 
  In  a  seminal  briefing  on  2  September,  Sudan’s  level  of  compliance  was 
presented  to  the  Council  by  SRSG  Pronk,
306  who  had  in  August  negotiated  and 
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received the Sudanese government’s ‘Darfur Plan of Action’ in response to demands 
imposed  by  Resolution  1556.
307  In  his  carefully  worded  briefing,  upon  which 
sanctions could be imposed, Pronk stated that while Sudan had met some of the 
commitments it had made under the Communiqué, crucially, it had not met others.
308 
Khartoum  had  made  progress  in  improving  security  for  some  groups  of  IDPs, 
including  stopping  ‘all  offensive  military  operations’  in  those  areas;  had  shown 
restraint and avoided retaliation; and had redeployed the army away from civilian 
zones. The AU had reported no incidents of Sudanese air force attacks since the 
signing  of  the  Communiqué.  The  SRSG  also  noted  approvingly  that  Sudan  had 
started to ‘deploy additional police; to begin disarming the Popular Defence Forces; 
to  lift  all  access  restrictions  for  humanitarian  relief;  to  announce  a  policy  of 
voluntary returns only [and] to accept international human rights monitoring and 
establish national mechanisms to investigate abuses’, among other measures. On this 
progress, Pronk ‘commended’ Khartoum for such achievements within ‘this short 
period of the initial 30 days.’ However, most significantly, the SRSG then turned to 
highlight two ‘key’ areas in which the government had ‘not met its commitments’:  
 
First, it has not been able to stop attacks by militias against civilians or 
to disarm those militias. Disarming part of the Popular Defence Forces 
in  a  laudable  step,  but  it  is  not  the  same  as  disarming  all  militias, 
including  the  Janjaweed,  which  are  under  the  influence  of  the 
Government. Secondly, no concrete steps have been taken to bring to 
justice or even identify any of the militia leaders or the perpetrators of 
these  attacks,  allowing  violations  of  human  rights  to  continue  in  a 
climate of impunity.
309 
 
  In  response  to  Pronk’s  briefing,  the  Council  on  18  September  passed 
Resolution 1564, which was co-sponsored by Germany, Romania, Spain, the UK and 
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the United States. It was passed eleven to zero, with abstentions again from China 
and  Pakistan  and  now  additionally  from  Algeria  and  Russia.
310  In  its  operational 
paragraphs, the resolution expressed the Council’s ‘determination to do everything 
possible to end the suffering of the people of Darfur’ and again determined ‘that the 
situation  in  Sudan  constitutes  a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security  and  to 
stability in the region’. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council declared its ‘grave 
concern’ that Khartoum had ‘not fully met its obligations’ under Resolution 1556 
and the Communiqué to ‘improve, as expected by the Council, the security of the 
civilian population of Darfur in the face of continued depredations’, while it also 
‘deplored’ ceasefire violations, including ‘Government of Sudan helicopter assaults 
and Janjaweed attacks on Yassin, Hashaba and Gallab villages on 26 August’.
311  
However,  the  resolution  did  not  go  as  far  as  to  accuse  the  Sudanese 
government of targeting civilians directly, maintaining the Council’s position that it 
was the militias that were engaged in atrocities (despite admitting that they were 
‘under  the  influence’  of  Khartoum).  Indeed,  via  Resolution  1564  the  Council 
‘reiterated  its  call’  for  Khartoum  to  ‘end  the  climate  of  impunity  in  Darfur  by 
identifying  and  bringing  to  justice  all  those  responsible,  including  members  of 
popular  defence  forces  and  Janjaweed  militias,  for  the  widespread  human  rights 
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law’, and insisted that Khartoum 
‘take all appropriate steps to stop all violence and atrocities’.
312  
In  addition  to  the  numerous  authoritative  reports  already  presented  to  the 
Council  on  the  nature  and  scale  of  violence  in  Darfur,  Resolution  1564  also 
importantly  authorised  the  Secretary-General  to  establish  an  ‘international 
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commission  of  inquiry’  to  ‘investigate  reports  of  violations  of  international 
humanitarian  law  and  human  rights  law  in  Darfur  by  all  parties’,  as  well  as  to 
identify  ‘whether  or  not  acts  of  genocide  have  occurred,  and  to  identify  the 
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held 
accountable’.
313  
Finally, reiterating its threat of sanctions should Khartoum ‘fail to comply 
fully’ with the resolution or with Resolution 1556, or fail to ‘cooperate fully’ with 
AMIS  monitors,  the  Council  would  ‘consider  taking  additional  measures  as 
contemplated in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as actions to 
affect  Sudan’s  petroleum  sector  and  the  Government  of  Sudan  or  individual 
members of the Government of Sudan, in order to take effective action to obtain such 
full compliance or full cooperation’.
314 Yet, while the type of potential sanctions were 
here made more explicit relative to the conditions in Resolution 1556, in this case the 
timeframe for compliance was ambiguous, representing the Council’s retraction from 
a  more  coercive  approach  to  the  Sudanese  government.  Indeed,  the  more  some 
Council members appeared to push for harsher measures against Sudan to compel 
compliance, the more resolute other members acted to defend Khartoum or deflect 
criticism from it.  
For example, Russia explained that it had abstained from voting because it 
was ‘convinced that threatening sanctions is far from the best method of inducing 
Khartoum to fully implement its obligations to the United Nations. In order to do 
that,  we  should  use  approved  diplomatic  methods.’
315  Moscow  felt  that  it  was 
‘counterproductive to link the possibility of introducing sanctions and the peace-
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building efforts’ of the AU, which would have more appropriately been covered 
under  Chapter  VIII  (regarding  the  relationship  between  the  UN  and  regional 
organisations).  
Fellow abstainer, China, argued that ‘[o]ver the past few months, the situation 
in Darfur has greatly improved and it is now moving in the right direction’.
316 Beijing 
claimed that Khartoum had ‘shown its sincerity in trying to resolve the problem, and 
has adopted many measures accordingly. That objective reality cannot be denied.’ 
According to China, ‘[u]nder those circumstances, and given the complexity of the 
Darfur issue, the Security Council and the international community should focus on 
encouraging the Sudanese government to continue to cooperate, rather than doing the 
opposite.’ Beijing had abstained because the draft resolution would ‘not contribute to 
the solution of the problem’, but did not veto it only because it wanted to see the 
Council continue to support the work of the AU. Finally, the Chinese representative 
‘noted that the sponsors have repeatedly stated that the threat of sanctions will not be 
automatically carried out. I wish to reiterate the fact that China’s position against 
sanctions remains unchanged. It has been our consistent view that, instead of helping 
to solve complicated problems, sanctions may make them even more complicated.’ 
Similarly, in explaining its own position and abstention, Algeria stated that it 
had interpreted Pronk’s assessment to mean that Sudan had shown progress towards 
meeting  its  commitments  under  Resolution  1556,  and  thus  it  had  hoped  that  the 
Council would have emphasised this and urged Khartoum to further improve in the 
areas in which it had failed to comply.
317 Algiers expected that the Council would 
have put more pressure on the rebels to find a political solution and be cantoned. Yet, 
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it  claimed,  because  neither  Annan  nor  Pronk  made  such  recommendations,  and 
‘because  we  believed  that  a  dynamic  of  cooperation  had  replaced  the  spirit  of 
confrontation,  we  did  not  expect  the  Security  Council  to  threaten  the  Sudanese 
Government once again with recourse to sanctions.’ As the draft resolution had not 
been sufficiently modified, Algeria abstained because it ‘does not really do justice’ 
to Khartoum. Finally, according to Algeria, the resolution was problematic because it 
called for an international inquiry to determine if genocide had been committed, a 
measure which would only inhibit the resolution of the crisis.  
The  final  abstainer,  Pakistan,  did  not  vote  on  the  resolution  because,  it 
argued, the Sudanese government had immediately set about complying with the 
Council’s previous demands while acknowledging that the time frame would be too 
short to demonstrate effective compliance in some areas.
318 Islamabad claimed that 
the new draft resolution was ‘not consistent’ with the UN’s own reports from the 
ground in Sudan, which allegedly showed that Khartoum was complying. Pakistan 
noted that it had been successful in pushing for a more balanced resolution, although 
the end result was not sufficiently so, and it could not ‘endorse the use, or the threat 
of use, of sanctions, which … would be unhelpful in this situation.’ 
  Once again, in contrast to these stated positions, the US claimed that the 
Council was acting through the resolution because Khartoum had ‘failed to fully 
comply’ with Resolution 1556.
319 It warned that the Sudanese government now must 
‘meet in practice its verbal commitments’ to accept an expanded AU operation in 
Darfur, and that if it didn’t, the Council would be forced to consider sanctions. The 
US argued that the Sudanese government had only made commitments, and met 
some of them, due to the pressure placed upon it by the international community, 
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including through the threat of sanctions. Furthermore, the government met some of 
the commitments ‘with great reluctance and after long delays that thwarted an early, 
effective humanitarian response.’ Washington called the crisis in Darfur a man-made 
one that was ‘fabricated’ by Khartoum, which was ‘intent on persecution, intent on 
breaking the spirit of an entire people — as an over-reaction to a rebellion.’  
The other members of the Council that supported Resolution 1564, including 
Britain  and  France,  generally  emphasised  the  need  to  save  lives  and  protect 
vulnerable  civilians  in  Darfur,  and  that  the  Sudanese  government  needed  to 
demonstrate progress toward that end. If it did not, then the Council should persuade 
it to do so in a speedy fashion, they argued.
320 Finally, Sudan was also afforded the 
opportunity to respond to the resolution, claiming that it was a blow to the peace 
process as it would inevitably undermine local efforts to reach a political solution to 
the conflict.
321 Khartoum argued that it had in fact honoured its commitments while 
contending that it was working towards resolving outstanding problems. It claimed 
that many parts of the resolution ‘represent the worst form of injustice and indignity’ 
and argued that sanctions would only exacerbate the root social and economic causes 
of the Darfur crisis. Khartoum again labelled the resolution as a politically motivated 
attempt to undermine the Sudanese government by its enemies in Washington and 
elsewhere. 
  After two key resolutions addressing Darfur, the positions and voting patterns 
in  the  Council  had  become  clearer.  The  US  led  a  majority  block  of  European, 
African,  Asian  and  Latin  American  members  which  publicly  supported  harsher 
measures against Khartoum while, crucially, China and now Russia demonstrated 
that  they  were  less  supportive  of  more  coercive  action  against  the  Sudanese 
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government and favoured a more conciliatory approach. In this position they were 
supported by non-permanent members Pakistan and Algeria. As a result, the moral 
and  political  authority  and  crisis-resolving  potential  of  Resolution  1564  was 
compromised, despite its clear passage; the Council, particularly amongst the veto-
wielding P5, appeared to be effectively split on how to respond to Darfur. Indeed, up 
to this point, the debate had only been over the imposition of ambiguously defined 
sanctions on Sudan. Despite clear evidence of Sudanese involvement in attacks on 
civilians in Darfur — a point which the Council had officially avoided making — 
and growing acceptance that Khartoum was acting to obstruct or subvert a number of 
less coercive initiatives to provide the region’s vulnerable population with security 
on  the  ground,  any  proposals  for  military  intervention  remained  firmly  off  the 
Council’s agenda.  
Following  Resolution  1564,  a  period  of  relative  stasis  in  the  Council’s 
response to Darfur ensued. In the absence of decisive further Council action or the 
implementation of measures contained in Resolution 1564 — aside from establishing 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (COI)
322 — the focus for the UN 
Secretariat  became  supporting  the  expansion  of  the  AMIS  observer  force,  and 
potentially diverting resources from the UN advance mission in southern Sudan to 
Darfur.
323 Indeed, the Council appeared to be comfortable with the AU taking the 
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lead  on  Darfur,  with  AMIS  troops  being  the  only  external  forces  considered  for 
deployment in the region, not least of which because of Khartoum’s consent.  
On 20 October the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided that AMIS 
would have an initial mandate of one year to monitor and observe compliance with 
the ceasefire agreement, assist in the confidence-building process, to contribute to 
the  security  of  humanitarian  relief,  the  return  of  IDPs  and  refugees,  while 
contributing  to  general  security  in  Darfur.  AMIS  was  to  be  boosted  to  3,320 
personnel, including 2,342 military of which 450 would be observers, 815 civilian 
police, and other civilian personnel.
324 However, considering the size of Darfur and 
the nature and scale of violence and insecurity in the region, it was clear to everyone 
that  AMIS  would  be  inadequate  in  effectively  providing  security  for  Darfurians; 
moreover, its mandate did not include robust civilian protection. 
  In  November,  SRSG  Pronk  warned  the  Council  that  ‘in  Darfur  itself  the 
situation has greatly deteriorated’ and that he was ‘afraid that the situation … may 
become unmanageable unless greater efforts are made both at the negotiating table 
and on the ground.
325 The only official Council action in response was the issuing of 
a press statement by rotating president, the United States, noting that the Council was 
‘deeply  concerned’  about  the  ‘deterioration  of  the  security  and  humanitarian 
situation’.
326 More concerted action failed to occur despite the Council condemning 
‘ongoing  violations  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  such  as  attacks  on 
civilians, sexual violence and hostage-taking that are being perpetrated in Darfur by 
all parties including the Government of the Sudan, rebel groups, and the Janjaweed 
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militias.’ In fact, this was the first time that the UNSC had accused the Sudanese 
government of attacks on its own civilian citizens in Darfur, but it did not provoke 
any new action on behalf of the Council; indeed, the threat of sanctions seemed to 
have been relegated in the Council’s approach, not even being mentioned in the 
statement. 
  On  18–19  November,  the  Council  met  in  Nairobi,  Kenya,  to  finalise  the 
impending north-south Sudan peace agreement, although the crisis in Darfur was 
unavoidably  a  subject  of  discussion.
327  During  the  meeting,  Vice-President  Taha 
addressed the Council, the highest-ranking Sudanese official to do so since the body 
became engaged with the Darfur crisis. Taha claimed, inter alia, that the conflict in 
Darfur was ‘instigated by local groups with the support of foreign parties’ and that 
his  government  was  acting  in  good  faith  to  reach  a  political  agreement  and  to 
alleviate  the  humanitarian  crisis.
328  During  the  meeting,  the  Council  unanimously 
passed Resolution 1574, which, while focused upon the north-south peace process, 
also  referred  to  Darfur,  although  these  references  were  primarily  perfunctory 
restatements of existing demands or observations.
329 Most notably, and not acting 
under  Chapter  VII,  it  stated  that  the  Council,  in  ‘accordance  with  its  previous 
resolutions  on  Sudan,  decides  to  monitor  compliance  by  the  parties  with  their 
obligations … and, subject to a further decision of the Council, to take appropriate 
action  against  any  party  failing  to  fulfil  its  commitments’.
330  This  was  further 
evidence of the body’s retraction from a more coercive response to Darfur. 
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Indeed, reflecting on a year that had seen genuine Council engagement with 
the Darfur crisis but also the emergence of divisions within the body (particularly 
amongst the P5) on how it should respond further, SRSG Pronk in mid-December 
told the media that “it was time for more than ‘kind words and recommendations’ 
from  the  big  powers.  All  the  Sudanese  parties  needed  to  see  a  united  front, 
particularly  from  the  Security  Council.”
331  Furthermore,  Pronk  was  quoted, 
Khartoum and the Darfur rebels ‘need to see that the [P5] are no longer divided on 
the way forward … If the Sudanese Government and the rebels were faced with a 
unified front, with the powerful nations in the world saying that they would not 
tolerate non compliance with the Council’s resolution, the parties would have no 
other choice but to come up with a negotiated political solution”.
332  
 
COI findings create new pressure for Council action: Early 2005 
 
  In  2005,  Argentina,  Denmark  and  Greece,  Japan,  and  Tanzania  replaced 
Chile  Germany  and  Spain,  Pakistan,  and  Angola,  respectively,  as  non-permanent 
members of the Council. One of their first acts was to oversee on 9 January the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Sudanese government 
and  the  SPLM/A  in  Nairobi,  Kenya,  formally  ending  the  long-running  civil  war 
between  north  and  south  Sudan  and  establishing  a  political  power-sharing 
arrangement, which the Council hoped would ‘mark a watershed in the history of the 
Sudan.’
333  The  rotating  Council  president,  Argentina,  urged  the  forthcoming 
Government of National Unity (GNU) in Sudan to ‘commit itself fully and actively 
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to  ending  the  violence  in  Darfur,  thereby  extending  the  benefits  of  the  [CPA] 
throughout  the  national  territory.’  The  agreement  had  two  potentially  important 
consequences  for  Darfur.  First,  the  political  compromises  that  had  been  enacted 
could lead to a change in Khartoum’s counter-insurgency strategy in Darfur. Second, 
now that north-south Sudan peace had been reached, the Council could focus on 
Darfur  after  a  number  of  months  of  inaction.  Indeed,  in  the  face  of  continuing 
violence and crisis in Darfur and stalemate inside the Council, the US representative 
claimed in mid-January that ‘sanctions were clearly still on the table’,
334 but it was 
clear that this position was not one shared by all Council members. 
  Nevertheless, pressure for the Council to take more coercive action against 
the Sudanese government was increased significantly by the release of the Council-
mandated International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur on 1 February (see Chapter 
2 for the report’s main findings). The Secretary-General supported Washington’s 
assertion  that  sanctions  should  have  remained  a  consideration  for  the  Council 
because the COI had found that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were 
‘responsible for crimes under international law’ and that ‘attacks on villages, killing 
of civilians, rape, pillaging and forced displacement have continued even while it 
was  conducting  its  inquiry.’  Annan  said  of  the  COI:  ‘Its  most  important 
recommendation, to which I hope the Security Council will give immediate and very 
serious attention, is that ‘action must be taken urgently to end these violations’.
335 It 
was evident that such findings would compel the Council into taking new forms of 
action on Darfur, but the extent to which Council members would be prepared to 
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take a more coercive approach to dealing with Khartoum over its role in atrocities 
was unclear.  
Indeed, tellingly, before the UNSC was due to be officially briefed on the 
COI’s report in mid-February, a special session of the Council had been scheduled to 
celebrate the signing of the CPA and to discuss the proposed consensual deployment 
of  a  10,000-strong  UN  peacekeeping  operation  in  southern  Sudan  to  support  its 
implementation.
336  The  meeting  was  attended  by  AU  and  UN  representatives, 
SPLM/A  leader  John  Garang,  and,  crucially,  Vice-President  Taha,  whose 
government had just been accused of atrocities by the COI — which he rejected — 
and
 who personally had just been ‘entrusted with the Darfur file’ by President Bashir.  
While the focus of the meeting was on the CPA, Council president, Benin, 
stated that the body condemned ‘continuing ceasefire violations and acts of violence 
in Darfur’ and ‘deplored the continuing attacks on civilians’. The Council urged 
‘Sudanese authorities at all levels and all the rebels’ to comply with the demands of 
existing resolutions on Darfur. Moreover, noting the COI’s finding, the Council’s 
members ‘condemned the serious crimes under international law which had been 
committed in Darfur’ and ‘stressed their determination to tackle impunity and to 
ensure  that  the  perpetrators  are  brought  to  justice.’
337  Yet  despite  such 
condemnations,  the  Council’s  cooperation  with  the  Sudanese  government  on  the 
CPA,  as  evidenced  by  its  interactions  with  Taha,  appeared  to  preclude  a  more 
coercive approach to dealing with the crisis and atrocities in Sudan’s west. 
  The Council was officially briefed on the COI report on 16 February by the 
Secretary-General  and  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  (HCHR), 
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Louise Arbour.
338 Annan called the report ‘one of the most important documents in 
the recent history of the United Nations. It makes chilling reading, and it is an urgent 
call to action.’ He told the Council it ‘established that many people in Darfur have 
been  the  victims  of  atrocities  perpetrated  on  a  very  large  scale  for  which  the 
Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible — including war crimes 
and, very likely, crimes against humanity’, while also noting that rebel groups were 
also implicated in possible war crimes. Annan said that it was ‘vital that these crimes 
not  be  left  unpunished’,  noting  the  COI’s  recommendation  that  the  situation  in 
Darfur be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and added that the 
report demonstrated ‘beyond all doubt, that the past two years have been little short 
of hell on earth for our fellow human beings in Darfur. And despite the attention the 
Council has paid to the crisis, that hell continues to this day.’ He argued that the 
‘international community, led by the Council, must immediately find a way to halt 
the killing and protect the vulnerable. The full range of options should be on the table 
—  including  targeted  sanctions,  stronger  peacekeeping  efforts,  new  measures  to 
protect  civilians  and  increased  pressure  on  both  sides  for  a  lasting  political 
solution.’
339 
  HCHR Arbour stated that one way to ‘reduce the carnage’ in Darfur was to 
‘remove  from  their  positions  those  who  orchestrate  and  execute  it’  and  that  the 
Council’s establishment of the COI was a good step in that direction.
340 She said that 
the COI’s findings represented a ‘blueprint for action’ rather than simply a measure 
to  bring  justice  for  past  atrocities.  Importantly,  in  direct  contradiction  of  Taha’s 
previous statements to the Council rejecting external interference in Sudanese affairs 
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and claiming that Sudan’s judicial system could and should prosecute any crimes in 
Darfur,  Arbour  noted  that  the  COI  had  ‘reviewed  steps  taken  by  the  Sudanese 
Government and by judicial authorities to address those crimes, and it concluded that 
they  were  both  unwilling  and  unable  to  act’,  citing  the  weakness  and  perceived 
impartiality of the Sudanese justice system, the contravention of many human rights 
laws  in  Sudanese  law,  and  the  insufficient  number  and  inadequate  nature  of 
prosecutions by the system to date regarding the Darfur conflict. Most crucially, 
however, Arbour proposed that: 
 
In my view, any new initiative proposed by the Government of Sudan 
today to address these crimes could not be supported in the light of the 
Commission’s conclusion. In particular, the extent of involvement of 
Government officials — as documented by the Commission — would 
appear to foreclose such options.
341 
 
This argument should also have been applied to the provision of security in 
Darfur.  As  such,  because  the  Sudanese  government  was  directly  responsible  for 
exacerbating insecurity in Darfur, including by attacking the civilian population, it 
should  have  had  its  control  of  security  in  the  region  curtailed  by  the  coercive 
deployment of an external force. Indeed, highlighting the urgency need for more 
effective Council action, on the ground in Darfur by mid-February 2005, according 
to the UN, ‘[m]ost estimates put at 70,000 the number of people killed since the 
conflict began … with another 1.65 million internally displaced and 200,000 more 
who fled over the border into Chad’.
342 The release of the COI’s report and Arbour 
and Annan’s briefing of the Council were significant developments in the context in 
which the Darfur crisis would now be viewed. Moreover, increased pressure had 
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been placed upon the Council to respond, and it would need to at least be seen to be 
taking new action in light of the documented atrocities against civilians and direct 
involvement of the Sudanese government in them. 
 
Council re-engages with Darfur: March 2005 
 
  Indeed, in March 2005, in the face of mounting pressure, the Council re-
engaged with Darfur. For example, urging the Council to act more forcefully, Annan 
called an informal meeting of the body on 7 March to discuss new options to address 
the Darfur crisis, in which he attempted to ‘press for a beefed up international force 
on the ground’.
343 Annan suggested either strengthening the 1,900 AMIS monitors 
already  in  Darfur  or  deploying  a  new  UN  force,  with  or  without  the  AU  troops 
included, claiming that ‘everyone agrees that a stronger international presence on the 
ground is crucial.’
344 Additionally, SRSG Pronk concluded that recent attacks on aid 
convoys and other humanitarian workers, which ultimately diminish the relief of 
desperate civilians, would continue ‘unless a very robust protection force of at least 
8,000 troops is deployed’ in Darfur to protect civilians and the humanitarian relief 
operation.
345  In  consideration  was  if  and  how  UNAMIS  in  south  Sudan  could 
contribute to security in Darfur.
346 Yet, crucial in this equation was the consent of the 
Sudanese government, and, absent such consent, how far members of the Council 
would be willing to act coercively.  
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  In this context, Resolution 1590, which established for an initial six-months 
period in southern Sudan the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was passed 
unanimously by the Council on 24 March at the request of the parties to the CPA.
347 
Designed as a peacekeeping force to take over the existing UN advance mission, 
UNMIS,  consisting  of  10,000  UN  troops  and  715  civilian  police,  was  mandated 
under Chapter VII to ‘take all necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its 
forces  and  as  it  deems  within  its  capabilities’  to  protect  UN  personnel  and 
humanitarian  workers,  and  ‘without  prejudice  to  the  responsibility  of  the 
Government  of  Sudan,  to  protect  civilians  under  imminent  threat  of  physical 
violence’. Yet, as it was aimed primarily at supporting and implementing the CPA, 
UNMIS was only authorised to ‘liaise’ with AMIS over the crisis in Darfur. As such, 
the resolution requested the Secretary-General within 30 days to provide ‘options for 
how UNMIS can reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate 
assistance to AMIS’, although this was limited to logistical and technical support.  
This passage of a Council resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping force in 
Sudan  —  including  Chapter  VII  authority  for  civilian  protection  —  was  made 
possible by the signing of the CPA and moreover by the consent of the Sudanese 
government. Yet, despite Khartoum’s invitation to deploy external troops in southern 
Sudan, a similar force in Darfur would be precluded by the government’s rejection of 
any  more  robust  measures  by  the  Council  in  the  country’s  west.  Tellingly,  the 
Sudanese representative thanked the sponsors of Resolution 1590 for their ‘rational 
approach  in  defining  the  Mission’s  mandate  in  a  separate  resolution.  We  fully 
appreciate the wisdom of the members of the Council and their cooperation aimed at 
ensuring the unanimous adoption of this resolution so very important and historic for 
                                                        
347 UN Security Council, Resolution 1590 (2005), S/RES/1590/2005, March 24, 2005.   158 
Sudan’, implying that the Council had deliberately detached the issue of supporting 
the CPA from dealing with crimes against humanity in Darfur.
348 While this was 
good news for the people of southern Sudan, it perpetuated pervasive insecurity for 
the population of Darfur. 
  Nevertheless, five days later, on 29 March, the Council did return to address 
Darfur specifically and took a more coercive approach, passing Resolution 1591, its 
second on Sudan for the month.
349 The successful draft resolution was introduced by 
the  United  States  and  supported  by  12  members  —  Argentina,  Benin,  Brazil, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, the Philippines, Romania, the UK, Tanzania and 
the US — with three abstentions, from China, Russia and Algeria. Passed entirely 
under  Chapter  VII,  and  determining  that  the  ‘situation  in  Sudan  continues  to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security’, the resolution expressed how 
the Council ‘deplored’ that the Sudanese government and the rebels had not abided 
by previous Council resolutions on Darfur, the ceasefire agreement, or the Abuja 
peace process, and noted, inter alia, ‘air strikes by the Government of Sudan in 
December  2004  and  January  2005’  and  the  ‘failure’  of  Khartoum  to  ‘disarm 
Janjaweed militiamen and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their 
associates who have carried out human rights and international law violations and 
other atrocities’.  
Operationally, ‘in light of the failure of all parties to the conflict in Darfur to 
fulfil  their  commitments’,  the  Council  established  a  ‘Committee  of  the  Security 
Council’, consisting of all of its members and assisted by a four-member Panel of 
Experts,  to  conduct  technical  assessments  of  compliance  and  violations,  to 
implement travel and financial sanctions against individuals yet-to-be-identified by 
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the  Committee  who  ‘impede  the  peace  process,  constitute  a  threat  to  stability  in 
Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human 
rights law or other atrocities’, or who violate the existing arms embargo, the latter of 
which  was  extended  to  all  parties  to  the  N’Djamena  ceasefire  agreement  (now 
including  the  Sudanese  government).  It  also  demanded  that  the  Sudanese 
government ‘immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the 
Darfur region’. The sanctions were to come into force 30 days after the passage of 
the  resolution,  while  the  Council  would  consider  further  sanctions  if  there  were 
additional violations or non-compliance with existing commitments and resolutions.  
During the Council session, the three members that abstained from voting 
made public statements, along with Tanzania, the US, and Sudan.
350 Russia argued 
that while it was concerned about the lack of compliance by all parties in the Darfur 
conflict, it wanted to ensure that the Council, in ‘righting this negative situation’, did 
not damage implementation of the CPA. Moscow contended that the ‘potential of 
political and diplomatic measures to defuse the conflict … has by no means been 
exhausted.’  It  claimed  that  imposing  sanctions  on  the  nascent  Government  of 
National Unity would not be conducive to a productive start, although ‘naturally, 
[this] does not negate the justification for targeted pressure on those who in fact are 
creating obstacles to normalizing the situation in Darfur.’ Russia did not support the 
resolution based on its position that sanctions in Sudan would be difficult for the 
Council to implement and that a more effective process was needed to get peace talks 
back on track.  
China, similarly, stated that it did not support the draft because it had ‘serious 
reservations  about  the  resolution’  and  also  warned  that  sanctions  imposed  on 
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individuals relating to Darfur could complicate the CPA. Beijing argued that, while 
pressure should be maintained on the parties to resolve the conflict, ‘just maintaining 
pressure  without  regard  for  the  complexity  of  the  issue  and  the  specific 
circumstances of the Darfur crisis could end up further complicating the situation and 
making  it  even  more  difficult  to  resolve.’  The  Chinese  claimed  that  the  Council 
should play a constructive role, not a negative one — such as by imposing sanctions, 
which China ‘has always taken a cautious approach to’ — and that because Chinese 
concerns  were  not  reflected  in  amendments  to  the  draft,  it  did  not  support  the 
resolution. 
Non-permanent Algeria argued that, while it too was concerned about the 
plight of Darfurians and emphasised the role of the AU in attempting to resolve the 
crisis, the Council itself should ‘adopt a positive and balanced approach that takes 
account  of  the  complexity  of  the  situation  in  the  Sudan  and  that  respects  that 
country’s  sovereignty,  unity  and  territorial  integrity.’  Algiers  also  argued  that 
sanctions  could  hinder  the  CPA,  and  it  ‘regretted’  that  unanimity  on  the  draft 
resolution had not been secured as it believed that ‘there was consensus within the 
Council on the need to send a strong message to the parties to cause them to respect 
their  commitments.’  The  reasons  for  a  lack  of  consensus,  Algiers  argued,  was 
because the sponsors ‘made no efforts to iron out the disagreements’ and decided to 
leave the draft text unchanged, despite the efforts of those members that wanted 
some changes to achieve such consensus.  
Sudan,  which  was  given  the  opportunity  to  reply  to  the  passage  of  the 
resolution, argued that the resolution and its threat of sanctions was irresponsible and 
would complicate matters in the country, including the resolution of the Darfur crisis. 
It argued that the rebels relied on the Council to threaten the Sudanese government   161 
and for this reason the rebels had stalled political negotiations. Khartoum claimed 
that  the  draft  resolution  was  a  product  of  the  US  Congress,  which  had  no 
understanding of or concern for different cultures, and indeed the AU position on the 
conflict  had  been  ignored.  Washington  replied  briefly  that  the  US  Congress  did 
understand the conflict and culture in Sudan and indeed many members of Congress 
had travelled to Darfur to experience the situation there first-hand. 
  The voting on Resolution 1591 represented a continuation of existing trends 
in  the  Council  on  Darfur:  permanent  members  China  and  Russia  were  again 
extremely reluctant to criticise Sudan and were not supportive of sanctions, and they 
were joined in abstaining from the vote by non-permanent member Algeria, which 
called for the Council to respect Sudanese sovereignty. As sponsor of the resolution, 
the United States again appeared to be leading the push for harsher measures against 
Sudan — supported by a majority of the body’s members  — while engaging in 
diplomatic  jibes  with  Khartoum  over  the  countries’  respective  political  interests. 
Despite the continuation of divisions within the Council, particularly between its 
permanent membership, the Council had finally established a sanctions regime on 
Sudan, even if it was limited in scope and as yet unclear about which individuals 
would be subjected to it, and had extended the arms embargo to cover the operations 
of the Sudanese military in Darfur.  
Two days later, on 31 March, in its third key action on Sudan for the month, 
the Council adopted Resolution 1593 by attracting 11 positive votes, although it also 
saw four abstentions from a seemingly unlikely coalition of China, the United States, 
Algeria, and Brazil.
  351 Sponsored by Britain, Resolution 1593 was relatively short 
but highly significant for the body’s response to the Darfur crisis specifically and for 
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international criminal justice more generally: the resolution’s referral of the situation 
in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court was 
the first of its kind by the Council since the Court was established on that date. The 
Darfur referral was based upon the findings and recommendations of the COI report 
and the resolution was passed under Chapter VII.  
In  making  the  ICC  referral,  the  Council  ‘decided’  that  that  the  Sudanese 
government and other parties to the conflict ‘shall cooperate fully with and provide 
any necessary assistance’ to the prosecutor’s investigation. Welcoming the passage 
of Resolution 1593, the Secretary-General stated that he commended the Council for 
‘using  its  authority  under  the  [ICC’s]  Rome  Statute  to  provide  an  appropriate 
mechanism  to  lift  the  veil  of  impunity  that  has  allowed  human  rights  crimes  in 
Darfur to continue unchecked’ and congratulated it members for ‘overcoming their 
differences to allow the Council to act to ensure that those responsible for atrocities 
in Darfur are held to account.’
352 Illustrating the significance and contentious nature 
of  the  resolution,  as  well  as  the  intensification  of  the  body’s  deliberations  on 
responding to the crimes and crisis in Darfur, all Council members plus Sudan made 
statements during the Council session.  
Explaining its decision to abstain from voting, the US claimed that while it 
‘strongly support[s] bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and atrocities 
that have occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity’, and that ‘justice 
must be served there’, it instead ‘believes that the better mechanism would have been 
a hybrid tribunal in Africa’.
353 However, Washington did not veto the draft resolution 
because it was ‘important that the international community speak with one voice in 
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order to help promote effective accountability’ and because of the included provision 
that the ICC not be able to prosecute any US officials or military personnel in Sudan. 
As a non-party to the ICC, it was evident that Washington’s abstention pertained to 
its generic position — that it ‘continues to fundamentally object to the view that the 
ICC should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government 
officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute. That strikes at the essence of the 
nature of sovereignty’
354 — rather than any specific desire to preclude prosecution for 
crimes in Darfur.  
Conversely, fellow abstainer Brazil — also at the time the Council president 
— stated that it was fully supportive of the ICC referral and yet did not support the 
resolution  because  of  the  very  exemptions  from  prosecution  it  made  for  certain 
categories of individuals that the US insisted it include: ‘nationals, current or former 
officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to 
the Rome Statute … shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing 
State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan 
established or authorised by the Council or the African Union’.
355 In this sense, Brazil 
argued that the authority of the ICC should be strengthened, not weakened for the 
sake  of  negotiating  a  specific  Council  resolution,  despite  the  importance  of  the 
Darfur referral in the context of that particular crisis. 
  Making  a  different  argument,  China  stated  that  had  also  abstained  on 
Resolution 1593 because ‘when trying to ensure justice, it is also necessary to make 
every effort to avoid any negative impact on the political negotiations on Darfur. 
When  punishing  the  perpetrators,  it  is  also  necessary  to  promote  national 
reconciliation. When trying to solve the question of Darfur, it is also necessary to 
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sustain hard-won results in the North-South peace process.’
356 Beijing went on to 
state  that  ‘[b]ased  on  that  position  and  out  of  respect  for  national  judicial 
sovereignty, we would prefer to see perpetrators of gross violations of human rights 
stand trial in the Sudanese judicial system’. Indeed, China did not support the Darfur 
referral absent the consent of Khartoum, it said, and more generally opposed the 
ICC, an institution to which it was also not a party. For Algeria, the AU was the 
appropriate body to deal with the crisis in Darfur, including implementing measures 
to bring to justice perpetrators of crimes in the region, but because the Council had 
again ignored AU suggestions, Algiers had abstained from voting.  
  Of the group of 11 Council members that supported Resolution 1593, the UK 
argued that by passing this resolution, which it had sponsored, the Council had ‘acted 
to ensure accountability for the grave crimes committed in Darfur’, and hoped that it 
would  ‘send  a  salutary  warning  to  anyone  intending  to  commit  any  further  such 
atrocities.’
357 According to London, the Council’s referral to the ICC was the ‘most 
efficient and effective means available to deal with impunity and to ensure justice for 
the people of Darfur.’ France similarly argued that the Council was ‘duty bound to 
take action’ in regards to the reports of atrocities presented, such as by the COI. As 
such, Paris supported the ICC referral because it ‘sent a twofold and very forceful 
message not only to all those who have committed or might be tempted to commit 
atrocities in Darfur, but also to the victims: the international community will not 
allow  those  crimes  to  go  unpunished.’  France  claimed  that  this  resolution 
demonstrated  that  the  body  would  ‘remain  vigilant  to  ensure  that  there  is  no 
impunity’  and  that  the  ICC  was  the  ‘symbol  of  such  hope  for  the  victims  of 
atrocities.’  The  final  permanent  member,  Russia,  also  stated  its  support  for  the 
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resolution because ‘[a]ll who are guilty of gross violations of human rights in Darfur 
must  be  duly  punished’,  and  as  such  the  ICC  referral  would  ‘contribute  to  an 
effective solution in the fight against impunity in Darfur in the context of providing 
for the normalization and stability of the situation in that region…’
358 
  Finally, the Council invited Sudan to respond to the passage of Resolution 
1593, to which Khartoum reiterated its claims that the body was acting unwisely 
because its actions would ‘complicate’ the situation on the ground in Darfur, and 
argued that the Council was imposing double standards of justice in light of the 
exceptions made in the resolution over categories of persons that could not come 
under the court’s jurisdiction (a thinly-veiled critique of the US position).
359 Sudan 
also claimed that African suggestions for resolving the crisis were again ignored and 
that Khartoum was in fact administering trials for those accused of crimes in Darfur. 
Finally, it claimed that major powers were practicing a new form of colonialism 
though their manipulation of the ICC and the Council to serve their own interests 
against the interest of former colonies and developing states, such as Sudan. 
The  voting  pattern  and  statements  pertaining  to  Resolution  1591 
demonstrated  that  China  continued  to  consistently  abstain  from  resolutions  that 
imposed restrictions on or punished the Sudanese government. Beijing’s position 
was again supported by Algeria. The US abstention in this case attested to its generic 
position on the ICC rather than any fundamental rejection of prosecution for crimes 
in Darfur, and, in the context of its general hostility towards the Court, Washington 
in fact made a significant concession by not vetoing the draft. Brazil’s abstention, 
conversely, was a reaction to the perceived degradation of the ICC and it claimed 
that the resolution did not go far enough in mitigating impunity in Darfur.  
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While 11 members supported Resolution 1593 and the potential role of the 
ICC, including three permanent members, divisions amongst the P5 again weakened 
the Council’s moral and political authority and its ability to pressure an obdurate and 
increasingly diplomatically successful and confident Khartoum. Moreover, while a 
limited and ambiguous sanctions regime, arms embargo, international investigation, 
and now ICC referral had been established by the Council in its response to the 
crimes and crisis in Darfur, such disunity suggested that, at this point, despite an 
increasingly persuasive case for doing so, there appeared little chance of the body 
coercively deploying a necessary military operation to protect Darfurian civilians 
from the own government and its allied militias.  
 
Prolonged Council inaction on Darfur: Post-March 2005 
 
  After  the  flurry  of  activity  including  three  resolutions  on  Sudan  during 
March, the Council pushed Darfur down its agenda for a number of months. The next 
resolution on Darfur was not passed until September 2005, and indeed the crisis in 
western Sudan was not even on the Council’s agenda for the months of April and 
November,  during  which  China  and  Russia  respectively  held  the  body’s  rotating 
presidency,  although  on  5  April  the  Secretary-General  submitted  to  the  ICC 
prosecutor a sealed file containing the names of fifty-one suspects of war crimes in 
Darfur that were confidentially identified by the COI. The UN also reported that its 
offices in Khartoum were attacked by members of a crowd of tens of thousands of 
protesters  angry  at  the  ICC  referral.
360  Annan  noted  that  in  Darfur  the  Sudanese 
government  ‘continues  to  pursue  the  military  option  on  the  ground  with  little 
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apparent regard for the commitments it has entered into’ and that ‘reports continue to 
be received that Government forces operate jointly with armed tribal militias’, while 
public  statements  had  been  made  by  the  Sudanese  government  threatening 
international staff in Darfur if action was taken by the ICC.
361  
The Council’s actions were limited to endorsing the proposed expansion of 
AMIS to 6,171 military and 1,560 civilian police personnel and looking at ways in 
which UNMIS could provide support.
362 On 6 June the Council was briefed for the 
first time on the ICC’s Darfur case by the Court’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, who stated that based on his preliminary investigations:  
 
There is a significant amount of credible information disclosing the 
commission of grave crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court having 
taken place in Darfur. Those crimes include the killing of thousands of 
civilians  and  the  widespread  destruction  and  looting  of  villages, 
leading to the displacement of approximately 1.9 million civilians. The 
living conditions resulting from those crimes have led to the deaths of 
tens of thousands from disease and starvation, particularly affecting 
such  vulnerable  groups  as  children,  the  sick  and  the  elderly. 
Information  also  highlights  a  pervasive  pattern  of  rape  and  sexual 
violence.
363 
 
  On 23 September the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1627, the first 
resolution  on  Sudan  since  March,  although  its  purpose  was  simply  to  renew  the 
mandate of UNMIS by a further six months until 24 March 2006.
364 Then on 13 
October, the Council issued a Presidential Statement expressing its ‘grave concern’ 
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at reports of increased violence in Darfur over the previous month, including attacks 
by the SLM/A and JEM on AMIS personnel, the Janjaweed attack on Aro Sharow 
IDP camp, killing 29, and the government forces attack on Tawilla. The Council 
warned  that  such  attacks  could  be  referred  to  the  sanctions  committee.
365  Such 
meagre actions, however, appeared to reflect divisions in the Council over new and 
more coercive measures against Khartoum, and even over effectively enforcing the 
demands of previous resolutions. During this very period, UN member states had 
unanimously  endorsed  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  doctrine  at  the  UN  World 
Summit (see Chapter 1).  
  Indeed, the lack of coercive Council action was underscored by continuing 
reports of atrocities in Sudan by the Secretary-General and his representatives in 
Sudan.  In  a  14  October  report  to  the  Council,  Annan  noted  the  ‘alarming 
deterioration  in  the  security  situation  in  all  three  Darfur  states’  in  which  the 
‘frequency and intensity of the violence committed by the Sudanese Armed Forces 
and the Popular Defence Forces, Government-aligned tribal militia and the armed 
movements … reached levels unseen since January 2005.’
366  
On 21 December, the Council met on Darfur for the final time for the year, 
producing both Resolution 1561 and a Presidential Statement. The former, passed 
unanimously  and  under  Chapter  VII,  extended  the  mandate  of  the  sanctions 
committee’s  Panel  of  Experts  until  29  March  2006.
367  In  the  latter,  the  Council 
welcomed  and  was  encouraged  by  the  level  of  support  for  the  seventh  round  of 
Darfur  peace  talks,  reiterated  its  call  for  all  parties  to  respect  their  existing 
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agreements, and called for the Sudanese government to disarm the militias and to 
bring to justice those accused of committing crimes. It also expressed its concern at 
the cross border attacks by militias supported by the governments in both Sudan and 
Chad.
368  
In his final report on Darfur to the Council for 2005, Annan concluded that 
over the past eighteen months, the ‘response of the Security Council to the crisis in 
Darfur has been consistent and forceful’ as it had requested ‘the cessation of all 
violence and attacks, the disarmament and control of the Janjaweed militia, an end to 
impunity, and a call for a political solution’, and that in March 2005 the Council had 
decided  to  ‘impose  targeted  measures’  and  refer  Darfur  to  the  ICC.  Yet,  the 
ineffectiveness and inadequacy of the Council’s relatively non-coercive approach to 
Khartoum was clear: 
 
Despite  the  breadth  of  these  measures,  adopted  over  an  extended 
period, reports from the ground confirm the marked deterioration in the 
situation since September, including the proliferation of actors to the 
conflict, an increase in the number of inter-tribal clashes, the entry of 
destabilizing elements from Chad, and more instances of banditry. This 
is  a  deeply  disturbing  trend  which  has  devastating  effects  on  the 
civilian  population.  Large-scale  attacks  against  civilians  continue, 
women and girls are being raped by armed groups, yet more villages 
are  being  burned,  and  thousands  more  are  being  driven  from  their 
homes.  As  we  approach  the  end  of  2005,  the  second  full  year  of 
conflict in Darfur, regrettably we have to acknowledge that the most 
urgent needs of millions affected by the war remain largely unmet, 
including their protection and safety. While countless lives have been 
saved thanks to a massive humanitarian relief effort led by the United 
Nations, those most exposed to violence and gross violations of human 
rights  continue  to  live  in  fear  and  terror.  This  includes  the  large 
majority  of  internally  displaced  persons,  as  more  camps  for  the 
displaced  have  been  attacked  in  recent  months,  and  violent  armed 
groups are a constant threat in areas surrounding many camps. Even 
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more  exposed  are  those  who  have  managed  to  remain  in  their 
villages.
369 
 
2006: UN Peace Operation Put on the Horseshoe Table 
 
  After almost three years of keeping the legal option of military intervention 
off its table, in 2006 the Council finally began to consider the deployment of a UN 
peace  operation  in  Darfur  to  take  over  from  the  inadequate  AMIS  force,  as 
conditions inside Sudan’s western region deteriorated and atrocities against civilians 
continued. However, it became clear that the Council was only willing to consider a 
consensual, rather than coercive, deployment, which would prove to be a crucial 
obstacle in the face of Sudanese government opposition. Moreover, the normative 
context in which Council-authorised military intervention was debated had evolved 
with  the  unanimous  September  2005  UN  World  Summit  endorsement  of  the 
‘responsibility to protect’, an endorsement that the Council itself would specifically 
sanction in April 2006.  
 
Initial discussions on a UN peace operation in Darfur: Early 2006 
 
  In  2006,  five  new  non-permanent  members  joined  the  UNSC  after  their 
election by the General Assembly: Republic of Congo and Ghana, Peru, Qatar, and 
Slovakia  replaced,  respectively,  Algeria  and  Benin,  Brazil,  the  Philippines,  and 
Romania. After months of inaction on Darfur, it was reported in early January that 
the Secretary-General and the Council had begun discussing the possibility of a UN 
force taking over the role of AMIS in Darfur and expanding the operation, as it was 
clear that the African Union mission was severely under-resourced, inadequate, and 
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likely unable to fulfil even its limited mandate beyond the coming March.
370 Annan 
revealed  that  although  the  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO) 
could  not  logistically  have  a  force  deployed  by  that  time,  it  had  nevertheless 
commenced contingency planning to ensure that there was no gap in the international 
presence in the region. This was indeed the first instance in which the possibility of a 
UN force in Darfur was raised publicly, reflecting both the growing frustration by 
some  members  that  the  Council’s  existing  approach  was  compromised  and 
ineffective in providing security on the ground in Darfur, and international political 
pressure for more coercive action against Sudan. The transition to a UN force in 
Darfur would be at the centre of the Council’s deliberations over Darfur for the 
remainder of 2006. 
  This theme was addressed more comprehensively by SRSG Pronk and AU 
Special Envoy for Sudan, Salim Ahmed Salim, in their 13 January briefing to the 
Council.
371 Pronk noted that the parties had missed the stated 31 December 2005 
deadline to reach a political agreement to end the conflict, and characterised the 
security environment in Darfur as ‘chaotic’. He argued that the ‘perpetrators of the 
2003 and 2004 violence have attained their goal: many areas have been cleansed. 
They have free passage in the countryside. Millions of villagers sitting in camps are 
too afraid to leave. Terror continues. At least once a month groups of 500 to 1,000 
militia, on camels and on horseback, attack villages, killing dozens of people and 
terrorizing  others,  who  flee.’
372  Importantly,  in  warning  that  the  IDPs  and  other 
vulnerable people in the region ‘do not trust anybody anymore’ — referring to local 
                                                        
370 UN News Centre, “UN Weighs Options for Sudan’s Darfur Region as Funds for African Union 
Force Run Low”, January 12, 2006. 
371 See UN Security Council, 5344
th Meeting, S/PV.5344, January 13, 2006; and UN Security 
Council, “Official Communiqué of the 5345
th (closed) Meeting of the Security Council”, S/PV.5345, 
January 13, 2006. 
372 UN Security Council, 5344
th Meeting, S/PV.5344, January 13, 2006, p. 4.   172 
governmental  authorities  —  Pronk  argued  that  ‘international  guarantees’  were 
required. As such, the SRSG then outlined to the Council, in the clearest terms to 
date, the need for a robust UN force in Darfur: 
 
The force which is necessary to provide such guarantees should be big 
— much bigger than the present [AMIS] one. It should not be on call 
but  in  place,  present  everywhere  where  people  may  be  attacked.  It 
should be strong, able to defend itself, able to deter attacks on civilians 
and able to disarm militias and the Janjaweed, which should have been 
disarmed by the Government in the first place. That has not been done, 
despite demands laid down in Security Council resolutions. The force 
should stay long enough to provide confidence — at least three to four 
years after the reaching of a peace agreement. Its financing should be 
guaranteed all along. It should have a broad mandate — broad enough 
to deter non-compliance. It should be an integral element of a unified 
approach towards Darfur, with humanitarian, political, police, legal, 
human rights, reconstruction and economic development instruments. 
It should be supported by sanctions — sanctions on troop movements 
which are not in accordance with the agreement; sanctions on arms 
deliveries; and sanctions against those who have caused atrocities, and 
in particular those who have instructed others to do so — not only foot 
soldiers,  but  commanders  and  those  political  leaders  who  were 
responsible for the carnage of 2003 and 2004 and who refuse to stop 
the atrocities of 2005.
373 
 
  In  addition,  Salim  focused  upon  the  AU-led  Abuja  peace  talks  between 
Khartoum  and  the  Darfur  rebels,  highlighting  the  problem  of  fragmentation  and 
disunity  amongst  the  rebel  movements,  and  explaining  that  two  of  the  key 
disagreements  between  the  parties  were  over  power  sharing  and  security 
arrangements. The AU envoy also argued that the parties needed to be placed under 
more  pressure  to  negotiate,  and  that,  if  they  continued  to  cause  delays,  then  the 
Council should ‘hold them responsible for prolonging the suffering of their people. 
In  such  an  eventuality,  the  threat  and  application  of  carefully  targeted  sanctions 
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should  be  credible  and  evident  and  should  enjoy  the  strong  support  of  a  united 
Security Council.’
374  
Speaking  to  the  press  after  the  briefing,  Tanzania,  as  Council  president, 
confirmed that the Council was considering its options regarding the possible end of 
the  AMIS  operation  in  Darfur,  including  the  potential  for  a  UN  force  to  be 
established, although consultations were ongoing and much would depend on the 
outcome of the Abuja peace talks. The Sudanese representative also spoke to the 
press after the briefing, rejecting the need for a UN force to take over from AMIS 
because,  it  was  claimed,  the  African  Union  mission  was  effective.
375  Indeed,  it 
appeared  as  though  Khartoum  was  finding  itself  under  increasing  pressure  as 
proposals for a more robust international force in Darfur — one more likely to curtail 
the Sudanese government’s freedom of action in the western region of the country — 
gained salience inside the Council. 
  Publicising the idea of a UN force in Darfur, and further pre-empting the 
Council on this issue, the Secretary-General published an Op-Ed in the Washington 
Post on 25 January supporting such a move.
376 Noting the expiration on 31 March 
2006 of the mandate of AMIS, Annan claimed that the AU’s 12 January decision to 
give in-principle support to such a transition ‘puts the Security Council on the spot’ 
because it had not yet publicly endorsed such a move. Annan also highlighted the 
normative  pressure  placed  on  the  Council  to  respond  to  Darfur  by  the  General 
Assembly’s unanimous endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine at the 
2005 UN World Summit. According to Annan, the ‘transition from the A.U. force to 
a U.N. peace operation in Darfur is now inevitable. A firm decision by the Security 
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Council is needed, and soon, for an effective transition to take place.’ Providing 
further  indication  of  the  type  of  force  that  would  be  required  in  Darfur,  Annan 
argued: “[b]ut let no one imagine that this crisis can be solved simply by giving the 
present A.U. mission a ‘U.N. hat.’ Any new mission will need a strong and clear 
mandate, allowing it to protect those under threat, by force if necessary, as well as 
the means to do so. That means it will need to be larger, more mobile and much 
better equipped than the current African Union mission. Those countries that have 
the required military assets must be ready to deploy them.” It was clear that such 
public support for a robust UN force from within the UN Secretariat and by the 
African  Union  placed  the  spotlight  back  on  the  Council,  the  preeminent  body 
mandated to maintain international peace and security.
377 
  As a result, in early February the Council held closed door consultations and 
then a public meeting on the possibility of establishing a UN peace operation in 
Darfur,  before  issuing  another  Presidential  Statement  commending  the  work  of 
AMIS, acknowledging the AU PSC’s in-principle support for a transition to a UN 
force, and inviting the AU Chairperson to initiate consultations with the Council to 
that  end.
378  Until  such  a  transition  could  occur,  the  Council  stressed  that  AMIS 
should continue to be actively supported and that a peace agreement needed to be 
quickly  reached  in  Darfur.  However,  illustrating  its  continuing  engagement  with, 
rather than coercion of, the Sudanese government, the Council requested Annan to 
‘initiate  contingency  planning  without  delay’  on  potential  options  for  a  new  UN 
force in Darfur in cooperation with the GNU as well as with the Council, and the 
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AU: indeed, the Council appeared to under-appreciate the intensity of opposition to 
such  a  force  by  Khartoum  and  the  difficulties  that  this  would  create  for  any 
deployment. 
 
Khartoum opposes transition to UN force in Darfur: February-April 
2006 
 
  The Council’s initial enthusiasm for the transition to a UN force — if only 
expressed in ambiguous terms — was soon tempered by the hostility to such a move 
by the Sudanese government, making it unlikely that there would be any cooperative 
deployment of blue helmets to provide security for vulnerable civilians in Sudan’s 
west.  For  example,  in  a  28  February  press  briefing,  SRSG  Pronk  outlined  how 
Khartoum was ‘very strongly opposed’ to UN troops in Darfur (even through it had 
recently agreed to 10,000 others in the south of the country) and had been lobbying 
other governments to support its position.
379 Furthermore, Pronk noted that the AU 
appeared to be reconsidering its in-principle support for the transition because of 
Sudanese  criticism.  While  voicing  his  own  support  for  a  new  UN  force,  Pronk 
suggested that there would need to be a peace agreement in Darfur before it was 
likely  that  the  P5  would  authorise  such  a  deployment.  The  SRSG  also  noted  an 
increasingly ‘anti-UN’ feeling in Khartoum, with threats by government officials that 
Sudan  would  be  another  Iraq-style  disaster  for  international  troops  if  coercively 
deployed.  
  On  10  March  the  AU  extended  the  mandate  of  AMIS  for  a  further  six 
months, providing assurance that at least some form of international force — albeit 
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an  inadequate  one  —  would  remain  in  Darfur,  but  also  effectively  reducing  the 
pressure for the speedy transition to and deployment of a UN force.
380 However, the 
AU did also reaffirm its in-principle support for the transition, which was welcomed 
by  then  Council  president,  Argentina.
381  On  21  March,  the  Council  held  private 
consultations with UNMIS troop-contributing members, Pronk, and Mark Kroeker, 
the UN Police Advisor in the DPKO.
 382 The SRSG was quoted as saying that ‘[w]e 
must mend our own shortcomings and provide a future UN operation in Darfur with 
a robust mandate and a strong force’, one that was ‘large enough to be everywhere 
needed, strong enough to deter any attack, with a mandate broad enough meet all 
possible threats, and with staying power, long enough to install confidence amongst 
all people in Darfur, including potential returnees’.
383  
In response to such briefings, the Council met on 24 March and unanimously 
passed Resolution 1663, which, inter alia, welcomed the AU’s in-principle support 
for the transition, its extension of AMIS until 30 September, and its intention ‘to 
pursue the conclusion of a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April 2006’.
384 
For its part, the Council also extended the mandate of UNMIS until 24 September 
2006, ‘with the intention to renew it for further periods’, and, importantly, requested 
that Annan, jointly with the AU, and in ‘consultation’ with the Council and Sudanese 
parties: 
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expedite the necessary preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to 
a  United  Nations  operation,  including  options  for  how  UNMIS  can 
reinforce the effort for peace in Darfur through additional appropriate 
logistics, mobility and communications, and that the Secretary-General 
present to the Council by 24 April 2006 for its consideration a range of 
options for a United Nations operation in Darfur. 
 
  Yet, in light of the contrasting positions of permanent members on dealing 
with Sudan over Darfur, the unanimous passage of Resolution 1663 belied a genuine 
commitment  to  the  coercive  transition  and  deployment  of  UN  troops  inside  the 
Council. Rather, it suggested the ambiguity of such proposals and the anticipation of 
further attempts at bargaining with Khartoum over the matter. Similarly, five days 
later,  on  29  March,  the  Council  unanimously  adopted  Resolution  1665,  which 
belatedly  acknowledged  the  9  December  2005  report  of  the  Panel  of  Experts  on 
compliance with and violations of agreements and resolutions, including the arms 
embargo imposed on Sudan.
385 The report had outlined that weapons continued to 
enter the region illegally from neighbouring countries and from other parts of Sudan, 
and that the Sudanese government itself had been transferring military equipment 
into Darfur.
386 Acting under Chapter VII and determining that the situation in Sudan 
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the 
Council extended the Panel’s mandate until 29 September 2006. But the fact that 
China  and  Russia  now  supported  the  extension  of  the  Panel’s  mandate  —  after 
originally  claiming  that  sanctions  would  obstruct  the  peace  process  and  having 
abstained from Resolution 1591, which established the sanctions regime in March 
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2005 — suggested that the sanctions regime was neither effectively coercive nor 
much of a concern for Khartoum and its allies on the Council.
387 
  On 11 April, under a Chinese presidency, the Council met to discuss Darfur 
and  issued  a  Presidential  Statement  reiterating  a  number  of  previous  assertions, 
including support for the AU-led Abuja peace process with its final deadline of 30 
April, the need to protect the civilian population, and its commendation of AMIS and 
endorsement of the proposed transition.
388 Illustrating of its continuing approach to 
Khartoum, however, the statement also ‘reiterated’ the Council’s ‘commitment to the 
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, which will be 
unaffected by the transition to a United Nations operation.’  
A week later, the Council was again briefed by AU envoy Salim about Abuja 
peace  talks.  The  envoy  claimed  that  there  had  recently  been  ‘significant 
developments in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur. 
That agreement is clearly within our reach, despite the fact that a great deal of hard 
work still remains to be done.’ He added that AMIS ‘as presently constituted, is not 
optimally equipped to fulfil its mandate. That problem will become even more acute 
with  the  added  responsibility  that  will  come  with  a  comprehensive  ceasefire 
agreement.’ The AU envoy urged the Council ‘not to wait for the transition from 
AMIS  to  the  United  Nations  force  to  take  place  before  strengthening  the 
implementation mechanisms of any agreement to be reached at Abuja.’
389 Yet, it 
appeared as though the body was indeed intending to wait and hope that a peace 
agreement  would  be  achieved  in  Darfur  and  that  this  would  lead  the  Sudanese 
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government  to  willingly  accept  a  UN  force,  avoiding  further  confrontation  with 
Khartoum  and  contention  within  the  Council’s  membership  over  a  potentially 
coercive transition. 
 
Council imposes sanctions on four individuals: Resolution 1672 
 
  In the meantime, on 19 April, the Panel of Experts released its second report 
on violations of and compliance with Resolution 1591, including the question of 
sanctions, covering the three-month period since its last report.
390 It found numerous 
violations, including by the Sudanese government. For example, regarding the arms 
embargo, the Panel found that the flow of arms into Darfur from other parts of Sudan 
and neighbouring states ‘continued unabated’, and that the Arab militias appeared to 
be  continuing  to  receive  weapons  and  ammunition  from  Khartoum,  among  other 
sources.  It  also  found  that  Khartoum  had  continued  to  ‘move  armed  troops  and 
supplies’ into Darfur without the Sanctions Committee’s approval. In addition, on 
the monitoring of the implementation of sanctions, the Panel noted that no individual 
had yet been designated by the Sanctions Committee, attesting to the ineffectiveness 
of the sanctions regime.  
Furthermore, the Panel also found that the SLA had violated the N’djamena 
ceasefire  agreement  while  the  Sudanese  government  had  failed  to  disarm  and 
neutralize the Janjaweed, and revealed that it possessed a confidential list of people 
accused  of  committing  violations  of  international  humanitarian  law.  Finally,  the 
Panel  said  that  while  Khartoum  had  established  some  judicial  procedures  to 
investigate and bring people to justice in Darfur, at present they were inadequate to 
mitigate  impunity,  while  the  Sudanese  government  continued  to  use  fixed-  and 
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rotary-wing  aircraft  for  ‘aerial  reconnaissance  missions  and  for  directing  ground 
forces engaged in military operations.’ The Panel recommended, inter alia, that the 
Council  establish  a  no-fly  zone  over  Darfur  for  government  aircraft;  to  speedily 
designate certain individuals for sanctions; to consider expanding the arms embargo 
regime;  and  include  greater  civilian  protection  monitoring  in  the  Committee’s 
mandate.
391  Such  findings  provided  credible  new  evidence  against  Khartoum  and 
further pressured the Council to take more coercive action over Darfur. 
  In response, the Council met on 25 April to address Sudan, Darfur, and the 
spillover  of  violence  and  humanitarian  problems  to  neighbouring  Chad.  Two 
Presidential Statements were issued, the first reiterating the Council’s support for the 
Abuja  peace  process  and  its  AU  mediators,
392  and  the  second  noting  the  body’s 
concern about and condemnation of clashes along the Sudan-Chad border, including 
violence against Darfurian refugees.
393 More significantly, the Council also passed 
Resolution 1672 with 12 affirmative votes and three abstentions, from China, Russia 
and Qatar.
394 The resolution, sponsored by Argentina, Denmark, France, Japan, Peru, 
Slovakia, the UK and the US and passed under a Chapter VII mandate, imposed 
sanctions for the first time on four individuals as authorised by Resolution 1591 and 
suggested  by  the  Panel  of  Experts:  Major  General  Gaffar  Mohamed  Elhassan, 
Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces; Sheikh 
Musa  Hilal,  Paramount  Chief  of  the  Jajul  Tribe  in  North  Darfur  (a  Janjaweed 
leader); Adam Yacub Shant, SLA Commander; and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, 
Field  Commander  for  the  National  Movement  for  Reform  and  Development 
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(NMRD, a third rebel faction). Speaking after the vote were the representatives of 
the three abstaining members, plus the United States.
395  
Russia stated that it had abstained because it felt that applying sanctions to 
the four individuals ‘might have a negative impact on the prospects for concluding a 
peace agreement within the time period’, even though the ‘violation of international 
norms,  including  international  humanitarian  law,  should  not  go  unpunished.’
396 
Instead,  Moscow  was  ‘convinced  that,  within  the  Sudanese  context  and  also  in 
broader terms, the implementation of sanctions should be closely linked with the task 
of  promoting  the  process  of  a  political  settlement  of  the  conflict  and  ensuring 
regional  stability.’  Non-permanent  Qatar  asserted  that  it  did  not  vote  on  the 
resolution because it had not seen ‘clear and consistent evidence that would condemn 
those individuals in the way required for imposing sanctions on them’ during the 
Sanctions Committee process, and thus thought that the Council should leave such 
matters to the ICC in order ‘not to influence and investigations being carried out’.
397  
Finally, Doha argued that, due to the positive progress report by Salim on the Darfur 
peace talks, this would be a bad time to impose any sanctions, which should only 
have been considered after the 30 April Abuja deadline.  
  Similarly, speaking in a national capacity (as it was also Council president), 
the Chinese representative revealed that Beijing had abstained from voting because, 
first, it had a general attitude of scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions, and 
second, more specifically, that the ‘timing for adopting such a resolution is not right’ 
due  to  the  impending  conclusion  of  the  Abuja  peace  talks.
398  China  argued  that 
‘[d]uring  this  exceptionally  important  period’  the  Council  should  ‘focus  on  the 
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overall political situation and remain on high alert. If it takes any course of action, it 
should focus on promoting and facilitating, rather than affecting and interfering in, 
the peace talks.’ It warned that the Council would be responsible if the sanctions 
caused the peace talks to fail. Finally, like Qatar, China was not convinced of the 
evidence  presented  against  the  individuals  in  the  Sanctions  Committee  and  more 
generally had problems with the processes of, and deliberations in, the committee 
itself.  
The  United  States,  conversely,  argued  that  the  passage  of  the  resolution 
‘constituted an important first step’ in the Council ‘fulfilling its responsibilities under 
the  several  resolutions  respecting  Darfur  that  it  has  adopted.’
399  According  to 
Washington, Resolution 1672 demonstrated that the Council ‘is serious in its effort 
to restore peace and security in the region and that, far from interfering in the peace 
process in Abuja, it will strengthen that process.’ The voting pattern and statements 
again  demonstrated  the  reluctance  of  China,  Russia  and  OIC-affiliated  non-
permanent members to impose mandatory measures on Khartoum (even though only 
one  Sudanese  military  commander  was  named)  while  instead  favouring  a  more 
conciliatory and accommodative approach. The US again led a majority of Council 
members  supporting  individual  sanctions  as  a  measure  to  bring  pressure  on  the 
parties to the Darfur conflict. 
  The next day, returning to the proposed transition to a UN force in Darfur, the 
Council was briefed by USG for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, and Assistant 
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping (ASG), Hedi Annabi.
400 They told the Council 
that it had two options, the first focusing on ground forces and the second on air 
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support. However, crucially, detailed logistical planning could not be conducted until 
the  Sudanese  government  gave  permission  for  the  DPKO  to  make  a  proper 
assessment on the ground in Darfur. ASG Annabi was quoted as saying to the press 
after the briefing that the Sudanese government ‘has indicated that at this time they 
are not in favour of a transition to a UN operation, but that following an agreement in 
Abuja  they  will  be  prepared  to  discuss  with  the  United  Nations  how  the United 
Nations could help in implementing that agreement’.
401 It remained highly uncertain, 
however, whether or not the Sudanese government would actually agree to accept a 
UN force inside its borders even if a peace agreement was achieved. Also uncertain 
was the extent to which Council members were likely to pass measures to coerce 
Khartoum into accepting such a deployment given the clearly divergent approaches 
of the P5. 
 
Darfur Peace Agreement signed, Council responds: May 2006 
 
  On  5  May  the  Darfur  Peace  Agreement  (DPA)  was  eventually  signed  in 
Abuja  between  the  Sudanese  government  and,  problematically,  only  one  of  the 
Darfur rebel factions (SLA-Minni Minawi), reflecting the divisions that had emerged 
in the rebel movement as well as deficiencies in the agreement itself, including a 
failure to accommodate the concerns of all parties.
402 On 9 May the Council met at 
ministerial  level  to  address  the  signing  of  the  DPA,  during  which  Annan  first 
welcomed the DPA and updated the Council on planning for the transition of forces 
to  a  UN  force,  stating  that  ‘[h]elping  to  protect  the  people  of  Darfur  and  to 
implement the Abuja agreement will be one of the biggest tests [the UN] has ever 
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faced — perhaps the biggest since those in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the early 
1990s. But it is a challenge we cannot refuse and, having accepted it, we cannot 
delay.’
403  
Annan  added  that  the  next  step  was  for  a  technical  assistance  mission  to 
deploy to Darfur to establish the requirements for a UN operation, but that Khartoum 
had not yet approved: ‘[a]ccordingly, I have written to President Bashir to seek his 
support for the assessment and I hope very soon to be able to discuss it with him 
directly. His support for that vital mission is essential.’ The Sudanese government, it 
appeared, was being given another chance to cooperate with the Council’s demands, 
despite numerous violations of previous agreements, while Khartoum’s signature on 
the DPA gave the government new leverage in its relations with the UN. 
  Ministers from Council members also made statements, further illustrating 
the differing positions on Sudan by the permanent members, particularly regarding 
the question of the transition to a UN force. For example, British Foreign Secretary, 
Margaret Beckett, stated London’s support for the transition and said she looked 
forward to Khartoum honouring a pledge it made to allow the technical mission in 
after  the  DPA  had  been  signed.
404  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Philippe 
Doust-Blazy, similarly added that the Council ‘must absolutely take the necessary 
measures as soon as possible to strengthen the African force in Darfur. [AMIS] has 
played  an  essential  role;  it  will  be  given  new  tasks  as  a  result  of  the  Abuja 
agreement. It must also be ready to pass the baton to the United Nations. Indeed, it is 
incumbent upon us — in particular the Security Council — to accelerate preparations 
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for a transition from AMIS to a [UN] peacekeeping operation, as the conditions for 
such an operation are now almost in place.’
405  
Going further, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that a UN 
transition was needed and that a US-sponsored draft resolution in circulation would 
take  steps  to  put  that  into  action.  She  also  declared  that  ‘[i]f  the  idea  of  an 
international community is to mean anything, if the founding principles of the [UN] 
are to be more than just dreams and if the notion of the responsibility to protect the 
weakest and the most powerless among us is ever to be more than just an empty 
promise, then the [Council] must act. We must pass this draft resolution and we must 
seize this momentous opportunity to restore hope to the people of Darfur.’
406 
Placing a different emphasis, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei 
Lavrov, agreed that the deployment of a new UN force in Darfur ‘will require the 
cooperation and support of the Sudanese parties, especially that of the [GNU]. We 
are  convinced  that  resolving  that  matter  should  be  done  through  constructive 
dialogue.’
407 He added that Russia would ‘continue to lend all types of assistance to 
help strengthen the political settlement in Darfur, in the interest of the unity and 
territorial integrity of the Sudan and of the strengthening of peace and security in the 
region.’  
Similarly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, Li Zhaoxing, stated that 
the transition from AMIS to the UN was a ‘decision in principle made by the AU, 
and  the  United  Nations  Secretariat  has  carried  out  relevant  preparations  for  that 
purpose.  China  hopes  and  trusts  that  the  Sudanese  Government  and  the  various 
factions in Darfur will seize, and make full use of, the current momentum and will 
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speed up consultations with the Secretariat so that the relevant preparations can be 
completed as early as possible.’
408 Most specifically, however, he stated that ‘I wish 
to take this opportunity to stress once again that the sole purpose of a United Nations 
operation in Darfur is to assist the Sudanese Government and the various factions in 
Darfur in implementing the Abuja agreement. Therefore, the consent and cooperation 
of the Sudanese government are prerequisites for the deployment of a United Nations 
operation.’  
From these statements, it was clear that Moscow, and Beijing in particular, 
were not supportive of a coercive deployment of UN troops in the face of Sudanese 
non-consent. And, despite their strong public support for it, the extent to which the 
Western permanent members were prepared to push for the transition under such 
circumstances was unclear. At this point, however, the Council’s only action was to 
issue a Presidential Statement expressing that the body ‘strongly welcomed’ the DPA 
as a ‘basis for lasting peace in Darfur’, and urging the rebel factions that did not sign 
the agreement to do so immediately.
409 The Council also pushed for the strengthening 
of AMIS, including financially, in order to support the implementation of the DPA in 
the interim before the transition to a UN force could be undertaken. On this note, the 
Secretary-General  was  required  to  continue  preliminary  planning  for  the  UN 
transition, in consultation with the Sudanese government, and the body called for the 
GNU to ‘facilitate immediately the visit of a joint United Nations and African Union 
technical  assessment  mission  to  Darfur’,  which  until  then  had  not  been  given 
permission. The Council added that any UN force in Darfur should have ‘strong 
African participation and character’. 
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Council initiates transition to UN force: Resolution 1679 
 
  After the signing of the DPA there was both optimism and pessimism inside 
the Council: an agreement had been signed between two belligerent parties in Darfur, 
but Khartoum continued to obstruct the transition to a UN force to support the DPA 
and  to  protect  vulnerable  civilians.  In  this  political  environment,  the  Council 
unanimously  passed  Resolution  1679  on  16  May,
410  which,  importantly,  made 
reference  for  the  first  time  in  a  case-specific  resolution  to  the  recent  landmark 
Council endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine in Resolution 1674 
(28 April 2006).
411 Because of this, the Council was apparently accepting that it had a 
responsibility to protect civilians in Darfur — because the Sudanese government had 
clearly failed to protect its own citizens, and had in fact targeted them —  and that 
ultimately, according to the doctrine, this could mean the use of coercive military 
force  by  the  body.  However,  in  also  reaffirming  its  ‘strong  commitment  to  the 
sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which would 
be unaffected by transition to a United Nations operation’, Resolution 1679 appeared 
to preclude any coercive fulfilment by the Council of the stated responsibility in 
Darfur. This would have normative consequences for the doctrine, which appeared to 
have failed at its first hurdle.
412  
Nevertheless, under Chapter VII, Resolution 1679 called upon all parties to 
the DPA to abide by its commitments, urged non-signatories to sign the agreement, 
and stated that the Council would consider, at the AU’s request, to impose further 
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sanctions on parties or individuals that violate or obstruct the DPA. The remainder of 
the resolution addressed the proposed transition: it called upon the AU to agree on 
requirements to ‘strengthen AMIS’s capacity to enforce the security arrangements’ 
of  the  DPA,  ‘with  a  view  to  a  follow-on  United  Nations  operation  in  Darfur’; 
endorsed the AU PSC’s recent decision that ‘concrete steps should be taken to effect 
the transition’ now that the DPA had been signed, and called upon all signatories to 
the agreement to cooperate to ‘accelerate’ the transition, including that it called for 
the deployment of the joint UN/AU technical assistance mission ‘within one week’; 
stated that the Secretary-General should consult with the AU, the Council, and the 
DPA  parties,  including  the  GNU,  on  ‘decisions  concerning  the  transition’;  and 
finally, requested Annan ‘within one week’ of the return of the assessment mission to 
submit recommendations to the Council ‘on all relevant aspects of the mandate of the 
United  Nations  operation  in  Darfur,  including  force  structure,  additional  force 
requirements,  potential  troop-contributing  countries  and  a  detailed  financial 
evaluation’.
413 
  Again illustrating their positions of support for Khartoum in the face of the 
proposed transition, the representatives of Russia, China and Qatar made what they 
considered to be important qualifying statements in the Council after the passage of 
the resolution, making clear that the body’s action could not advance beyond their 
limited concessions.
414 This also highlighted the intensifying resistance to increasing 
pressure for more coercive action by the Council. Russia registered the argument that 
the passage of this resolution under Chapter VII ‘neither alters the character of the 
Security Council’s decisions on the Sudan nor predetermines the mandate of the 
future United Nations peacekeeping presence in Darfur, to be established in the light 
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of all relevant factors and dynamics of the situation in that Sudanese province and in 
the Sudan as a whole.’ As such, Moscow argued that it was ‘important that further 
steps to establish a United Nations peacekeeping presence in Darfur be agreed with 
the Government of the Sudan.’  
Similarly, China continued to have ‘reservations concerning the resolution’s 
invocation of Chapter VII’ because, in its view, the content of the resolution was 
‘inconsistent’ with the purposes of this chapter. It argued, like Russia, that the use of 
Chapter VII here should not create a precedent for future Council resolutions on 
Sudan: ‘[a]t the appropriate time, there should be a specific agreement based on 
specific circumstances.’ Beijing reiterated its position that for any UN peacekeeping 
operation,  including  in  Darfur,  the  ‘agreement  and  cooperation  of  the  Sudanese 
government must be obtained.’ Qatar concurred that any transfer to a UN mission in 
Darfur  must  be  coordinated  with  and  have  the  prior  approval  of  the  Sudanese 
government. 
  At this point, it was clear that because of the Council’s particular approach to 
the crisis in Darfur, gaining Khartoum’s consent was now central to any transition to 
a more robust and more effective UN operation in the region. In this sense, despite 
the documented atrocities committed by the Sudanese government against its own 
population, and despite the Council’s explicit invocation of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ in the context of Darfur, the Council persisted with a consensual rather than 
coercive approach to the deployment of UN troops. Furthermore, Sudan understood 
and exploited the apparent divisions within the permanent membership to reject even 
a consensual deployment.  
For example, after first noting ‘continuing militia attacks on civilians and 
SAF attacks on Darfur villages, including through the use of helicopter gunships’ in   190 
March  and  April,  Annan  reported  a  ‘troubling  anti-United  Nations  campaign’  in 
Khartoum  and  other  Sudanese  cities  which  ‘focused  largely  on  the  envisaged 
transition’.
415 On 25 May, after lobbying in Khartoum by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi 
and ASG Annabi, and also by Annan in direct contact with President Bashir, it was 
announced that the consent of the Sudanese government had finally been secured for 
the deployment of the joint assessment mission to Darfur.
416 However, a week later, 
Annabi told the Council that while the assessment mission would leave shortly for 
the region (to be headed by USG Guehenno), he made clear that Khartoum had not 
actually approved the transfer to a UN force.
417  
 
Council delegation in Sudan to push for transition: June-July 2006 
 
In part an attempt to create further momentum for a cooperative transition, 
between 4–10 June a fifteen member Council delegation travelled to Sudan, Chad 
and AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for talks with the government and 
other regional parties.
418 The briefing upon return by the delegation head, Britain, 
further  illustrated  both  the  attitude  of  Khartoum  towards  the  transition,  which 
Resolution 1679 suggested might have an enforceable Chapter VII mandate, and the 
relatively cooperative approach taken by the Council in response to Sudan’s position. 
For example, the UK claimed that it was ‘important that the mission began its work 
in Khartoum and emphasize its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
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the Sudan’ and stressed that the Council wanted to work in ‘partnership’ with the 
GNU.
419  
Moreover, although the Council delegation was in ‘full agreement’ with the 
AU  that  the  transition  should  occur  ‘at  the  earliest  opportunity’,  crucially,  the 
mission had been unable to persuade the Sudanese government of the merits of that 
course  of  action.  Furthermore,  in  Khartoum  the  delegation  ‘found  many  hostile 
perceptions’ of a UN deployment, not least because of the adoption of Resolution 
1679 under Chapter VII, which was ‘clearly a major irritant for the Government, the 
President and parliamentarians in Khartoum’, while President Bashir also ‘made it 
clear that he did not think external troops should be mandated to attack Sudanese.’ 
For this reason, the president had said that controlling the Janjaweed should be the 
GNU’s  responsibility,  to  which  the  Council  agreed  and  had  called  for  all  along, 
according to the UK. Similarly, Tanzania, as an African member of the Council and 
delegation, argued that the mission: 
 
took place against the background of an uneasy relationship [between 
Khartoum  and]  the  Security  Council,  as  we  adopted  tougher 
resolutions  to  protect  civilians,  address  impunity,  facilitate 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur and push the peace negotiations in 
Abuja. The unanimous adoption, just before the mission took place, of 
Resolution 1679 … with its necessary but perhaps premature reference 
to Chapter VII, set a difficult stage for our mission. It provided an 
excuse for the Sudan Government to take a harder line on the proposed 
transition ... 
420 
 
Tanzania added that there was ‘open resistance to the transition, and negative 
public  perceptions  have  been  created  among  the  general  public  regarding  the 
intentions  of  the  Security  Council.’  The  mission  had  attempted  to  explain  to 
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Khartoum that the transition was ‘not an option, but an obligation. The invocation of 
Chapter VII is not against the Government of Sudan and its people, but is a necessary 
reserve option to implement the [DPA], especially in the disarmament of entities like 
the Janjaweed and rebel groups, to ensure the protection of civilians and to maintain 
unimpeded humanitarian access.’ Tanzania further argued that the AU had ‘gone 
well beyond endorsing in principle the transition … it is actually urging a more 
expeditious United Nations deployment. [AU Chairperson] Konare has even written 
to NATO to ask for logistical support to strengthen the African Union forces in 
Darfur without actual ground deployment of NATO, only as an intermediate step 
while waiting for an expeditious transition’ to a UN force.
421  
  As such pressure mounted on Khartoum to accept the transition, President 
Bashir  was  quoted  as  making  a  number  of  statements  vehemently  opposing  the 
move, indicating the difficulties that a consensual approach to deployment by the 
Council was facing. For example, regarding the deployment of UN troops Bashir 
stated that “This shall never take place … These are colonial forces and we will not 
accept colonial forces coming into our country … They want to colonize Africa, 
starting with the first sub-Saharan country to gain its independence. If they want to 
start colonization of Africa, let them choose a different place.”
422 In another example, 
Bashir declared that “We do not reject the United Nations, but in no way will we 
accept UN troops because … these troops have an imperial and colonial agenda. 
Changing [AMIS] to the United Nations will never happen, never ever happen.”
 423  
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Indeed, on 27 June USG Guehenno briefed the Council on the findings of the 
technical assistance mission that he had just headed in Sudan, suggesting that while 
‘it would be wise’ to begin deployment of the UN force by 1 January 2007, the main 
obstacle remained the Sudanese government’s non-consent
 424 In a follow up briefing 
on 12 July after further discussions with President Bashir, Guehenno said while he 
and Annan had still not been able to secure Khartoum’s consent for a transition to a 
UN  force,  they  had  made  progress  in  dispelling  the  notion  that  the  UN  would 
effectively be a colonial, occupying force in Darfur.
425 Annan later revealed that he 
‘told President Bashir, very candidly, that the strengthening of AMIS in the short 
term, and a transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur in the medium term, 
are two fundamental tools available to the Sudanese people, to their Government, 
and to the international community.’
426  
 
Council extends UNMIS mandate to cover Darfur: Resolution 1706 
 
  In the context of intensifying pressure for the transition to a UN force in 
Darfur  by  some  Council  members  and  UN  and  AU  officials,  and  intensifying 
opposition to it by Khartoum, the Secretary-General issued a detailed report to the 
Council suggesting ways in which the UN could strengthen AMIS in the interim and, 
more  importantly,  incorporating  the  technical  assessment  mission’s 
recommendations, providing a comprehensive blueprint for the proposed UN ‘peace 
support operation’ in Darfur.
427 As such, the ‘primary purpose’ of the UN military 
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operation in the region ‘should be to establish a stable and secure environment to 
protect civilians and support the implementation of the [DPA]. Initially, the focus of 
the  security  operations  would  be  the  provision  of  security  to  the  vulnerable 
population.’  
To this end, Annan recommended an ‘expansion’ of the mandate of UNMIS 
into  the  Darfur  region  from  1  January  2007;  however,  crucially,  this  was  to  be 
‘subject to the consent of the Government of Sudan and in concurrence with other 
parties’ to the DPA. Indeed, while the proposed UN operation ‘would have as its 
abiding  priority  the  protection  of  civilians’,  it  would  ‘work  closely  with  the 
Government of National Unity and other key actors to this end.’ Despite this obvious 
problem, according to the proposal the force should be mandated to ‘take all action 
necessary to protect civilians under immanent threat, within the capability of the 
United Nations presence, and to deter, including pre-emptively, potential spoilers 
through robust action’. Furthermore: 
 
The mandate should allow the force full freedom of movement and 
authorize  robust  action  when  required.  The  force  should  therefore 
possess  surveillance  and  reconnaissance  capabilities;  an  assessment 
capability to steer operations; and air and ground reaction forces with 
sufficient military power to deter and defeat spoilers. Reserves would 
also be needed to deal with unfavourable developments in the security 
situation.
428 
 
  The proposal presented the Council with three options for the composition of 
the UN force. The first option, the ‘optimal balance’, consisted of 17,300 troops with 
support staff and military observers, three fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft, up to 
eight ‘tactical reconnaissance/armed deterrence’ helicopters, and eighteen ‘military 
utility’  helicopters;  the  second  option,  and  the  ‘most  challenging  to  deploy  and 
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sustain’ was constituted by 18,600 troops, but with a reduced air capability of only 
four  reconnaissance  and  nine  utility  helicopters;  while  the  final  ‘rapid  reaction’ 
option incorporated only 15,300 troops, but with six additional helicopters and other 
‘high-mobility’  capabilities.  Whichever  option  was  chosen  by  the  Council,  the 
mission would also require the deployment of up to 3,300 police officers, and 16 
formed police units.
429 
  In the lead up to a contentious Council vote on the proposed transition, an 
intensive  series  of  negotiations  took  place  between  the  Secretary-General,  the 
Council, and Khartoum. On 10 August, Annan sent a letter to the Council president 
citing  how  funding  shortfalls  meant  that  AMIS  might  not  even  be  able  to  keep 
operating  until  the  end  of  its  30  September  2006  mandate,  and  reiterated  that 
President Bashir remained unwilling to authorise the transition.
 430 Moreover, on 17 
August ASG Annabi briefed the Council that the Sudanese government appeared to 
be preparing for a major military offensive in Darfur while remaining opposed to a 
UN force there, and that President Bashir had stated his intent to attack any UN 
troops that entered the region without the government’s consent.
431  
That same day, the Council received another letter from Annan containing an 
annexed  ‘national  plan’  by  the  Sudanese  government  to  ‘strengthen  security  and 
restore stability’ to Darfur.
432 In the correspondence, President Bashir had stated that 
he  wanted  to  ‘emphasize  that  the  restoration  of  stability  and  the  protection  of 
civilians are central to the responsibilities of the Government of the Sudan’. The plan 
involved,  inter  alia,  deploying  a  further  12,000-22,500  government  troops  into 
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Darfur along with 4,000 integrated SLA fighters under the DPA and an additional 
3,348 AU troops and 7,050 notional police to areas around IDP camps. However, 
this plan was clearly at odds with the notion of an impartial UN peacekeeping force 
providing security.
433 
  Additionally, on 21 August, attempting to pre-empt an impending Council 
vote  on  deploying  UN  forces,  the  Sudanese  president  sent  a  further  letter  to  the 
Council  claiming  that  his  government  and  other  actors  had  been  working  to 
implement the DPA and had hoped that the UN would have accepted his submitted 
plan for the resolution of the Darfur crisis.
434 As such, he stated that the ‘process of 
transferring the mandate of the African Union forces in Darfur to United Nations 
forces does not find acceptance among large sectors of the people of the Sudan. All 
its legislative, parliamentary and executive institutions at every level, including the 
Government of National Unity, have adopted unanimous resolutions categorically 
rejecting the process of transfer.’ On 28 August USG Egeland and ASG Annabi 
further  briefed  the  Council,  although,  according  to  a  communiqué,  the  invited 
Sudanese representative failed to attend.
435 Egeland warned the Council that “‘a man-
made catastrophe of an unprecedented scale’ looms within weeks unless the Security 
Council acts immediately to deal with the spiralling violence, looting and internal 
displacement.”
436  
  Then,  on  31  August  the  Council  met  to  adopt  the  highly-anticipated 
Resolution 1706, with 12 affirmative votes and three abstentions, again from China, 
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Russia,  and  Qatar.
437  The  resolution  was  co-sponsored  by  Argentina,  Denmark, 
France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the UK, Tanzania, and the US. In its preambular 
paragraphs,  the  resolution  again  cited  the  Council’s  prior  endorsement  of  the 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine in Resolution 1674, but also again reaffirmed the 
Council’s ‘strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial 
integrity of the Sudan, which would be unaffected by transition to a United Nations 
operation  in  Darfur’.  Largely  following  the  recommendations  of  the  Secretary-
General, the Council, in the operative sections of Resolution 1706, decided that the 
mandate of UNMIS should be expanded and that it should deploy to Darfur.  
However, accepting the crucial qualification made in Annan’s proposal, the 
Council stated that it ‘invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for 
this deployment’ (notably, the original draft resolution circulated on 17 August by 
the  US  and  UK  did  not  include  such  a  caveat).  In  reality,  this  provision  gave 
Khartoum  an  effective  veto  over  any  UN  deployment  and  represented  the 
achievement of a major concession to Sudan by its allies in the Council and a defeat 
for those pressing for a more coercive approach, even if the underlying aim of a more 
coercive approach, particularly by a united permanent membership, would have been 
to pressure the Sudanese government to accept UN troops.  
Despite this extraordinary abdication of its legal authority, the Council went 
on to select the first troop configuration option (17,300 troops, 3,300 civilian police, 
and sixteen formed police units) and ‘decided’ that UN support to AMIS should 
begin to be deployed no later than 1 October 2006 and that the full transition to 
UNMIS would occur no later than no later than 31 December 2006.
438 UNMIS was 
mandated to support the implementation of the DPA and the N’djamena ceasefire 
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agreement  in  a  variety  of  ways.  In  the  context  of  civilian  protection,  the  most 
important aspect of the mandate of UNMIS was its robust Chapter VII authority to 
‘use all necessary means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems 
within its capabilities’: 
 
to  protect  United  Nations  personnel,  facilities,  installations  and 
equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United 
Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, assessment and evaluation 
commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups, without prejudice to the 
responsibility  of  the  Government  of  the  Sudan,  to  protect  civilians 
under threat of physical violence [and] in order to support early and 
effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent 
attacks  and  threats  against  civilians  [and]  to  seize  or  collect,  as 
appropriate, arms or related material whose presence in Darfur is in 
violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 
7 and 8 of resolution 1556, and to dispose of such arms and related 
material as appropriate
439 
 
  Due to the highly contentious nature of the resolution, it was not surprising 
that a number of Council members made statements in support of their positions, 
statements that were revealing of the political dynamics at play in the body. For 
example,  the  US  called  upon  the  Sudanese  government  to  comply  with  the 
resolution: ‘[w]e expect its full and unconditional cooperation and support for the 
new United Nations peacekeeping force. Failure on the part of the Government of the 
Sudan to do so will significantly undermine the [DPA] and prolong the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur.’
440 France stated that while the UN had a ‘collective responsibility’ 
to ensure peace in Darfur, such an outcome would ‘require continued consultation 
with  the  Sudanese  authorities,  whose  cooperation  will  be  essential  for  the 
deployment  of  the  operation  in  Darfur  and  for  the  fulfilment  of  its  mission.  Of 
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course, the United Nations has no other goal that to provide its assistance to one of 
its members, the Sudan.’
441 
The UK argued that that the ‘test before the Council today was whether it was 
prepared  to  act  to  mandate  [UNMIS]  and  assume  its  responsibilities  towards  the 
people of Darfur. The adoption of the resolution shows that it is. The resolution gives 
the United Nations force in Darfur a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all necessary 
means to protect civilians’.
442 However, London also argued that even through the 
Council  had  rejected  President  Bashir’s  own  proposal  to  send  further  Sudanese 
forces in Darfur, this ‘does not mean that we do not attach importance to the consent 
and agreement of the Government of Sudan. It remains the case that the United 
Nations cannot deploy in Darfur until we have that agreement; that is not in dispute. 
We  look  forward  hopefully  to  the  Government  of  Sudan’s  giving  its  acceptance 
soon. But in the vote today, the Council has sent a crystal clear message that it wants 
that agreement to be forthcoming quickly. Indeed, in the text of its resolution, it 
explicitly invites the Sudan to provide this.’
443  
  China  also  made  its  position  clear,  stating  that  it  was  in  favour  of  the 
transition, or more precisely the conditions under which it could occur: ‘[i]t is a good 
idea and realistic option, and it will help to improve the situation on the ground and 
serve  the  interests  of  all  parties.  We  therefore  support,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Government of National Unity, the deployment of United Nations troops in Darfur as 
soon as feasible.’
444 China elaborated that the transition ‘can be possible and the 
mission can be deployed only when the consent of the Government of National Unity 
is obtained. That is the understanding of the African Union, as well as the decision of 
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the Security Council.’ These statements clearly reiterated traditional Chinese support 
for  the  norm  of  non-intervention.  According  to  Beijing,  the  draft  resolution  was 
voted upon too soon and should have been delayed until after a proposed high-level 
meeting with all of the parties in early September. Because of this, and because, it 
claimed, there was not a clear enough statement requiring the consent of Khartoum 
for  the  UN  deployment  (such  as  included  in  the  Secretary-General’s  original 
proposal, perhaps), China had abstained from voting.  
Russia concurred that it was ‘of fundamental importance that the resolution 
clearly states the overriding need for the consent of the Government of National 
Unity of the Sudan’ for the UN deployment, although such consent ‘has yet to be 
received. To obtain it, we must continue constructive dialogue with the Sudanese 
leadership.’
445 Moscow stated that ‘[p]ending the receipt of such consent, the Russian 
delegation  decided  to  abstain  in  the  vote  …  although  we  have  no  objections  in 
principle  to  its  content.’  Similarly,  Qatar  stated  that  it  ‘would  have  preferred  a 
different approach to this sensitive issue. Due regard should have been taken of the 
numerous aspects and underlying concrete principles of international practice before 
adopting a resolution that will have bearing on the sovereignty of Sudan … More 
efforts  should  have  been  made  on  the  political  front  to  prepare  the  ground  for 
Sudan’s voluntary consent to expanding the mandate’ of UNMIS. It stated that ‘[a]s 
far as we know, consent is voluntary.’
446  
  Conversely, taking a more coercive approach, the current Council president, 
Ghana, speaking in a national capacity, stated that it had ‘reservations about the 
inclusion in the draft text of explicit language that implies that the Government of the 
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Sudan can take all the time it wants before allowing the United Nations to deploy in 
Darfur, or even refuse to do so, regardless of the cost in human lives.’
447  
Voting and statements on Resolution 1706 thus continued the existing trend 
inside  the  Council:  China,  Russia  and  Qatar  did  not  endorse  actions  that  even 
suggested a challenge to Sudan’s sovereignty — despite the effective Sudanese veto 
over any UN deployment in Darfur. In turn, the three Western permanent members 
were reduced to voicing hope that Khartoum would accept the proposed transition, 
even though President Bashir’s numerous statements suggested otherwise, and were 
reluctant to openly criticise Sudan. Representing a more coercive approach, Ghana 
argued that the Council should not have transferred its decision-making authority 
over the deployment of UN peace operations to Khartoum, a government that the 
Council-mandated COI had found guilty of widespread atrocities against its own 
citizens. 
 
UN deployment obstructed by Sudan’s non-consent: Post-Resolution 
1706: 
 
In the wake of the fatal concession made in Resolution 1706, the Council 
spent the remainder of the year trying to achieve Sudanese government consent over 
some form of deployment of UN forces in Darfur to provide essential security for 
vulnerable civilians. The first formal opportunity to do this came at a high-level 
meeting of the Council on 11 September, at which Annan and representatives of the 
Sudanese  government,  Arab  League,  OIC,  and  AU  participated.
448  Annan  set  the 
tone, arguing that it was ‘vital that we all speak candidly about what is happening 
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and about what it will take to bring to an end the suffering of so many millions of 
people.’  Citing  recent  reports  of  renewed  fighting  in  Darfur,  including  aerial 
bombing by the SAF, in violation of the DPA, and that the displaced population was 
at 1.9 million out of nearly three million dependent on humanitarian aid, Annan 
asked: ‘[h]aving finally agreed — just one year ago — that there is an international 
responsibility to protect, can we contemplate failing another test? He argued that 
‘current  developments’  in  Darfur  ‘defy  several  of  the  Council’s  resolutions  and 
violate commitments that were made, including the non-deployment of additional 
Sudanese armed forces. Such action is legally and morally unacceptable.’ ‘But’, said 
Annan, ‘let us be clear: we all know that the Government of the Sudan still refuses to 
accept the transition, and the Council has recognized that without the Government’s 
consent the transition will not be possible.’ Finally, the Secretary-General warned 
that: 
 
The consequences of the Government’s current attitude — yet more 
death and suffering, perhaps on a catastrophic scale — will be felt first 
and foremost by the people of Darfur. But the Government itself will 
also  suffer  if  it  fails  in  its  sacred  responsibility  to  protect  its  own 
people. It will suffer opprobrium and disgrace in the eyes of all Africa 
and the whole international community. Moreover, neither those who 
decide such policies nor those who carry them out should imagine that 
they will not be held accountable.
449 
 
  In response, Sudan, which was under intense international pressure to consent 
to  the  deployment,  argued  that  it  had  no  problem  working  cooperatively  with 
UNMIS in southern Sudan because the CPA was ‘governed by the principles of the 
Charter  and  respect  for  sovereignty.’
450  In  contrast,  Khartoum  claimed  that  the 
Council’s approach to Darfur had ‘proceeded down a different path characterized by 
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an imbalanced scale of justice and the lack of the criteria for credibility’ (despite 
having been granted an effective veto over the deployment of UNMIS in Darfur). 
Sudan also claimed that discussions leading to the passage of Resolution 1706 made 
‘erroneous  conclusions’,  that  the  Council  had  taken  ‘hasty  measures’  with  the 
resolution, and as a result ‘chose a confrontational approach’, whereas the Sudanese 
government was always open to peaceful dialogue.  
In support of Khartoum, the Arab League stressed the ‘need to secure the 
consent’ of Sudan ‘before dispatching forces to Darfur so as to ensure that they are 
not rejected’, a position with which the OIC concurred.
451 Moreover, China claimed 
that there was consensus in the Council on both the need to transition to UNMIS as 
well  as  the  need  to  first  obtain  consent  from  Khartoum.  Beijing  hoped  that  the 
Sudanese government could be persuaded to accept this, but reiterated that ‘[a]t the 
same time, we consider that the Security Council should respect the views of the 
national Government in question and that no United Nations peacekeeping operation 
should  be  imposed.’
452  Russia  stated  that  ‘[r]ecent  events  have  shown  that  the 
Sudanese leadership has adopted a policy of independently seeking a solution to the 
problem of Darfur without the involvement of United Nations peacekeepers in that 
process.  Let  me  be  frank:  we  do  not  agree  with  that  position.’  However,  while 
supporting the transition to a UN force in principle, Moscow asserted that this ‘must 
be done on the basis of cooperation with the leadership of the Sudan’.
453 
Conversely, the US claimed that Sudan had not addressed the key issue of 
how  it  was  going  to  resolve  the  humanitarian  crisis  in  Darfur  nor  committed  to 
implementing Resolution 1706: instead of ‘assuming its responsibility’, Khartoum 
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had ‘indicated that it will take a step backwards by forcing the expulsion of [AMIS 
troops] by the end of the month, leaving a vacuum in Darfur for the Government of 
National Unity to fill with its own troops.’ It called on Khartoum to cooperate with 
the Council ‘because the situation in Darfur cannot stand.”
454 According to Britain, 
the claim that Resolution 1706 ‘infringes national sovereignty, when UNMIS has 
been in the south working to consolidate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ring 
very hollow.’
455 The UK said that in the Council’s many consultations in Darfur 
‘what  has  been  consistent  is  the  unwillingness  of  the  President  of  the  Sudan  to 
actually agree that [UNMIS] should be deployed into Darfur.’ London proposed that 
the UN had ‘made it clear that it is ready to fulfil its part. The question is, is the 
Government of the Sudan prepared to fulfil its obligations to its own people?’  
France  added  that  the  Sudanese  government  ‘must  now  accept’  the 
deployment of UNMIS in Darfur: ‘It owes that to its population, which — as has 
been noted today several times — it has the responsibility to protect, if necessary 
with the assistance of the international community.’
456 By now, however, it was clear 
that  the  Sudanese  government  was  successfully  able  to  deflect  harsh  Western 
rhetorical criticisms and that Khartoum, through its allies on the Council, was largely 
in control of the deployment or otherwise of UN troops. 
  In this context, the Council’s next action, on 22 September, and the first of a 
number of procedural measures, was to unanimously pass Resolution 1709, which 
temporarily  extended  the  mandate  of  UNMIS  until  8  October  2006  ‘with  the 
intention to renew it for further periods’
457 pending the outcome of gaining Sudanese 
acceptance for the expansion in Darfur
 (the AU had extended the mandate of AMIS 
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until  31  December  2006  two  days  earlier).  Then,  on  29  September,  the  Council 
passed Resolution 1713, again unanimously, which was co-sponsored by Denmark, 
France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the UK and the United States.
458 The resolution, 
passed under Chapter VII, extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 29 
September 2007 and requested that Annan appoint a further member to assist in its 
work.  
Speaking before the vote, Qatar claimed that Panel was unprofessional and 
had not handled sensitively the types of allegations that it was making, particularly 
against officials of the Sudanese government.
459 Nevertheless, Doha voted in favour 
of the resolution because it believed that the Panel could be reformed in order to 
work better. Additionally, on 29 September, Annan and AU Chairperson Konare sent 
a joint letter to President Bashir outlining the steps the UN would take to enhance 
AMIS in the interim period until the end of its mandate.
460 Annan confirmed on 6 
October that in reply, Bashir had agreed to the assistance package but, yet again, not 
to the eventual UN transition.
461  
  It  was  also  evident  by  this  stage  that  the  variety  of  non-military  or 
cooperative measures attempted by the Council over the past three years had failed to 
fundamentally deter Khartoum or bring adequate security to Darfur. For example, on 
3 October the Panel of Experts transmitted its latest report to the Council citing, inter 
alia, that the Sudanese government had been transporting military equipment into 
Darfur  in  contravention  of  Council  resolutions,  while  the  Panel  revealed  it  had 
‘credible information’ that Khartoum ‘continues to support the Janjaweed through 
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the provision of weapons and vehicles. The Janjaweed/armed militias appear to have 
upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, 
pickup  trucks  and  rocket-propelled  grenades.’
462  The  Panel  also  lamented  that 
Khartoum  had  not  implemented  the  financial  sanctions  imposed  upon  the  four 
individuals  designated  by  the  Sanctions  Committee  and  concluded  that  the 
government had ‘wilfully avoided implementing the resolution.’  
On  6  October  the  Council  again  met  and  passed  unanimously  Resolution 
1714, which was sponsored by the US, and which welcomed the decision of the AU 
PSC on 20 September to extend the mandate of AMIS until the end of the year, and 
itself  extended  the  mandate  of  UNMIS  until  30  April  2007,
463  even  though  no 
consent for its deployment in Darfur had been granted by Khartoum.
 These measures, 
while procedurally important, belied the necessity of a coercive military intervention 
and illustrated the success that Khartoum had achieved in obstructing a more robust 
response by the Council to the atrocities and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. 
 
Council resigned to three-phased hybrid operation: Late 2006 
 
  Indeed, by late 2006 it had become obvious that the Sudanese government 
was not going to consent to a transition to UN troops in Darfur, as Resolution 1706 
had provided it the opportunity to do. In mid-November, it also became clear that the 
Council members pushing for the transition had resigned themselves to reaching a 
further  compromise  with  Khartoum  over  the  UN  deployment.  As  such,  on  16 
November the ‘High Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur’ took place in 
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Addis Ababa, co-chaired by Annan and Konare and attended by representatives of 
the  P5,  Sudan,  and  other  African  countries.
464  According  to  a  ‘Conclusions’ 
statement,  the  aim  of  the  summit  was  threefold:  to  re-energise  the  failing  peace 
process,  to  establish  a  stronger  ceasefire,  and  to  examine  ways  to  proceed  with 
peacekeeping in the region.
465  
Most notably, on the latter, the parties agreed to support a new three-phase 
approach  instead  of  continuing  to  demand  Khartoum’s  consent  to  a  complete 
transition from AMIS to a UN force. The new compromise involved, in phase one, a 
UN ‘light support package’ to AMIS, which was already underway with agreement 
of the GNU; phase two involved an enhanced ‘heavy support package’, which was to 
be negotiated by the Tripartite Mechanism of the UN, AU and GNU; and finally, 
phase  three  would  be  a  extensive  but  ‘hybrid’  UN/AU  peacekeeping  operation, 
which was agreed in-principle with the GNU ‘pending clarification of the size of the 
force’. Tellingly, the Sudanese government was also granted time to ‘consult on the 
appointment of the SRSG and Force Commander’. 
The aims of the peacekeeping force would be to ‘contribute to the restoration 
of security and protection of civilians through implementation of the security aspects 
of the DPA’, as well as to ‘ensure full humanitarian access’.
466 The UN would ensure 
that the force was ‘logistically and financially sustainable’, while it was also agreed 
that  the  force  would  have  a  ‘predominantly  African  character’  and  that  ‘troops 
should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  sourced  from  African  countries.’  Additionally, 
‘[b]ackstopping and command and control structures’ would be provided by the UN. 
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The size of the force would be 17,000 with 3,000 police and must ‘enjoy free and 
unhindered  movement  in  Darfur’.  Annan  later  claimed  that  Sudan’s  in-principle 
acceptance  of  the  hybrid  operation  at  the  meeting  could  be  a  ‘turning  point’  in 
resolving the Darfur conflict, and that he was awaiting President Bashir’s response to 
the Conclusions reached in Addis.
467 In reality, however, the Sudanese government 
had again succeeded at compromising, in advance, any potential UN presence on the 
ground in the country’s west. 
  In a further illustration of the derogation of Council authority on matters of 
peace enforcement, Annan (delivered by USG Guehenno) told an AU PSC meeting 
on  30  November  that  the  Council  was  ‘now  looking  to  this  [AU  meeting]  for 
decisions that will facilitate the Addis agreement’s rapid implementation.’
468 Annan 
added that if the first two phases of the peacekeeping plan fail to eventuate in the 
deployment of the hybrid force, then it would be ‘highly unlikely’ that the Security 
Council would authorise UN funding for Darfur peacekeeping: the Council ‘will not 
agree to commit what could amount to a billion and a half dollars a year without the 
minimal compromise conditions arrived at in Addis Ababa. This was made clear by 
Permanent  members  during  our  discussions  in  Addis  Ababa  and  reiterated 
subsequently in New York’. During the meeting, the AU endorsed the 16 November 
Consultation’s  ‘Conclusions’,  with  additional  concessions  to  Khartoum  that  the 
Special Representative shall be jointly appointed by the AU Commissioner and the 
UN Secretary-General, and that the Force Commander, who should be African, shall 
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be appointed by the AU Chairperson ‘in consultation with’ Annan.
 The PSC also 
extended the mandate of AMIS for six months from 1 January 2007.
469 
The failures of the Council’s relatively non-coercive approach to addressing 
the crisis in Darfur were reflected in the December 2006 report of the Secretary-
General, who argued that the ‘continued rejection, made under claims of sovereignty, 
of the deployment of United Nations troops in support of the AMIS operation results 
in the perpetuation of the attacks and abuses, which can no longer be tolerated.’
470 On 
19 December the Council issued a Presidential Statement in which it ‘endorsed the 
conclusions’  of  the  High-Level  Consultation,  and  welcomed  the  AU’s  earlier 
decision to support it and GNU’s stated commitment to it.
 471 As such, the Council 
called  upon  all  parties  to  facilitate  the  immediate  deployment  of the  three  phase 
peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Then, in its final action on Darfur for the year 
(and study period), the Council on 27 December issued a press statement welcoming 
President  Bashir’s  recent  letter  ‘in  which  he  reconfirmed  his  commitment  to  the 
Addis  Ababa  and  Abuja  Agreements,  in  particular  to  bring  about  a  cessation  of 
hostilities,  to  revitalise  the  political  process  and  to  allow  the  immediate 
implementation  of  the  United  Nations  three-phased  support  plan  to  the  African 
Union, culminating in the deployment of a hybrid United Nations–African Union 
force in Darfur.’
472  
Waiting  again  for  Sudan’s  agreement  was  illustrative  of  the  Council’s 
underlying non-coercive approach to civilian protection in Darfur [indeed, indicative 
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of the failure of this approach to place substantive pressure on Khartoum — and thus 
prolonging violence, insecurity and suffering for the population of Darfur — Bashir 
did not actually formally consent the deployment of the hybrid force until June 2007, 
after  which  the  Council  ‘re-authorised’  in  Resolution  1769  on  31  July  2007  the 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), although it 
did not actually deploy to Darfur until 1 January 2008]. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  This examination of the chronological development of the Security Council’s 
response to the Darfur crisis between 2003-06 has presented a wealth of important 
empirical  data.  First,  after  an  initially  inactive  response  the  Council  became 
increasingly engaged with Darfur, such that from mid-2004 the crisis in western 
Sudan featured at least once a month (with a couple of exceptions) on the body’s 
agenda for the rest of the study period.  
Second,  due  to  numerous  official  and  independent  reports  throughout  the 
period of study — most notably by the COI — it is clear that the Council was fully 
aware  of  the  nature  and  scale  of  atrocities  being  committed  against  the  civilian 
population  in  Darfur,  including  the  orchestration  and  direct  commission  of  such 
crimes  by  the  Sudanese  government.  This  added  weight  to  the  argument  that  a 
military intervention was necessary and increased pressure on the Council to act 
more  coercively,  not  least  because  Council  members  could  not  claim  a  lack  of 
credible  information  coming  from  on  the  ground  (as  some  had  attempted  to  do 
during the Rwandan genocide in 1994
473).  
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Third, the Council did initiate a number of actions short of coercive military 
intervention,  including  establishing  the  COI,  referring  the  case  to  the  ICC,  and 
creating a limited sanctions regime and arms embargo. In cooperation with the AU, 
the Council also supported the deployment of AMIS military observers, although 
with  an  inadequate  mandate  and  capacity  to  protect  civilians,  and  facilitated  the 
largely  ineffective  Darfur  Peace  Agreement.  Most  significantly,  the  Council 
authorised the transition from AMIS to a full UN peacekeeping mission with a robust 
civilian protection mandate in August 2006, but the deployment of this operation was 
crucially precluded by the Council’s self-imposed caveat of requiring prior Sudanese 
government consent — which was predictably withheld. 
  Illustrating the political dynamics inside Council deliberations on Sudan, and 
exposing key elements of the body’s decision-making processes, the voting patterns, 
positions and statements of individual Council members were also revealed. Western 
members, including the P3, publicly supported more coercive measures against the 
Sudanese government because of its actions in Darfur. The US, UK and France co-
sponsored  a  number  of  resolutions  and  other  initiatives  that  aimed  at  generating 
pressure  on  Khartoum  to  change  its  brutal  counter-insurgency  policies,  and  at 
creating direct security or a measure of justice to the people of Darfur. This included 
the push for sanctions, the establishment of investigatory and judicial proceedings 
(although the US resisted the ICC referral), and the ultimately failed attempts to 
transform AMIS into a more robust UN peacekeeping force.  
Yet, despite these initiatives, there was little evidence to suggest that Western 
members  were  seriously  contemplating  coercive  military  intervention  after  the 
failure of non-military measures to bring about change and in the face of continuing 
Sudanese government obstructionism. While Western members explicitly used the   212 
discourse of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in their public statements in the Council, 
illustrating the influence of the emergent normative doctrine, this rhetoric was not 
supported by credible threats of coercive action. 
  Conversely,  China  and  Russia,  as  the  other  two,  non-Western  permanent 
members, were publicly less supportive of any measures that they deemed too harsh, 
or  which  placed  mandatory  pressure,  on  the  Sudanese  government.  China  in 
particular  demonstrated  its  lack  of  support  for  such  measures  by  consistently 
abstaining on Council resolutions that proposed punitive or coercive action against 
Khartoum.  In  this  position,  China  was  consistently  supported  by  non-permanent 
members Algeria, Pakistan, and Qatar (during their respective terms), and although 
Russia did support the ICC referral and the initial, vague threat of sanctions, it too 
generally showed little inclination towards generating pressure on Sudan. In their 
public statements in the Council, these members continued their historical practice of 
employing the pluralist argument that the Council should not violate the sovereignty 
of Sudan by interfering in its domestic affairs, or otherwise suggested — despite a 
wealth of evidence to the contrary — that Khartoum had in fact been demonstrating 
compliance with the body’s demands and should be commended. 
  Because  of  divergent  positions  and  approaches  amongst  the  permanent 
membership, the Council was unable to project a united front and as a result its moral 
and political authority was compromised, a situation which the Sudanese government 
ably exploited. It was apparent that, under the threat of a likely Chinese veto, other 
members of the body decided against pursuing more coercive, and thus divisive, 
action  through  the  Council’s  channels,  preferring  instead  to  achieve  enough 
compromise in pre-vote negotiations to satisfy Chinese (and Sudanese) demands. 
Ultimately,  the  result  of  this  political  dynamic  was  that  the  Council  failed  to   213 
coercively deploy a UN military intervention in Darfur to protect vulnerable civilians 
between 2003-06, despite a persuasive legal-institutional, normative and moral case 
for  doing  so.  The  task  of  Chapters  4  and  5  is  to  critically  examine  the  political 
interests  and  calculations  behind  the  positions  and  votes  of  individual  Council 
members in order to explain why a necessary coercive military intervention in Darfur 
was precluded.   214 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Explaining Council Non-intervention in Darfur:  
The Western P3 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite  a  persuasive  moral,  normative  and  legal-institutional  case  for  the 
coercive  deployment  in  Darfur  of  a  UN  Security  Council-authorised  peace 
enforcement operation with a robust civilian protection mandate, such a force was 
not deployed during the 2003-06 period of study. Moreover, the Council ‘failed to 
even seriously contemplate military intervention’
474 in the face of both continuing 
security and humanitarian crises in western Sudan and credible, publicly-available 
evidence that the Sudanese government had orchestrated and committed widespread 
crimes against humanity and war crimes against its own citizens. 
While the previous chapter has detailed the chronological development of the 
Council’s response to the Darfur crisis — including most significantly the body’s 
‘authorisation’  of  a  robust  peacekeeping  operation  in  Resolution  1706  of  August 
2006 — critical analysis reveals that opposition to it from the Sudanese government 
and the subsequent political calculations of Council members precluded the actual 
deployment of that force: indeed, a disunited and thus weak Council was unable even 
to generate sufficient coercive pressure on Khartoum to bring about a substantive 
change in Sudanese counter-insurgency policy in Darfur over the four year period of 
study. As a result, the Security Council, as the preeminent global body mandated to 
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maintain peace and security, clearly failed in its posited ‘responsibility to protect’ 
vulnerable civilians in Darfur.
475  
The  reasons  for  the  hostility  of  the  Sudanese  government  to  external 
interference or intervention in its ‘domestic affairs’ are self-evident and particularly 
transparent given the regime’s complicity in a number of international crimes. What 
is not so clear, however, is why, despite this predictable opposition, the Security 
Council did not coercively intervene in Darfur. Explaining this lack of intervention is 
the task of the remainder of this thesis. As such, the following two chapters will 
illustrate how conflicting policies or competing national interests within the Council, 
particularly  amongst  the  P5,  precluded  such  a  coercive  deployment,  or,  as  one 
analysis of Resolution 1706 concludes, ‘effectively conditioned deployment upon the 
consent  of  Khartoum.’
476  They  will  substantiate  the  key  theoretical  claim  that 
humanitarian interventions will likely not occur when they directly clash with the 
national interests of the major powers. To do this, both this chapter and then Chapter 
5 will examine the policy decisions regarding Darfur of individual Council members 
and  the  national  interests  behind  such  positions  emanating  from  their  respective 
capitals.
477 
In  the  context  of  the  Council’s  response  to  Darfur,  then,  this  chapter 
examines the interests and politics of the Western permanent members — the United 
States, United Kingdom and France — who, as purported defenders of human rights 
and preachers of liberal values, were under domestic pressure to ‘save Darfur’, and 
who, rhetorically at least, were the most engaged in generating pressure on Sudan in 
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the Council. In spite of these apparent catalysts for intervention, it is argued that the 
powerful Western P3, in particular the United States, had conflicting policy priorities 
and certain capacity constraints when it came to coercing Khartoum, of which three 
sources  will  be  examined:  first,  the  perceived  strategic  imperatives  of  the  post-
September  11,  2001,  ‘War  on  Terror’;  second,  a  commitment  to  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  north-south  Sudan  peace  process;  and  third,  the  deprivation  of 
legitimacy and resources that resulted from the highly-contentious 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. As a result, the interests of the Western permanent members in maintaining a 
working  relationship  with  the  incumbent  regime  in  Khartoum  militated  against 
enforcing civilian security in Darfur. 
 
The Western Permanent Members and Sudan 
 
  As Chapter 3 has illustrated, a relatively superficial review of the Council’s 
public  debate  and  voting  on  matters  pertaining  to  Darfur  would  give  the  clear 
impression that the Western permanent members were highly active in attempting to 
resolve the conflict, enhance civilian security, and alleviate the acute humanitarian 
crisis in the region.
478 It would also give the impression that the American, British 
and French governments were the driving force behind attempts in the Council to 
generate sufficient political pressure on Khartoum for it to consider changing its 
brutal counter-insurgency strategy in Darfur. As that pressure proved ineffectual, it 
appeared as though the Western P3 were then the instigators of proposals to deploy a 
UN peacekeeping force to the region in the face of Sudanese government opposition. 
Such  impressions  are  only  partially  correct:  as  preachers  of  liberal-democratic 
values, Western governments were forced to respond to domestic and global public 
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pressure to ‘do something’ about Darfur and likely felt a genuine desire (and perhaps 
responsibility)  to  protect  the  victims  of  what  the  US  government  had  indeed 
characterised as ‘genocide’ and the EU as ‘tantamount to genocide’.
479 Yet, as the 
previous chapter has also identified, in addition to such harsh rhetorical admonitions 
of  Khartoum,  ‘doing  something’  was  limited  to  the  initiation,  financing,  or 
facilitation of a variety of important — but ultimately inadequate — measures short 
of military intervention. 
As Piiparinen has observed more critically, the ‘(in)action of the international 
community  in  Darfur  has  been  widely  regarded  as  epitomizing  the  discrepancy 
between the bold statements and actual deeds of Western governments.’ For him, this 
is because despite having ‘actively promoted’ the responsibility to protect principle 
and its application to Darfur, Western policymakers have ‘lacked the commitment 
and resolve to launch an effective humanitarian intervention’ in Sudan.
480 Similarly, 
Flint  and  de  Waal  contend  that  despite  their  harsh  public  rhetoric,  Western 
governments’  ‘catalogue  of  actions  to  stop  the  slaughter  in  Darfur  is 
unimpressive’,
481 while Grono argues that even though the US ‘has called Darfur a 
genocide, it has yet to put real pressure on the Sudanese regime.’
482 Regarding the 
Western  P3’s  response  to  Darfur,  Prunier  concludes  that  the  ‘French  only  cared 
about  protecting  Idris  Deby’s  regime  in  Chad  from  possible  destabilization;  the 
British  blindly  followed  Washington’s  lead,  only  finding  this  somewhat  difficult 
since Washington was not very clear about which direction it wanted to take’.
483 
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Indeed, a deeper examination of decision-making in the respective capitals — 
particularly Washington and London, the seats of the two Western governments most 
engaged with Darfur
484 — reveals that this ambiguous response and lack of resolve 
was  actually  a  product  of  competing  policy  priorities  with  regards  to  Sudan  and 
‘hard’  and  ‘soft’  power  capacity  constraints,  both  of  which  militated  against  the 
coercive deployment of UN troops. Put simply, the US and UK had progressively 
established  what  they  considered  to  be  valuable  cooperative  relationships  with 
Khartoum, and, despite their public criticisms of Sudan, Washington and London 
calculated that neither their interests nor their abilities favoured substantively altering 
the terms of those relationships in the face of atrocities in Darfur. 
As  will  be  elaborated  below,  the  two  most  important  of  these  competing 
policy priorities were valuable Sudanese cooperation in regional counterterrorism 
and a desire to ensure that Khartoum signed and then remained committed to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM/A. In addition to the global ‘War 
on Terror’, the international political context that conditioned and constrained the 
Western  response  to  Darfur  was  the  highly  contentious  2003  US  and  UK-led 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq (particularly as the initial act of war did 
not achieve a prior Council mandate). Iraq consumed a majority of attention and 
political  capital  in  Washington  and  London,  and,  added  to  deployments  in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, overstretched American and British military capacities. 
Each of these elements will be examined in terms of its respective impact on the 
Western response to Darfur, and in particular on the body’s failure to coercively 
deploy a military intervention in Sudan. 
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Competing policy priority (i): Perceived strategic counter-terrorism 
imperatives 
 
  After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
the  Bush  administration  launched  a  self-proclaimed  ‘War  on  Terror’  ostensibly 
aimed at the identification and preventive elimination of certain militant groups or 
networks — and governments which harboured or supported them — which were 
perceived  to  threaten  the  security  or  interests  of  America  and  its  allies.
485  Most 
overtly, the Taliban regime was overthrown by a US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 
late 2001 for its hosting of the leadership of the al Qaeda terrorist network. A number 
of  other  measures  —  primarily  targeting  Islamist  militant  groups  and  their 
sympathisers — were implemented globally over subsequent years, including, inter 
alia, the freezing of suspect groups’ financial assets, overhauling border and travel 
security  procedures,  establishing  enhanced  intelligence  and  internal  monitoring 
capabilities, and threatening further military operations against states considered to 
be present or potential terrorism ‘risks’.
486 As a defining feature of early twenty-first 
century international politics, the ‘War on Terror’ has been extensively documented 
elsewhere and does not need further introduction here.
487 What is highly relevant for 
the analysis in this thesis, however, is the cooperative counter-terrorism relationship 
developed between Khartoum and Washington — one that has had a remarkable 
about-face. 
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  During the 1990s, the Clinton administration became increasingly concerned 
about  Sudan’s  links  to  militant  Islamist  organisations  which  had  the  potential  to 
commit or foster transnational acts of terrorism. Under Hassan al-Turabi’s radical 
influence, the National Islamic Front regime, which came to power in a strategic 
partnership with Omar al-Bashir via his 1989 military coup, actively sought to make 
Sudan an Islamic state under Sharia law and opened the country’s borders to like-
minded fundamentalists from across the region, including Osama bin Laden and his 
nascent al Qaeda network, which operated out of Sudan between 1991-96 (after bin 
Laden was ejected from Saudi Arabia).
488 It was alleged that terrorist training camps 
were established in the country as militant Islamist groups gathered in, and allied 
with,  Khartoum.  According  to  one  respected  analysis, t he  current  Sudanese 
government  has  a  ‘long  history  of  harbouring  terrorist  organizations  and  radical 
Islamic groups. It is the only sub-Saharan African government on the U.S. State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List and the only one that has officially provided support and 
safe haven for terrorist organizations.’
489  
Illustrating  the  antagonistic  relationship  between  the  West  and  Khartoum 
during this period, in 1997, after the Sudanese government was implicated in a failed  
assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa two 
years earlier, the US imposed unilateral trade sanctions, an asset freeze, and a ban on 
American military support for Sudan,
490 while the Security Council also imposed 
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sanctions.
491 Then, after the 1998 terrorist bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam, the US controversially launched a one-off cruise missile strike on the 
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in North Khartoum, which it alleged was a terrorist 
facility, while at the same time it ‘broadened counterterror cooperation’ with Kenya, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda.
492 Full military intervention to mitigate terrorism, of 
the form proposed in the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine, however, was not considered a 
viable policy option at the time. Instead, by the late 1990s, the US had managed to 
successfully  isolate  the  ‘pariah  state’  of  Sudan  through  diplomatic  and  military 
pressure, while there were signs that the radical Islamist project in the country was 
failing.
493 Later, there were even signs of a change in policy on Sudan, when in early 
2000, the United States ‘opened a dialogue’ with Khartoum.
494 
In  part,  President  Bashir  himself  had  become  concerned  at  the  deep 
association of his government with terrorist groups and other radicals. In addition to 
ejecting bin Laden and his associates from the country in 1996 (from where they 
moved to Afghanistan), Bashir further paved the way for future counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the West when he moved to distance his regime from the most 
hardline Islamists that were previously involved in his coup.
495 This included, most 
notably, dismissing and then imprisoning NIF leader al-Turabi in 1999. When Sudan 
began to export oil in the late 1990s, Khartoum ‘became keener to cooperate with US 
demands. It proceeded to round up terrorist suspects and to share intelligence’ with 
the Americans.
496 Then, after the 9/11 attacks, the Sudanese government ‘accelerated 
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the moderation of its foreign policy and distancing from terrorist organizations’.
497 
These  were  the  foundations  of  a  dramatic  about-face  in  the  counter-terrorism 
relationship between the United States and Sudan. 
Indeed, with the attacks of 9/11 and a new US government implementing and 
threatening further ‘regime change’,
498 President Bashir calculated that it would be in 
his regime’s best interests to be ‘with rather than against’ the United States in its 
emerging global ‘War on Terror’. According one view, after the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Bashir increasingly ‘took the Bush administration’s pressure 
seriously’.
499  More  specifically,  when  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan  ‘brought  hints 
from senior U.S. officials that Sudan might be attacked, the regime substantially 
increased  its  counter-terrorism  cooperation  with  Washington’.
500  And  this  was  a 
justifiably paranoid reaction: in Sudan, the US was still openly ‘concerned about the 
possible presence … of terrorist training camps and, accordingly, [had] worked to 
secure the cooperation of the Sudanese government in fighting terrorism’. Rather 
than face military intervention, Khartoum complied and proved that it was willing to 
‘secure American aims’, for which it was instead ‘rewarded with stronger ties’ with 
Washington.
501  
As a result, and after the establishment of a regional counter-terrorism base in 
Djibouti, the US ‘increased its engagement’ with Khartoum: in May 2003, for the 
first time in a decade, a US military aircraft landed in Sudan as Secretary of State 
Colin Powell met with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail to ‘discuss 
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cooperation on the war on terrorism’.
502 Sudan offered the Bush administration its 
services  in  counter-terrorism  cooperation  and  ‘invited  an  intelligence-sharing 
relationship’, 
503  in  which  it  had  a  comparative  advantage  due  to  its  strategic 
geographic location and membership of the wider Arab and Islamic communities. 
However, this new cooperative relationship was ‘sensitive and previously veiled’ as 
public knowledge of the relationship would clearly be politically damaging for both 
sides.
504  According  to  Silverstein,  in  exchange  for  this  ‘largely  unpublicized’ 
cooperation, Khartoum wanted to be both removed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism  and  have  Washington  lift  the  economic  sanctions  that  had  prohibited 
bilateral  trade  since  1997.
505  And  for  the  US,  Sudan’s  role  in  counter-terrorism 
operations was more valuable that was originally estimated: 
 
Initially, the collaboration focused on information Sudan could provide 
about Al Qaeda’s activities before Bin Laden left for Afghanistan in 
1996, including Al Qaeda’s pursuit of chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons and its many business fronts and associates there. Since then, 
Sudan has moved beyond sharing historical information on Al Qaeda 
into taking part in ongoing counter-terrorism operations, focusing on 
areas where assistance is likely to be most appreciated.
506  
 
In  particular,  Sudan  has  been  able  to  provide  the  US  with  significant 
intelligence on foreign radicals and insurgents in Iraq, both by tracking those who 
have  passed  through  Sudan  on  route  to  the  Middle  East  and  by  inserting  covert 
Sudanese operatives into Iraqi resistance circles. In addition, Sudan’s Mukhaberat 
intelligence  service  has  ‘detained  Al  Qaeda  suspects  for  interrogation  by  U.S. 
                                                        
502 Prendergast and Roessler, “Can A Leopard’, 13. This was notably just after the SLM/A and JEM 
attacks on El Fasher. 
503 Africa Action, “A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur”, 
Africa Action Report, Washington D.C., September 9, 2006, p. 7. 
504 Ken Silverstein, “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism”, Los Angeles 
Times, April 29, 2005. 
505 Silverstein, “Official Pariah”. 
506 Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, “U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning It”, Los Angeles Times, 
June 11, 2007.   224 
agents’, and had ‘seized and turned over to the FBI evidence recovered in raids on 
suspected  terrorists’  homes,  including  fake  passports’,  while  the  Sudanese 
government  had  ‘expelled  extremists,  putting  them  into  the  hands  of  Arab 
intelligence agencies working closely with the CIA’ and is ‘credited with foiling 
attacks against American targets by, among other things, detaining foreign militants 
moving through Sudan on their way to join forces with Iraqi insurgents.’
507  
A 2005 article in The Guardian newspaper quoted a former US intelligence 
official  as  revealing  that  in  the  Middle  East,  Sudanese  agents  have  ‘penetrated 
networks  that  would  not  normally  be  accessible  to  America  …  Some  of  that 
cooperation has spilled over into the war in Iraq: Sudan is credited with detaining 
foreign militants on their way to join anti-American fighters there.’
508 The former 
official  added  that t he  ‘intelligence  relationship  is  the  strongest  thread  between 
Washington and Khartoum … Khartoum is probably the only government in the 
Arab League that has contributed in a major way to the protection of US forces and 
citizens in Iraq.’
509 Another analysis similarly concludes that since 9/11 Sudan has 
been ‘increasingly valuable’ to US counter-terrorism efforts because: 
 
the Sunni Arab nation is a crossroads for Islamic militants making their 
way  to  Iraq  and  Pakistan.  That  steady  flow  of  foreign  fighters  has 
provided cover for Sudan’s Mukhaberat intelligence service to insert 
spies into Iraq … As a result, Sudan’s spies have often been in a better 
position than the CIA to gather information on al-Qaeda’s presence in 
Iraq, as well as the activities of other insurgent groups.
510 
 
In addition to Iraq, counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and Sudan 
has also extended to the Horn of Africa, a region that since the 9/11 attacks has 
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‘come  under  increased  scrutiny  as  a  strategic  focal  point  in  the  war  against 
terrorism.’
511  As  such,  after  9/11  the  US  established  the  Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism  Initiative  (TSCTI),  which,  according  to  Cohen,  focuses  on 
‘counterinsurgency’ in the Sahelian subregion.
 512 In addition, the US set up the Joint 
Task  Force  Horn  of  Africa  (JTF-HOA)  military  facility  in  Djibouti,  housing  US 
special  forces  and  other  personnel  and  mandated  with  ‘regional  counterterrorist 
surveillance … intelligence collection and exchanges, and training of African units.’ 
The facility forms the core of the Horn of Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, which 
provides counterinsurgency training to the region’s militaries.
513 Later, in October 
2007, the US established a new Africa Command (AFRICOM) to coordinate US 
military  and  counter-terrorist  operations  on  the  continent.
514  Yet,  despite  these 
initiatives, the US still had a lack of reliable first-hand intelligence sources on the 
ground,  as  ‘U.S.  intelligence  capacities  decayed  precipitously  during  the  1990s, 
following the end of the Cold War. Critical uncovered gaps arose in northern Nigeria 
and  Somalia.’
515  This  point  was  highlighted  by  a  2004  United  States  Institute  of 
Peace  report,  which  concluded  that  an  ‘effective  U.S.  response’  to  the  threat  of 
terrorism in the Horn must indeed include, inter alia, ‘improved regional intelligence 
capabilities’.
516  As a result, Sudanese cooperation and intelligence sharing became 
critical to the US counter-terrorism capacity in the region. 
Indeed, a primary target of US counter-terrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa 
is  the  ‘failed  state’  of  Somalia,  a  suspected  host  for  radicals  groups  and  alleged 
                                                        
511 United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, United States Institute of 
Peace Special Report 113, Washington, D.C., January 2004, 1-2. 
512 Herman J. Cohen, “In Sub-Saharan Africa, Security is Overtaking Development as Washington’s 
Top Policy Priority”, American Foreign Policy Interests 30 (2008): 88-95, 92. 
513 Cohen, “In Sub-Saharan Africa”, 92. 
514 Cohen, “In Sub-Saharan Africa”, 93-94. 
515 Independent Task Force, “More Than Humanitarianism”, 58. 
516 USIP, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, 1-2.   226 
terrorists due to the largely anarchic conditions inside the country since the early 
1990s.
517 According to Ken Menkhaus, Somalia ‘remains high on the list of potential 
terrorist safe havens’, while the country has been a particularly important transit zone 
for foreign terrorists — including members of al-Qaeda — to enter Africa from the 
Middle East and elsewhere, especially when moving through Somalia into Kenya.
518 
The US became increasingly concerned about Somalia after the rise of the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU), which took control of large parts of the country’s south in mid-
2006. Certain members of the ICU as well as the militant Al-Ittihad Al-Islami are 
allegedly associated with al-Qaeda and linked to the 1998 US embassy bombings in 
East  Africa.
519  The  Bush  administration  has  thus  been  ‘concentrating  most  of  its 
energies on capturing or killing three foreign Al Qaeda fugitives and a dozen or so of 
their  Somali  associates,’  including  launching  air  strikes  on  suspected  Al  Qaeda 
targets.
520  More  generally,  the  US  has  commenced  counter-terrorist  air  and  naval 
surveillance of Somalia and envisages its military presence in neighbouring Djibouti 
to  be  a  potential  ‘rapid  reaction  force’  to  counter  any  terrorist  activities  in  the 
region.
521  
However, the US ‘strategy of backing warlords against Islamists in Somalia 
failed as the Islamists increasingly gained control of greater territory, while at the 
same  time  continuing  to  shield  al-Qaeda  suspects.’
522  Moreover,  in  Somalia, 
“[f]undamental  human  rights  and  the  international  ‘responsibility  to  protect’ 
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principle have been sacrificed on the altar of counter-terrorism, but in so doing, U.S. 
engagement in Somalia is actually fostering the rise of Islamist radicalism across the 
region and playing into the hands of extremists.”
523 Because of this failure of US 
policy,  Khartoum  has  been  able  ‘exploit  [its  regional  influence]  to  strengthen 
counter-terrorism  links  with  Washington’,  not  least  because  Sudan’s  national 
security and intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, has links to 
influential  Somali  Islamists,
524  while  more  generally  Sudanese  agents  have  also 
cooperated with the CIA to ‘monitor’ such groups.
525 
The  emerging  US  ties  with  Sudanese  intelligence  were  symbolised  most 
vividly  by  the  April  2005  hosting  of  Major  General  Gosh  by  the  CIA  at  its 
headquarters in Virginia, after the Agency had flown him to the United States on a 
private  jet.  Post-9/11,  Gosh  became  the  al-Bashir  regime’s  internal  security  and 
intelligence chief and has cooperated extensively with the US on counter-terrorism in 
Sudan and the region, ‘detaining terrorism suspects and turning them over to the 
United States; expelling Islamic extremists; and raiding suspected terrorists’ homes 
and  handing  evidence  to  the  FBI.’
526  Furthermore,  cited  in  a  media  report,  Marc 
Laverne, former head of the UN expert’s group on Sudan, claimed that the Bush 
administration  ‘regularly  discusses  terrorism  with  top  Sudanese  intelligence  and 
security officials who happen to also be architects of the Darfur campaign.’ Laverne 
named Gosh and presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie as being ‘well known in certain 
Washington  circles’:  ‘These  people  regularly  visit  Washington  and  they  are  in 
permanent contact with the United States which considers them special partners.’ 
Lavergne argued that ‘[b]y agreeing to divulge everything it has about bin Laden, Al-
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Qaeda, the Palestinians, Algerian Islamists and a bunch of other troublemakers in the 
world,  the  Sudanese  government  is  providing  an  enormous  service  to  the  US 
government and is irreplaceable.’
527 
Another US official told the Los Angeles Times that the CIA’s ‘view was that 
the Sudanese are helping us on terrorism and it was proud to bring him over. They 
didn’t  care  about  the  political  implications.’
528  But  others  did:  as  Gosh  was  also 
accused  of  being  responsible  for  atrocities  in  Darfur,  his  trip  to  the  US  caused 
outrage in some quarters of the US public and within the bureaucracy.
529 This outrage 
clearly illustrates the competing political priorities and interests in Washington (and 
other Western allies in the ‘War on Terror’). As Thomas-Jensen argues, the US has 
been ‘conflicted’ over its Sudan policy: ‘On the one hand, there’s sincere concern in 
the White House, certainly a lot of pressure from the US Congress to deal with the 
atrocities in Darfur, but the overriding strategic objective of the US in the Horn of 
Africa is fighting terrorism and so these two issues are now clashing.’
530  
Indeed, Bellioni has observed that American policy on Sudan ‘shows how the 
war on terror might trump human rights concerns, and lead the US government to 
ally  itself  with  repressive  regimes  which  support  its  counter-terrorist  policies.’
531 
More broadly, discussing expanding US intelligence and military cooperation with 
‘key’ states in Africa, a Council on Foreign Relations task force argued that while 
such relationships ‘have resulted in several highly valuable programs that warrant 
continued support to ensure they remain robust and effective’, greater governmental 
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oversight was required to ensure that such initiatives did not do more harm than 
good: 
 
Counterterror  initiatives  are  frequently  undertaken  with  inadequate 
consideration  of  whether  these  operations  will  build  durable 
partnerships and create true capacities within partner governments, as 
well as how they might have an impact on civil liberties, democratic 
governance,  and  popular  perceptions  of  U.S.  intentions.  Also, 
initiatives  fail  to  consider  how  to  mitigate  the  risk  that  host 
governments will be tempted to use the relationship that develops from 
an emerging security alliance with the United States as an excuse for 
egregious misrule.
532 
 
In a similar vein, Stohl contends that the relationship between US policies in 
the ‘War on Terror’ and repression in states cooperating in US counter-terrorism 
operations ‘has not been examined closely’, in part because scholars generally omit 
state violence from analyses of terrorism: ‘they do not consider how the choices in 
the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy enable, acquiesce to or ignore 
the violence of the recruited states and this has deleterious effects not only for the 
populations that are repressed but also the counterterrorism efforts of the United 
States.’
533 Such effects are vividly illustrated by the post-9/11 US-Sudan relationship.  
It is clear that the United States and its European allies — who positioned 
counter-terrorism  as  key  policy  priorities  after  the  9/11  attacks  on  the  US  and 
subsequent  attacks  in  Madrid  and  London  —  saw  Sudanese  counter-terrorism 
cooperation  as  invaluable  and  a  relationship  that  they  did  not  want  to  sever  by 
pressuring  Khartoum  too  hard  over  Darfur.  Indeed,  according  to  Prendergast  the 
evolving  counter-intelligence  relationship  between  Khartoum  and  Washington 
‘blunted any U.S. response to the state-sponsored violence that exploded in Darfur in 
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2003 and 2004.’ He claims that US officials have told him that ‘access to Gosh’s 
information would be jeopardized if the Bush administration confronted Khartoum 
on Darfur.’
534 For this reason, despite their public criticism of Sudan and despite the 
wealth of evidence of atrocities on the ground, it appeared as though the US-led 
Western  P3  prioritised  counter-terrorism  cooperation  over  a  coercive  military 
intervention in Sudan as the former would likely have been severed by the latter. 
 
Competing policy priority (ii): Securing the north-south Sudan peace 
process 
 
  In  addition  to  counter-terrorism  cooperation,  Western  permanent  members 
had a strong interest — and had invested significant political capital and resources — 
in  ensuring  that  the  Sudanese  government  and  the  SPLM/A  signed  and  then 
remained committed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end the civil war 
between Khartoum and south Sudan, which had been a destructive feature of the 
country’s post-independence history.
535 The CPA, which was eventually signed in 
January  2005,  contained  power-  and  wealth-sharing  provisions  which,  if 
implemented, would lead to the decentralisation and democratic ‘transformation of 
governance’ in the country, while it also held the promise of a referendum in 2011 
over south Sudan’s potential secession from the republic.
536  
The US and Britain, as the two permanent Council members most actively 
engaged with the north-south Sudan peace process in Naivasha, Kenya, were from 
the early years in the new century heavily invested in brokering a deal between the 
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warring parties. While this Western engagement (including Norway) was a positive 
and commendable step, when Darfur erupted in early 2003 it created the unfortunate 
political dilemma of trying to resolve two concurrent civil wars in different parts of 
Sudan, and moreover, essentially having to praise Khartoum for its restraint in one 
and condemn it for its atrocities and escalation in the other. As a result, securing the 
CPA by keeping Khartoum onside came at the expense of a coercive intervention in 
Darfur. 
  As  it  happened,  from  2003  the  political  dilemma  over  resolving  the 
concurrent civil wars eventuated in the international community following, initially, 
a ‘sequencing’ strategy for resolving conflicts in Sudan — deal with the CPA first 
and  then  move  onto  the  crisis  in  Darfur  second.
537  This  sequencing  strategy  was 
illustrated in Chapter 3, in which it became clear that that the Security Council did 
not place Darfur on its formal agenda until April 2004 — a full year after the initial 
eruption of conflict there — when it had its first briefing on the conflict and crisis in 
Western Sudan by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland. 
According  to  Slim,  this  was  because  the  Council  ‘feared  that  international 
confrontation  with  Khartoum  over  Darfur  could  unravel  the  precious  Naivasha 
process,  achieved  only  after  a  long  struggle.’  He  argues  that  the  ‘enormous 
importance of these talks both distracted and inhibited the international community, 
until they were able to make a strong linkage between the two under US leadership 
from May 2004 onwards.’
538  
This ‘linkage’ strategy represented a forced change from the initial approach, 
however, as it became clear that Darfur could not wait for the CPA’s conclusion. 
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Despite  this,  as  detailed  in  Chapter  3,  the  two  civil  wars  were  in  fact  explicitly 
decoupled both in late 2004 when the Council met in an extraordinary session in 
Nairobi, attended by Sudanese Vice-President Ali Othman Taha, to push through the 
remaining issues ahead of the impending signing of the CPA, and again in early 2005 
after the signing of the CPA and the release of the damning COI report. In both cases 
the  Council  deliberately  avoided  direct  criticism  of  Khartoum  over  its  actions  in 
Darfur.  In  this  context,  Slim  suggests  that  even  the  linkage  strategy  risked 
unravelling  the  hard-won  cooperation  of  President  Bashir  on  the  CPA,  and  thus 
‘required  the  international  community  to  avoid  outright  confrontation  with 
Khartoum, whose leaders it needed both to keep at one table in Naivasha and also to 
get a new one in N’djamena.’
539 For Traub, ‘by separating the north-south problem 
from Darfur’, US Ambassador to the UN John Danforth ‘achieved his long-sought 
goal of ending the civil war. But this also meant allowing Darfur to fester.’
540 As 
such,  a  central  element  and  product  of  this  approach  was  to  preclude  coercive 
military intervention in Darfur. 
  Indeed,  Williams  and  Bellamy  argue  that  Western  concerns  about 
jeopardising the Naivasha agreement were ‘pivotal’ in obstructing a more coercive 
approach to Darfur. They observe that the crisis in Darfur initially ‘was considered 
secondary’ to securing the north-south deal and other conflicts in Sudan. Yet, such 
concerns were not completely unfounded: Western states were ‘concerned that an 
intervention in Darfur could trigger a domino effect wherein other Sudanese groups, 
disgruntled  at  their  marginalization  from  the  [CPA]  process…would  pursue  the 
SLA/JEM route of armed insurgency just as the process was starting to make real 
                                                        
539 Slim, “Dithering”, 822. 
540 James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American Power (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2006), 242.   233 
progress.’
541 Similarly, there were concerns for the viability of the CPA model after 
Darfur  rebel  groups  ‘called  for  the  application  of  the  North-South  principles  to 
Darfur, which would have awarded near total control of Darfur to them.’
542  
According to Flint and de Waal, however, the potential of rebel groups to 
undermine  the  CPA  was  not  the  only  problem;  the  Sudanese  government’s 
‘calculation must have been that it could get away with murder. It had an ace in its 
hand: to make, or break, peace in the South. All through 2004, Sudanese officials 
hinted that they would stall the peace process to end Africa’s longest war if the world 
got tough on Darfur.’
543 Indeed, as the Naivasha talks ‘dragged on inconclusively, it 
became clear that the [Sudanese] government was exploiting the West’s eagerness 
for a settlement of the civil war in order to give it a free hand in Darfur.’
544 Prunier 
similarly concludes that Khartoum ‘kept playing Darfur against Naivasha in order to 
win at both levels or, if a choice had to be made, at least to keep Darfur out of the 
military reach of the international community.’
545 
Despite  this,  the  American  and  British  governments  —  the  non-African 
international drivers of the CPA process — still ‘muted their criticism of Khartoum’s 
genocide for much of 2003-2004 in the interest of securing a north/south Sudanese 
peace agreement’.
546 Similarly, Flint and de Waal argue that ‘Darfur was the problem 
no-one  wanted  to  acknowledge.  The  war  hit  the  headlines  just  as  the  Naivasha 
negotiations were entering their critical phase’; the US and UK ‘did not want their 
attention  diverted’,  while  France  was  preoccupied  with  keeping  stable  Sudan’s 
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neighbouring  former  French  colony  Chad,
547  which  was  threatened  by  substantial 
refugee flows out of Darfur and increasingly aggressive cross border militia raids and 
attempted coups emanating from Sudan.  
Within the US government at least, there was a degree of contestation over 
Sudan policy between competing departmental and factional blocs. Prunier argues 
that Washington ‘was embarrassed by the Darfur crisis, not least because it did not 
fit well within the two main camps in the State Department and on Capitol Hill, the 
‘realists’ and the ‘Garang lobby’.
548 The latter, comprised of the Congressional Black 
Caucus, evangelical and Jewish groups and their Congressional representatives, and 
USAID, among others, referred to those who were supportive of the SPLM/A leader 
John Garang and who thus pushed for strong support for legislation that put pressure 
on Khartoum, including urging the US government to facilitate a peace deal with the 
South to stop the war. Alternatively, according to Prunier: 
 
The ‘realists’ were found mostly in the State Department, the CIA and 
the DIA. They argued that, given the useful role that Khartoum was 
playing in the war on terrorism by supplying information on erstwhile 
friends, the [Sudanese government] should at least be helped even if 
perhaps  not  fully  supported,  especially  if  it  showed  any  signs  of 
cooperation at Naivasha.
549 
 
As  such,  and  responding  particularly  to  increasing  pressure  from  US 
evangelical lobby groups — a key Republican political demographic — who were 
concerned at the treatment of southern Sudanese Christians by largely Arabist and 
Islamist  Khartoum,  the  Bush  administration  via  special  envoy  (and  later  UN 
Ambassador) Danforth became actively involved in mediation and offering to grant 
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incentives to Khartoum if it made peace with the SPLM/A.
550 Other pressure for 
peace came from US oil firms and interests — which had been barred from the 
country  since  the  1997  imposition  of  trade  sanctions  —  as  they  wanted  the 
opportunity to be part of the rapidly developing Sudanese petroleum industry that 
was currently being exploited by Chinese companies (see Chapter 5). As a result, the 
US government ‘strongly backed the CPA negotiations, indicating that once the deal 
had been signed, the US would move rapidly towards normalizing relations with 
Sudan,  including  lifting  long-standing  bilateral  sanctions,  providing  development 
assistance,  and  probably  also  bringing  a  US  major  oil  company  to  Sudan  and 
facilitating  debt  relief’;  however,  when  Darfur  erupted  these  promises  proved 
problematic.
551  
This  was  difficult  because  the  interests  of  many  of  the  aforementioned 
influential lobbies within US politics eventually coalesced around support for the 
CPA, even if this meant doing business with President Bashir. For the Darfur lobby, 
however, this was unacceptable in the face of the evidence of Sudanese government 
orchestrated atrocities in Darfur presented by the COI and the US State Department’s 
own  investigation  (culminating  in  the  administration’s  characterisation  of 
‘genocide’). Calls by human rights activists and others for military intervention in 
Sudan to protect vulnerable Darfurian civilians became an argument that would be 
politically  costly  for  the  Bush  administration  to  ignore.  Yet,  the  developing  US-
Sudan  relationships  on  counter-terrorism  and  the  CPA  were  considered  too 
significant to disrupt even in the face of the crisis in Sudan’s west, and as a result: 
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since the ‘realists’ in the intelligence community kept insisting that 
Khartoum was too important to be harshly treated, these contradictory 
pressures  led  the  White  House  to  compromise  on  all  fronts  — 
supporting the Naivasha negotiations, not putting too much practical 
pressure on Khartoum but nevertheless passing legislation which could 
be used as a sword of Damocles in case of non-compliance; be vocal 
on Darfur; put a fair amount of money on its humanitarian aspect; and 
do nothing at the military level.
552 
 
In March 2005, the Sudanese government consented to the deployment of 
10,000 UN peacekeepers in the country to help with and monitor the implementation 
of the CPA (as authorised by the Council in Resolution 1590). This new UNMIS 
force was given a robust civilian protection mandate.
553 Yet, Khartoum remained 
vehemently opposed to any international force in Darfur on the grounds that it would 
be  a  Western  ‘imperialist  invasion’  of  Sudan.
554  The  reasons  for  this  apparent 
contradiction  in  Sudanese  policy  were  due  in  part  to  the  consequences  of  the 
cooperative relationships that Western permanent members had established with the 
al-Bashir regime through the Naivasha process, achievements that Washington and 
London  were,  ultimately,  not  willing  to  sacrifice  by  coercively  deploying  a  UN 
military intervention to protect civilians in Darfur. Khartoum clearly understood this 
and was thus able to effectively ignore the harsh rhetoric over its actions in Darfur — 
and continue its counter-insurgency campaign there — because it knew that the West 
was in a compromised and thus weakened position. 
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Washington, London and the Iraq War: A deprivation of Western 
legitimacy and capacity 
 
  While Western permanent members had developed important relationships 
with Khartoum in the early years of the twenty-first century in counter-terrorism 
cooperation  and  the  Naivasha  peace  process,  the  broader  international  political 
context that overshadowed this cooperation and constrained the response to Darfur of 
Western  members  —  again,  primarily  the  US  and  UK  —  was  the  Iraq  War. 
Beginning  with  the  contentious  debate  over  the  war  during  2002,  through  the 
divisive invasion of March 2003, to the subsequent and problematic occupation of 
the country largely by British and American forces, attention and political capital in 
Washington  and  London  was  consumed  with  executing  the  war  and  occupation 
effectively as well as attempting to justify to critics across the globe (including, in 
this case, the French government) the decision to launch an allegedly pre-emptive (or 
more persuasively, preventive) war without a prior explicit mandate by the Security 
Council to do so.  
In addition to being the central foreign policy priority during the period of 
study in this thesis (and thus overshadowing acute humanitarian and security crises 
in places like Darfur), ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ imposed a number of constraints 
upon the ability of the American and British governments to respond effectively to 
Darfur — in terms of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ relative power capacities.
555 Of course, as 
discussed above, Washington and London’s existing cooperative relationships with 
Sudan likely precluded the coercive deployment of military force regardless of these 
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constraints.  What  is  important  here,  however,  is  that  because  of  their  Iraq  War-
induced weakened international positions, these Western government were unable to 
generate sufficient pressure to change the political calculations of Khartoum in its 
counter-insurgency  strategy  in  Darfur  or  in  its  position  regarding  external 
interference  in  its  ‘domestic  affairs’.  Moreover,  weakened  Western  governments 
were unable to persuade China and Russia to co-present a unified Council position 
on Darfur to the Sudanese government, which would likely have affected Sudanese 
perceptions of the body’s resolve to end the Darfur crisis and protect vulnerable 
civilians.  As  a  result,  the  combination  of  weak  Western  governments  with  their 
existing  relationships  with  Khartoum  served  to  further  preclude  a  coercive  UN 
military intervention in Darfur. 
  On  Iraq,  the  international  legitimacy  of  the  American  and  British 
governments was severely undermined by their failure to make a convincing case for 
forcibly removing from power Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime, and then, 
when  their  arguments  failed  to  convince  their  critics  or  fellow  Security  Council 
members, initiated the invasion without an explicit Council mandate (indeed fellow 
Western P5 member France, along with Russia, had threatened to veto any draft 
resolution authorising the war
556). A number of international lawyers, governments, 
and protesting populations around the world supported Secretary-General Annan’s 
later contention that the war was ‘illegal’.
557 According to Rampton and Stauber, 
‘American military power easily overwhelmed Iraq’s army, but in the crucial battle 
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for worldwide hearts and minds, America lost badly.’
558 While it is not the place or 
intention  of  this  thesis  to  debate  the  Iraq  War’s  legality  or  prosecution,  what  is 
crucial  here  is  the  ways  in  which  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom  undermined  the 
international  legitimacy  of  the  US  and  Britain  and  constrained  their  ability  to 
generate pressure on Sudan over Darfur. 
In  particular,  by  retrospectively  attempting  to  justify  the  Iraq  War  as  a 
‘humanitarian intervention’
559 after their central public argument for going to war — 
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and links to al-Qaeda — proved to be 
unpersuasive  and  misleading,  the  US  and  UK  undermined  a  weak  but  emerging 
international consensus on the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine in genuine cases of 
widespread atrocities against civilians, such as Darfur.
560 One of the arguments made 
by critics of this new doctrine was that it could be a pretext for imperial-minded 
powers to intervene in sovereign states for their own interests while cloaking such 
motives behind humanitarian rhetoric,
561 a point not lost on critics of the Iraq war. 
Because of the perceived cynicism of Western interventionist motives and 
justifications for war in Iraq, any argument for ‘humanitarian’ intervention to protect 
civilians in Darfur was thus able to be easily dismissed by Sudan and its allies as 
‘another Iraq’, despite the legitimacy of such an argument in the context of Darfur.
562 
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Furthermore,  as  Slim  has  observed,  after  Iraq  ‘US  expressions  of  concern  about 
Darfur have … been met with much scepticism in the Arab and Muslim worlds and 
encouraged speculation that the US was preparing to invade another Islamic state.’
563 
Indeed, despite the fact that both victims and aggressors in the Darfur conflict have 
mostly been Muslims, Khartoum has ‘adroitly manipulated public opinion — and not 
only  in  Sudan  —  so  that  any  Western  engagement  in  Darfur  would  be  seen  as 
another  campaign  in  the  Christian  crusade  against  Islam.’
564  Going  further,  one 
analyst concludes that: 
 
What makes Sudan a particularly unattractive target for intervention is 
the fact that Western governments have become wary of conducting 
military ventures in Islamic countries. They are aware that such actions 
may  enhance  anti-Western  sentiment  in  the  Islamic  world  and  thus 
play into the hands of terrorists.
565 
 
  In addition to their legitimacy crisis, the US and UK governments were also 
suffering from a capacity deficit or a loss of projectable ‘hard’ power. Due to their 
deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the American and British militaries 
were  reportedly  overstretched  and  unable  to  consider  new  operations,  such  as  in 
Darfur.
566 As Piiparinen concludes, the ‘war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
drained the military and political capacities of those same states that had previously 
advocated  the  responsibility  to  protect  vulnerable  civilians,  thereby  producing  a 
reluctance to engage in further military operations in Darfur or anywhere else.’
567 If 
an effective and coercive military intervention was to be undertaken in Sudan, it 
would require to a large degree the capabilities and strength of these two militaries, 
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much as the Kosovo operation did in 1999. But, because of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
deployments, this would not have been possible after 2003. Similarly, discussing 
potential  military  intervention  in  Darfur  in  February  2005,  UN  Under-Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno reportedly claimed that ‘In Europe, 
there are only two countries which have the capacity to mount this kind of operation 
— the U.K. and France. The U.K. has its hands full in Iraq right now, and France 
might not like the idea of this mission.’
568  
Indeed, in an environment of strategic political calculations, Sudan clearly 
understood  this  lack  of  capacity  or  motivation  for  a  Western-led  military 
intervention.  Combined  with  the  successful  development  of  its  ‘reputation’  as  a 
reliable  counter-terrorism  partner
569  and  its  position  as  a  central  player  in  the 
Naivasha peace process, Sudan was able to ‘call the West’s bluff’ in the face of harsh 
rhetoric  and  pursue  its  brutal  counter-insurgency  strategy  in  Darfur  relatively 
unencumbered by the fear of Western intervention. As a result, Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative  of  the  Secretary-General  for  Sudan,  characterised  the  situation  in 
which the threats of the Security Council were not taken seriously by Sudan as one at 
which ‘they’re laughing at us in Khartoum’.
570 
 
Conclusion 
 
  As preachers of liberal-democratic values and purported defenders of human 
rights, the three Western permanent members of the Security Council faced domestic 
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and global public pressure to ‘do something’ about the Darfur crisis, including calls 
for  coercive  Western-led  military  intervention  in  Sudan  to  protect  vulnerable 
civilians. While there was likely a genuine concern for the victims of the conflict and 
humanitarian  crisis  within  the  ranks  of  Western  governments,  competing  policy 
priorities in counter-terrorism cooperation and north-south Sudan peace negotiations 
militated against a more coercive approach to Khartoum, which had successfully 
marketed itself as a crucial partner in both the ‘War on Terror’ and the Naivasha 
process. While the US and UK attempted to operate between these competing policy 
priorities by rhetorically (and somewhat materially) pressuring Sudan over Darfur, 
they were also constrained by their relative weakness in international legitimacy and 
military capacity as a result of the contentious Iraq war and difficult occupation, a 
situation appreciated and ably exploited by Khartoum and its allies. France, while a 
critic of Operation Iraqi Freedom, was relatively less engaged with events in Sudan 
itself and more concerned about neighbouring Francophone Chad. 
The United States in particular, as the most powerful of the Western P3, was 
clearly conflicted — and thus ultimately ineffectual — in its policy towards Sudan 
over Darfur. As one analysis concludes, ‘U.S. support for the CPA, its intelligence-
sharing  relationship  with  Khartoum,  and  the  mutual  desire  to  move  towards  the 
normalization of economic and political relations between the two countries were 
policy  priorities  that  were  considered  to  have  undermined  a  more  robust  U.S. 
response on Darfur.’
571 More generally, Bellamy and Williams argue that despite the 
deterioration of conditions in Darfur, and illustrative of the political deadlock over 
how to respond to the crisis, the Council:  
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was reluctant to intervene and interventionist states like the US, UK 
and France were reluctant to force the issue for a variety of reasons. In 
particular, Western allies were reluctant to push [Khartoum] too hard 
as it had become an important source of intelligence relating to the US-
led war on terror, they were concerned that a more robust line over 
Darfur  could  jeopardise  the  prospects  of  achieving  peace  between 
[Khartoum] and the SPLM/A, and the US and UK in particular were 
already stretched militarily and suffering from a post-Iraq international 
credibility crisis.
572 
 
The combination of these three elements meant that the coercive deployment 
of a UN military intervention to protect civilians in Darfur was either not considered, 
or not considered possible, without strong and genuine Western leadership, support, 
and  commensurate  commitment  of  resources.  As  such,  instead  of  preparing  for 
military intervention, the Western response to Darfur was characterised, in the words 
of Prendergast, as merely ‘walking loudly and carrying a toothpick.’
573 In this sense, 
the centrally important strategic counter-terrorism interests of Western governments 
in Sudan in particular demonstrate vividly that humanitarian interventions will likely 
not occur when they directly clash with the national interests of the major powers.  
Yet, the Western P3’s positions and interests are only part of the story: a 
more comprehensive and persuasive explanation of why the Security Council did not 
coercively intervention in Sudan over its actions Darfur requires an analysis of the 
politics and interests of other key members of the Council, particularly non-Western 
permanent  members  China  and  Russia  —  whom  more  explicitly  opposed  the 
coercion of Sudan — as well as the non-permanent members whom demonstrated 
solidarity with Khartoum. Chapter 5 now turns to examine these members. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Explaining Council Non-intervention in Darfur: 
China, Russia, and Sudan’s Non-permanent Allies 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter constitutes the second part of the critical analysis of the Security 
Council’s response to the Darfur crisis and the explanation of why the body did not 
coercively deploy a military intervention in the region between 2003-06 to protect 
vulnerable civilians in the face a persuasive legal-institutional, normative, and moral 
case for doing so. To achieve this, it first examines the politics and national interests 
behind the positions on Sudan/Darfur of China and Russia, the Council’s other two, 
non-Western,  permanent  members.  As  the  empirical  data  in  Chapter  3  revealed 
clearly,  these  two  ‘Eastern’  powers  were  largely  opposed  to  the  body  passing 
mandatory and punitive measures against Khartoum or even generating substantive 
pressure  on  President  Bashir  to  desist  from  his  brutal  campaign  against  his  own 
citizens in Darfur.  
This opposition was registered publicly by Chinese and Russian abstentions 
from  key  votes  on  politically-significant  draft  resolutions  on  Darfur,  with  the 
exception of Russian acquiescence in the vague threat of sanctions in July 2004 if the 
Janjaweed were not disarmed and in the March 2005 ICC referral. Indeed, the fact 
that neither China nor Russia formally cast any vetoes during the period of study is a 
product of pre-voting compromises that were made between the permanent members, 
rather than any indication that Moscow and particularly Beijing weren’t genuinely   245 
committed  to  protecting  the  regime  in  Khartoum  from  unwanted  external 
interference. 
To further substantiate the claim that humanitarian interventions will likely 
not occur when they directly clash with the national interests of the major powers, 
the  chapter  examines  two  sets  of  Chinese  and  Russian  interests  in  obstructing 
attempts in the Council to pressure or intervene in Sudan over the crisis and atrocities 
in Darfur. First, it will examine the historical and publicly-advanced Chinese and 
Russian  positions  of  hostility  to  the  emerging  norm  and  practice  of  international 
intervention into the domestic affairs of sovereign states — absent host government 
consent — for human rights or humanitarian purposes. Although there is merit in a 
number of these general objections and warnings raised by China and Russia (and 
others) in this regard, these criticisms do not obviate the argument for the Council to 
effectively and, if needed, forcefully protect vulnerable civilians from violence inside 
their own states (as argued in Chapter 1). Indeed, the eventual doctrinal formulation 
of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and set of operational guidelines developed by the 
ICISS  in  2001  present  a  persuasive  refutation  or  accommodation  of  many  such 
concerns about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, because of the clear necessity 
for external intervention in Darfur, and because of extensive Chinese and Russian 
oversight  over  any  potential  UN-authorised  military  operation  (as  permanent 
members), the argument suggesting that such an intervention would be a threat to 
international order is not compelling in the context of the Darfur case. 
This chapter thus takes a more critical view of the interests behind China and 
Russia’s implicit claims to be opposing coercive measures against Sudan because 
they are defending, through their privileged positions on the Council, the principles 
of a pluralist international order against reckless Western interventionism. Instead, it   246 
demonstrates  that  such  arguments  actually  serve  Beijing  and  Moscow’s  national 
interests  well:  problems  with  international  scrutiny  of  disaffected  minorities, 
secessionist claims, and state repression inside their own borders mean that China 
and Russia would directly benefit from halting the further erosion of traditional state-
centric conceptions of sovereignty and from obstructing the further emergence of a 
norm  compelling  UN  military  intervention  to  protect  vulnerable  civilians  abused 
inside, or by, their own state. In this sense, by acting inside the Council to protect 
Sudan’s  sovereign  right  to  repress,  terrorise,  or  kill  its  own  citizens,  China  and 
Russia  were  simultaneously  protecting  their  own  rights  to  do  so  free  from 
international interference. 
Congruently, and more specifically, the second set of Chinese and Russian 
interests in obstructing coercive Council action on Sudan examined in this chapter 
pertains to the substantial and lucrative trade and investment relationships between 
both powers and Khartoum. Attesting to the evidently self-interested nature of such 
relationships  in  the  face  of  Sudanese  atrocities  against  its  own  citizens,  their 
economic  ties  to  Sudan  do  not  feature  at  all  in  China  and  Russia’s  public 
justifications of opposition to international intervention in Darfur (just as Western 
counter-terrorism  cooperation  with  Sudan  was  not  mentioned).  The  chapter  thus 
demonstrates how the diplomatic protection of Khartoum in the Council by Moscow 
and  particularly  Beijing  under  the  guise  of  defending  state  sovereignty,  and, 
implicitly, a pluralist international order, has been a deliberate strategy aimed not 
only at shielding Chinese and Russian abuses of segments of their own population, 
but also at the preservation of valuable trade and investment relationships.  
The chapter finally and more briefly examines the positions and interests of 
Algeria, Pakistan and Qatar, the three non-permanent members that demonstrated   247 
consistent support for Khartoum through their statements in the Council and by their 
own abstentions from key resolutions. The explanation of these positions lies in the 
politics and interests of inter-elite Islamic and/or Arab solidarity between these three 
governments and the al-Bashir regime, despite the fact that the majority of innocent 
Darfurian  victims  also  practiced  Islam  (although  the  majority  were  not  of  Arab 
lineage).  The  chapter  also  assesses  the  extent  to  which  these  dissenting  non-
permanent members — despite being without individual veto — had a collective 
impact on the ability of the Council to generate pressure on Sudan over Darfur. In 
particular, it is argued that this minority non-permanent opposition had a perceptible 
effect on the perceived legitimacy of any potentially coercive Council action, which, 
when combined with overt Chinese and Russian opposition and the compromised 
positions of Western members, precluded the coercive deployment of a UN military 
intervention in Darfur between 2003-06. 
 
China, Russia, and the Sudan 
 
While there was a crucial divergence within Western permanent members’ 
policy priorities over Darfur, and a disconnect between their harsh public criticism of 
Sudan  and  their  relatively  unpublicised  cooperation  with  President  Bashir  on 
regional counter-terrorism, as well as on the CPA, the positions of China and Russia 
were more internally consistent as different elements of national interest converged. 
However,  this  was  unfortunate  for  the  victims  of  violence  and  displacement  in 
western Sudan because the interests of China and Russia were indeed largely against 
any significant changes to the status quo in Khartoum and they henceforth acted to 
protect Sudan from potentially harsh mandatory measures in the Council. In doing 
so, China and Russia mollified any threat of UN-authorised military intervention in   248 
Darfur; this was a political dynamic in the Council that the Sudanese government 
ably exploited to its own advantage.  
Indeed, China and Russia’s consistently-advanced public rhetoric on Sudan 
regarding the Darfur crisis — emphasising that the Council’s measures should not 
impinge upon the sovereignty of the Sudanese state, despite the atrocities — was 
conducive  to  their  own  political  interests  in  keeping  the  plight  of  disaffected 
minorities  as  an  internal  matter  of  state,  and  to  their  own  economic  interests  in 
maintaining the power of their trade partners in Khartoum. As a result, these two 
permanent members could simultaneously argue publicly against sanctions and any 
potentially coercive military action under the implicit guise of a principled defence 
of the pluralist international order from irresponsible Western interventionism, and 
protect their own, less principled, trade relationships with the incumbent government 
in  Sudan  and  their  own  dubious  domestic  human  rights  records.  As  Grono  has 
observed, because the Council is a ‘creature of its members’, an effective response to 
Darfur  has  therefore  been  obstructed  by  national  interests:  ‘you  have  China,  the 
largest importer of oil from Sudan, ready to block any overly intrusive UN measures. 
And both Russia and China are leery of UN intervention into civil conflicts, fearing 
it may lead one day to intervention in Chechnya or Tibet or Xinjiang.’
574  
Concurring, Udombana notes that regarding Darfur, the ‘[i]ndividual interests 
of member states continue to hinder the Security Council … Both China and Russia 
continue to oppose sanctions against Sudan, largely because of their own economic 
and political interests. Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Sudan, and China is a 
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major consumer of oil from the country.’
575 Similarly, according to Prendergast and 
Sullivan,  inside  the  Council  China  has  ‘used  its  veto  wielding  position  to  block 
strong action against Khartoum, while Russia has largely followed suit.’
576 Belloni 
adds that, in general, the Council has ‘shown little will to support armed intervention, 
and not only because of Western apathy. China and Russia, in particular, wanting to 
maintain their privileged access to Sudanese oil reserves, have made known their 
decision  to  veto  any  proposal  for  military  action.’
577  As  a  result,  Russia  and 
particularly China’s policy of defending Sudanese — and by extension, their own — 
interests in the Security Council precluded the deployment of a coercive UN military 
intervention in Darfur.  
 
Chinese and Russian anti-interventionism 
 
  The  first  set  of  Chinese  and  Russian  interests  that  this  chapter  examines 
pertain to their implicit defence of pluralist international order from posited reckless 
and fundamentally dangerous Western interventionism. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the pluralist international order which emerged after the Second World War was a 
product  of  both  the  desire  to  contain  inter-state  war  and  the  decolonisation 
movement, with its increasingly accepted right of national self-determination. Under 
the  1945  UN  Charter,  the  process  of  achieving  self-determination  and  national 
sovereignty would result in the ‘sovereign equality’ of nascent independent states 
when  joining  the  organisation  and  subject  them  to  the  general  norm  of  non-
intervention that was emerging in international relations. In addition to seeking to 
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mitigate wars of aggression, the aim of such self-determination was to celebrate and 
accommodate a plurality of cultures, nations, and forms of government into post-war 
international  society.  Under  this  pluralistic  arrangement,  interventions  (under 
whatever rationale) were (and are) deemed to be anti-pluralist, neo-colonial, and an 
affront  to  the  newly  acquired  independence  and  sovereignty  of  states  in  the 
developing world.
578 
  With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  liberal  activists  and  non-governmental 
organisations pressured Western states to enhance their scrutiny and condemnation 
of abuses of human rights and human security in other parts of the world, including 
in China (particularly after the Tiananmen Square incident) and post-Soviet Russia. 
In parts of the developing world, a number of egregious violations of human rights, 
including  genocide,  ethnic  cleansing  and  violent  secessionist  attempts,  raised  the 
question of if and how external actors should intervene to protect civilian victims. 
Yet,  such  interventions  would  inevitably  challenge  the  pluralist  nature  of 
international society. While Western states have usually been at the forefront of such 
arguments  for  international  intervention  (largely  due  to  pressure  from  their  own 
domestic constituents), China and Russia have continually resisted (or reluctantly 
acquiesced in) the claim that there is a ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ or that 
powerful states have a ‘responsibility to protect’ victims of such atrocities through 
military intervention. As a result, there has historically been a clear divide between 
those predominantly in the West pushing for effective humanitarian interventions in 
extreme cases of civilian suffering, and those primarily outside the West, including 
in Russia and China, resisting such attempts. 
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  The  most  vivid  illustration  of  the  Chinese  position  on  humanitarian 
intervention came at the Beijing roundtable consultations undertaken in June 2001 by 
the ICISS commissioners in order to inform their final report. According to Ramesh 
Thakur, an ICISS commissioner, of all of the regional perspectives canvassed by the 
ICISS,  the  Chinese  participants  in  Beijing  presented  the  ‘hardest  line  against 
intervention and in defence of sovereignty’.
579 Thakur concluded that for the Chinese, 
“humanitarianism is good, interventionism is bad, and ‘humanitarian intervention’ is 
‘tantamount  to  marrying  evil  to  good’.  In  such  a  shotgun  marriage,  far  from 
humanitarianism burnishing meddlesome interventions, it will itself be tarnished by 
interventionism.”
580    Indeed,  the  rapporteur’s  report  of  the  Beijing  roundtable 
summarised  the  Chinese  position  as:  ‘[t]heoretically,  the  conceptualization  of 
humanitarian  intervention  is  a  total  fallacy.  Practically,  actions  of  humanitarian 
intervention  posed  grave  problems  for  international  laws  and  international 
relations.’
581 The Chinese participants argued that such interventions were dangerous 
and undesirable because they lacked any legal basis in the UN Charter, gave rebel 
groups  incentives  to  disengage  with  peace  mediation,  were  conducted  highly 
selectively by Western powers according to political interests, and were based upon a 
Western-centric philosophy of the relationship between individual, group and state 
rights.
582  More  specifically,  and  illuminating  the  later  position  advanced  by  the 
Chinese  government  in  Council  deliberations  on  Darfur,  the  Chinese  participants 
argued  that  while  the  international  community  should  promote  non-coercive 
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humanitarianism,  it  should  refrain  from  coercive  interventionism  because  of  its 
violation of state sovereignty: 
 
In  practice,  one  can  differentiate  humanitarian  actions  from 
humanitarian intervention according to some key principles, the core 
one being respect for sovereignty. Sovereignty is enshrined in the UN 
and remains the most important pillar in today’s international order; 
humanitarian  actions  must  conform  to  this  basic  principle.  Derived 
directly from the principle of respecting sovereignty are several other 
guiding norms that are concerned with the legitimacy of humanitarian 
actions.
583  
 
The  first  of  these  derivative  requirements,  and  a  ‘logical  reflection  of 
respecting  sovereignty’,  was  that  the  ‘[c]onsent  of  conflicting  parties’  was  a 
‘precondition’  for  external  involvement  or  intervention  in  an  internal  conflict.  In 
cases  where  consent  (most  centrally  that  of  the  host  state)  was  not  provided, 
‘international  society  should  reaffirm  Article  2(4)  of  the  UN  Charter  and  the 
principles  of  non-encroachment  upon  state  sovereignty  and  non-interference  in 
internal  affairs’.  Regarding  Darfur,  this  position  was  most  evident  in  China’s 
successful insistence that Resolution 1706 include the crucial caveat that the Council 
‘invites the consent of the government of Sudan’ to the deployment of a UN peace 
operation in the country that was mandated to address the conflict and humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur and to protect the region’s vulnerable civilian population.  
The second principle derived from respecting state sovereignty, according to 
the Chinese, was that any military intervention must achieve prior authorisation by 
the Security Council for it to be considered legal and legitimate. The immediate aim 
of this position was to prevent further action outside of the Council, as NATO had 
done in Kosovo in 1999, but it also reflected China’s desire for the P5 to retain veto-
wielding power over such operations, which of course China enjoyed. Finally, the 
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Chinese participants argued that the ‘nonuse of force except in self-defence is the 
trademark  of  a  peacekeeping  operation  whose  central  objective  is  to  ensure  a 
cessation of violence’, and thus UN peacekeepers should ‘remain strictly neutral’ and 
‘not support or oppose either side.’
584 While this is widely accepted for traditional 
peacekeeping  operations,  such  a  statement  would  appear  to  challenge  and  even 
preclude more robust mandates for UN peace operations, particularly those which 
aim  to  physically  protect  civilians  from  belligerent  parties  in  civil  conflicts 
(including military and paramilitary wings of the state). This Chinese position had 
direct  implications  for  the  Council’s  potential  measures  to  protect  vulnerable 
civilians in Darfur. 
  Russia’s traditional position on humanitarian intervention was most clearly 
set out in Moscow’s June 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. In 
a general sense, the Russian government claimed that it would ‘respect human rights 
and freedoms’ but also that ‘[a]ttempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the 
fundamental  element  of  international  relations  generate  a  threat  of  arbitrary 
interference  in  internal  affairs.’  Similar  to  Chinese  criticism  of  Western  actions 
outside  of  the  Security  Council’s  authorisation,  Moscow,  in  a  veiled  reference 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, reiterated that ‘only the U.N. Security 
Council  has  the  authority  to  sanction  use  of  force  for  the  purpose  of  achieving 
peace’.
585  In  this  context,  the  document  illustrates  Moscow’s  skepticism  towards 
liberal  arguments  in  support  of  external  intervention  to  protect  civilians  from 
atrocities: 
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Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force in violation of 
the U.N. Charter is unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilization of 
the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce into 
the international parlance such concepts as "humanitarian intervention" 
and "limited sovereignty" in order to justify unilateral power actions 
bypassing  the  U.N.  Security  Council  are  not  acceptable.  Being 
prepared for a constructive dialogue on upgrading the legal aspects of 
employing  force  in  international  relations  in  conditions  of 
globalization, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the 
search for concrete forms of response on the part of the international 
community in different acute situations, including humanitarian crises, 
must be conducted collectively on the basis of strict observance of the 
norms of international law and the U.N. Charter. 
 
Indeed,  according  to  Baranovsky,  Moscow  has  generally  taken  a  negative 
view  of  all  kinds  of  international  interventions  because  of  its  own  historical 
experiences,  while  it  did  not  consider  its  own  military  actions  abroad  to  be 
‘interventions’.
586 Over time, as the Soviet Union sought international legitimacy and 
became integrated into international society, Moscow began to speak in defence of 
the norm of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Accordingly, the ‘importance 
attributed  to  international  law’  by  the  Kremlin  ‘was  not  mere  propaganda  and 
genuinely reflected substantive interests of the country in the international arena.’ 
This was because: 
 
Acts  of  intervention  ignored,  circumvented  or  undermined  the 
sovereignty of states, which principle was considered the cornerstone 
of the international system. Since Moscow aimed at consolidating its 
own position in the system rather than destroying it, an insistence on 
respecting the principle of sovereignty was imperative.
587 
 
  As outlined by Baranovsky, there are a number of other reasons for Russian 
skepticism towards the notion of humanitarian intervention. First, similar to Chinese 
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political  philosophy,  the  rights  of  the  individual  have  been  subordinated  to  the 
necessities of the state throughout most of Russian and Soviet history. Second, the 
human  rights  discourse  that  is  employed  by  liberals  to  argue  in  favour  of 
humanitarian intervention is often associated by Russians with similar critiques of 
Soviet policy during the Cold War. Third, in the post-Soviet era much of Russian 
policy has been focused upon domestic economic and political restructuring rather 
than with problems in foreign lands. Similarly, the social and humanitarian crises in 
and around Russia’s borders take priority over like-problems further afield and more 
removed  from  the  Russian  public’s  view.  Finally,  the  psychology  of  capitalist-
induced  individualism  has  eroded  Russian  public  concern  for  solidarity  with  the 
victims of abuses in other parts of the world.
588 
Chinese  and  Russian  officials  thus  publicly  imply,  inside  and  outside  the 
Council,  to  be  acting  as  the  sentinels  of  global  security  by  defending  state 
sovereignty and the pluralist international order from reckless and dangerous liberal 
ideas  about  individual  rights,  and  from  self-serving  and  selective  Western 
interventions largely in the developing world. Prima facie, these arguments have 
merit and should not be discounted in debates over the legality and legitimacy of any 
humanitarian intervention.
589 However, in the context of the highly visible conflict 
and humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and in light of credible evidence presented to the 
Security Council that the Sudanese government was responsible for orchestrating and 
committing atrocities against its own civilians, the arguments of the Chinese and 
Russian governments that humanitarian intervention would be, to use Kofi Annan’s 
phrase,  ‘an  unacceptable  assault  on  sovereignty’  and  international  order,  are  not 
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compelling  in  this  case.  This  is  particularly  so  because  Beijing  and  Moscow,  as 
influential permanent members, would have direct oversight and control over any 
potential  Council-authorised  military  intervention  in  Sudan,  the  very  type  of 
multilateral  regulation  that  both  countries  argue  to  be  the  sine  qua  non  of  any 
external intervention if that intervention is to be considered legitimate and in order 
for it to do the least damage to the fragile norms of a pluralist international order. 
Therefore, a more critical analysis suggests that while claiming to be acting 
on  principle,  Chinese  and  Russian  arguments  against  humanitarian  intervention 
simultaneously advance their own national interests because of their concerns about 
international scrutiny of (and potential sanctions against) the plight of disaffected 
minorities, secessionist movements, and state repression inside their own borders. 
For  Russia,  continuing  secessionist  conflict  in  the  Caucuses  and  brutal  Russian 
reprisals  against  Chechen  and  other  claims  for  independence  would  become  an 
increasingly  unavoidable  topic  of  discussion  in  global  fora  if  the  norm  of 
intervention  for  human  security  purposes  was  strengthened  through  the  coercive 
deployment of a UN military operation in Darfur. Moreover, the double standard that 
would be apparent if Russia had agreed to the Council authorising such coercive 
intervention  in  Sudan  while  obstructing  any  discussion  of  Chechnya  would  be 
politically difficult for Moscow. As Cohen argues: 
 
One  reason  the  international  community  finds  the  Darfur  problem 
difficult  to  address  is  that  state  reliance  on  excessive  force  is  not 
unique  to  Sudan.  Other  governments  bent  on  maintaining  the 
dominance of a particular ethnic group have also waged brutal wars 
against their own populations. The Russian Federation, for example, 
has  conducted  a  scorched  earth  campaign  against  the  Chechens.  A 
veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has   257 
opposed  diplomatic  pressure  or  sanctions  against  the  Sudanese 
government for fear of setting a precedent.
590 
 
  China, perhaps even more than Russia, is concerned about maintaining its 
own  international  legitimacy  and  domestic  control  as  it  emerges  as  an  unstable 
superpower. Beijing’s desire to maintain its fragile global legitimacy was particularly 
evident in the extents to which the Chinese government went in the lead up to the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008 to conceal from international media scrutiny uprisings in 
Tibet and in portraying the Muslim Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang province 
as ‘terrorists’. For the Chinese government, deflecting international attention from 
such  domestic  discontent  inside  China  is  usefully  served  by  obstructing  any 
emerging norm permitting humanitarian intervention in cases of brutal government 
repression of ethnic minorities. In arguing that the Security Council should always 
respect Sudanese sovereignty in the body’s deliberations on the Darfur crisis (in the 
face of Khartoum’s orchestration and commission of atrocities), China and Russia 
were able to simultaneously obstruct the further emergence of the international norm 
of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and thereby weaken claims for further scrutiny of, 
and perhaps punitive action on, human rights abuses inside their own borders. Hence, 
defending Khartoum’s interests served their own interests well. 
In light of the traditional Chinese and Russian hostility towards humanitarian 
intervention,  the  endorsement  by  both  countries,  as  members  of  the  UN  General 
Assembly, of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome appeared to be an in-principle 
concession by Beijing and Moscow to the proposals of the ICISS and its advocates. 
The Summit Outcome stated, inter alia, that UN member states supported the notion 
that  the  international  community  had  a  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  the  victims  of 
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genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and committed 
themselves through the Security Council to take Chapter VII action ‘should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations’  (see  Chapter  1).  Moreover,  as  permanent  members  of  the  Security 
Council, both China and Russia again explicitly endorsed the Summit Outcome in 
Resolution 1674 in April 2006, which codified the endorsement as a basis for future 
Council action. This suggested that China and Russia were coming to accept that it 
was necessary for the members of the Council to act forcefully in such cases to 
properly reflect the recasting of the concept of ‘security’ in the Council’s title.  
Crucial to this endorsement, however, and of China and Russia’s acceptance 
of it, appears to be the clause in the Summit Outcome that Council interventionary 
action would be determined ‘on a case-by-case basis’, meaning that, despite any 
posited responsibility as Great Powers, Beijing or Moscow (or any of the P5) could 
obstruct the deployment of any Council military operation aimed at the protection of 
civilians  if  they  deemed  that  particular  action  to  be  contrary  to  their  national 
interests.  Indeed,  the  protection  of  narrower  national  interests  —  in  the  form  of 
lucrative trade and investment relationships with the incumbent regime in Khartoum 
—  is  the  other  context  in  which  Chinese  and  Russian  obstruction  of  coercive 
Council-authorised military intervention in Darfur should be viewed. 
 
China-Sudan and Russia-Sudan bilateral trade and investment 
 
  In  addition  to  the  ‘non-intervention  norm’  explanation  of  Chinese  and 
Russian positions on Darfur, there is an even more direct link between the national 
interests  of  Beijing  and  Moscow  and  the  interests  of  the  al-Bashir  regime  in 
Khartoum. This pertains to the extensive and lucrative bilateral trade and investment   259 
relationships between China and Sudan and between Russia and Sudan. Because 
Russia  and  particularly  China  have  emerged  as  rising  world  powers  in  the  new 
millennium (after a period of relative latency, and in Russia’s case, reform, in the 
first  post-Cold  War  decade),  their  rapid  economic  growth  has  demanded  new 
resources and markets for development and enabled them to have greater influence 
on important political dynamics and relationships in international society (including 
increasing  assertiveness  in  the  Security  Council).  The  proceeding  discussion 
examines how China and Russia’s interests in protecting their extensive bilateral 
trade  and  investment  relationships  with  Sudan  produced  a  strategy  of  protecting 
Khartoum diplomatically in the Council in the face of pressure for punitive action or 
coercive  intervention  against  it  over  Darfur.  Because  it  is  of  most  financial 
significance,  and  because  China  has  acted  most  proactively  to  protect  Khartoum 
from external interference over Darfur, the China-Sudan economic relationship will 
be the primary focus of the analysis. 
Chinese  economic  interests  in  Sudan  are  centred  upon  the  extensive 
importation of Sudanese oil and investment in Sudan’s relatively nascent petroleum 
industry, while China and Russia have both profited from significant exports of arms 
to Khartoum (with some of this trade being in violation of the Council’s own arms 
embargo  on  the  country).  For  Beijing  and  Moscow,  this  has  been  particularly 
lucrative and uncompetitive business in the absence of American companies from 
Sudan since Washington imposed unilateral economic sanctions and its own arms 
embargo in 1997. Despite concern by human rights groups at the role played by 
China  and  Russia  in  materially  supporting  Khartoum  in  its  civil  war  against  the 
SPLM/A (of which control over oil resources and revenues became and increasingly 
central  issue),  until  the  Darfur  conflict  erupted  in  early  2003  such  business  was   260 
conducted relatively free from international scrutiny. Since then, however, attention 
has turned to the material and now crucial diplomatic support afforded to President 
Bashir and his regime by Beijing and Moscow. 
The National Petroleum Commission (NPC) was established by the Sudanese 
government in October 1995 to facilitate greater development of the country’s oil 
sector.  The  NPC  allocates  new  oil  contracts  and,  since  the  signing  of  the  CPA, 
regulates the equitable sharing of oil revenues between Khartoum and south Sudan 
and  is  responsible  for  resolving  issues  arising  from  duplicate  contracts.
591 
Commencing wholesale in 1999, mass oil production in Sudan was initiated by the 
construction of a pipeline from the country’s central oil fields to its Red Sea transport 
hub of Port Sudan, jumping from a few thousand barrels per day in the late 1990s to 
over 400,000 barrels per day by 2006.
592 As this oil production has vastly outpaced 
domestic consumption, Sudan was able to export 320,000 barrels per day in that 
same year.
593 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in January 
2007 Sudan sat on five billion barrels of proven oil reserves, up from an estimated 
563 million barrels in 2006 and placing it fifth in total proven oil reserves out of 
African states (behind Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Angola, respectively).
594  
In Sudan, national oil exploration and production is organised by the Sudan 
National  Petroleum  Corporation  (Sudapet),  but  due  to  the  Corporation’s  limited 
financial and technical capacities, it engages in key partnerships with foreign oil 
companies.
595  These  foreign  companies  form  the  majority  Sudan’s  main  oil-
producing consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). 
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Importantly, the Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
holds a 40 per cent stake in GNPOC, while Malaysia’s Petronas (with 30 per cent) 
and India’s ONGC-Videsh (25 per cent) also have a share, alongside Sudapet (five 
per cent).
596 Geographically, GNPOC operates oil Blocks 1, 2 and 4, which produce 
the majority of Sudan’s daily oil output and split the border of North and South 
Sudan (and cover the disputed Abyei territory). The CNPC also has a 95 per cent 
share of Block 6 in Southern Kordofan/South Darfur. In addition, CPNC (41 per 
cent) and a second Chinese petroleum company, Sinopec (six per cent), own shares 
of Blocks 3 and 7, which recently commenced production when a new pipeline was 
installed.
597  
Chinese investment in the Sudanese petroleum industry is a product of the 
rapid economic growth of the east Asian power and the resulting high demand for 
energy. According to 2005 EIA forecasts, China’s oil consumption would increase 
by almost half a million barrels per day in 2006, accounting for 38 percent of total 
growth in world oil demand, such that China is now the world’s second largest oil 
consumer behind the US. Despite being the world’s sixth largest oil producer, China 
is now the third largest net importer of oil behind the US and Japan. In 2006, China’s 
domestic oil production was 3.8 million barrels per day, but its consumption was 7.4 
million barrels per day, meaning that it needed to import 3.6 million barrels per day, 
or just under half of its required oil needs.
598 This is the gap that China has sought to 
cover with foreign sources of oil. According to EIA, CNPC has obtained interests in 
foreign oil exploration and production in 21 countries around the world and in 2005 
announced a further US$18 billion in foreign oil and gas assets up to 2020.  
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Much of China’s new sources have come from Africa, representing part of a 
forging trade relationship between China and the continent which has challenged 
traditional economic patterns in the region. In 2006, Angola took over from Saudi 
Arabia as China’s top source of oil imports, ahead of Iran, Russia, Oman, Equatorial 
Guinea,  and  Yemen.
599  Goodman  argues  that  as  part  of  China’s  wider  efforts  to 
promote its own trade and development across Africa, its relationship with Sudan 
also  ‘demonstrates  the  intensity  of  China’s  quest  for  energy  security  and  its 
willingness to do business wherever it must to lock up oil.’
600 Indeed, CNPC has 
invested more than US$8 billion in the Sudanese oil industry including the initial 
construction of the 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea.
601 Furthermore, China now 
imports the majority of Sudan’s oil.
602 According to UN Comtrade data, during the 
four-year period of study in this thesis, China imported $7.5 billion worth of oil from 
Sudan. This was broken down as $1.87 billion in 2006, $2.57 billion in 2005, $1.66 
billion in 2004, and $1.4 billion in 2003.
603  
Chinese business in Sudan is successful in part because oil companies from 
other countries have been put off investing in Sudan due to the ongoing civil wars 
and  because  of  Sudan’s  pariah  status,  according  to  Goodman.
604  Thus,  while  US 
firms have been prohibited from investing in or doing business inside Sudan since 
the 1997 unilateral sanctions, around the same time China has taken the opportunity 
to  invest  in  the  infrastructure  to  extract  and  export  Sudanese  oil,  in  addition  to 
purchasing that oil itself.
605 Going further, Reeves argues that Beijing ‘is cynically 
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satisfied with low-level, ongoing conflict that destabilizes its most promising source 
of  offshore  oil  production  and  thereby  makes  competitive  entry  of  Western  oil 
companies unlikely’,
606 ensuring it retains a controlling interest in the Sudanese oil 
industry. In light of its extensive trade and investment relationship with Sudan, the 
argument that China has acted to shield Sudan from international intervention or 
sanctions  and  thus  protect  its  own  investments,  sources  of  energy,  and  reliable 
trading partner becomes persuasive. 
Indeed,  voting  patterns  detailed  in  Chapter  3  revealed  that  China  had 
abstained from key draft Council resolutions which attempted to impose mandatory 
demands on Khartoum and which harshly criticised the Sudanese government for its 
role  in  orchestrating,  or  obstructing  the  resolution  of,  the  Darfur  crisis.  In  an 
influential 2007 Council on Foreign Relations special report, Lee Feinstein argued 
that the UN had ‘failed to take strong action [on Darfur] in the first instance because 
China  has  adopted  the  role  of  Sudan’s  protector  on  the  Security  Council.’
607 
According  to  another  analysis,  China  has  ‘abstained  on  resolutions  threatening 
actions against Sudan, in particular against its petroleum sector, and threatened to use 
its veto against resolutions if they were too strong’ because it is the primary foreign 
investor in the Sudanese oil industry.
608 Because of this, China has been labelled as 
Sudan’s ‘chief diplomatic ally’ in the Council.
609 Similarly, Reeves concludes that 
China, with its threats to veto sanctions measures, is the ‘primary obstacle’ to more 
effective Council action on Darfur. He argues that while Russia and Pakistan are 
notable Chinese allies in the Council regarding Darfur: 
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it  is  China’s  perceived  national  interest  that  dominates  the  political 
calculus at the UN. The Chinese economy has a voracious appetite for 
offshore petroleum, and consumption of imported oil has more than 
doubled in the last five years. China has the dominant stake in Sudan’s 
two oil producing consortia and views Sudan policy almost exclusively 
through the lens of petroleum needs.
610  
 
The International Crisis Group has reached the same conclusions, observing 
that while targeted sanctions against the Sudanese petroleum sector were a potential 
measure short of military intervention to compel Sudanese compliance over Darfur, 
‘consensus in the Security Council on any such ban is extremely unlikely: at this 
point, China, the main importer of Sudan’s petroleum, would certainly veto any such 
action.’
611 Moreover, regarding potential Western sanctions against the Sudanese oil 
industry, Reeves suggests that “[g]lib talk in Washington and European capitals of an 
‘oil embargo’ is pointless: China could easily purchase every barrel of oil that Sudan 
produces for export.”
612 This certainly goes some way to explaining the weakness of 
the sanctions regime imposed on Sudan by the Council. In turn, for Sudan, China 
represents a ‘lucrative partnership that delivers billions of dollars in investment, oil 
revenue and weapons — as well as diplomatic protection’.
613  
Indeed,  in  addition  to  the  petroleum  sector,  a  May  2007  Amnesty 
International report examined the international arms trade with Sudan (which was in 
violation of the UN Security Council’s own arms embargo on the country), claiming 
that the ‘bulk’ of arms traded to Sudan were ‘transferred from China and Russia, two 
Permanent  Members  of  the  UN  Security  Council.’
614  The  report  argues  that  the 
‘governments of these supplier countries have been, or should have been, aware … 
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that several types of military equipment including aircraft have been deployed by the 
Sudanese armed forces and militia for direct attacks on civilians and indiscriminate 
attacks in Darfur, as well as for logistical support for these attacks.’
615 This was 
supported  by  a  2008  BBC  investigation,  which  provided  primary  evidence  of 
Chinese-made Dong Feng military lorries in use in Darfur and claimed that China 
had been training Sudanese pilots for Chinese-made A5 Fantan fighter jets, which it 
had sold to Khartoum.
616 The dubious legality of such deals aside, the trade has been 
highly  lucrative  for  Sudan  and  its  exporters.  According  to  Goodman,  Sudan  has 
made  around  US$500  million  a  year  in  profit  since  1999,  largely  from  Chinese 
investment. Of this, eighty percent has been used on the Sudanese military such that 
its  military  budget  had  doubled  between  1998-2002.  In  addition  to  fighting  the 
SPLM/A  in  the  past,  this  money  has  also  been  used  to  protect  the  oil  fields 
themselves from sabotage by the rebels, and to remove communities from locations 
in which future oil exploration might be successful.
617 
The Amnesty report cites 2005 trade figures showing that Sudan imported 
‘$24 million worth of arms and ammunition … as well as nearly $57 million worth 
of parts and aircraft equipment and $2 million worth of parts of helicopters and 
aeroplanes’ from China. In addition, the Chinese company AviChina Industry and 
Technology  ‘recently  delivered  six  K-8  military  training/attack  aircraft  to  the 
Sudanese air force and a further six will follow’, while other Chinese companies also 
developed,  produced,  and  delivered  flight  simulators  for  Sudanese  K-8S  jets.
618 
Indeed, According UN Comtrade data, during the four-year period of study in this 
thesis, Sudan imported around $79 million worth of military equipment, arms and 
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ammunition  from  China.  This  was  broken  down  as  over  $20.6  million  in  2006, 
almost $36 million in 2005, $18.5 million in 2004, and $3.7 million in 2003. 
In  addition  to  China,  Russian  arms  trade  with  Sudan  has  been  similarly 
lucrative.  According  to  Williams  and  Bellamy,  while  Russia’s  ‘opposition  to 
intervention [in Darfur] is arguably connected to concerns about Chechnya … the 
country also has substantial commercial interests in the region, especially since it has 
sold around $150 million worth of military equipment to Sudan, [although] in 2002 a 
$200 million oil deal with the Sudanese government fell through.’ Citing a Moscow-
based defence analyst, they suggest that Russia is concerned about the Sudanese 
government defaulting on its payments if an intervention was to occur.
619 Similarly, 
Africa Action claims in a 2006 report that it is ‘well established that Russia is a 
major supplier of arms to Khartoum’, citing how in 2004 the Sudanese government 
bought  12  MiG-29  jet  fighters  from  Russia  worth  between  $120–370  million.
620 
According to the report, in 2006 the Sudanese defence minister met with Russian 
officials to negotiate a $1 billion arms loan for military aircraft, and that a Russian 
company secured a new deal to construct a Sudanese oil pipeline in 2004.
621 Citing 
2005 trade figures, the aforementioned Amnesty International report revealed that 
Russia ‘exported to Sudan $21 million worth of aircraft and associated equipment 
including spare parts and $13.7 million of helicopters, adding to its substantial arms 
deliveries in recent years.’
622 
Thus, an intimate relationship between Beijing, Moscow, Khartoum, oil and 
weapons  developed  in  the  early  21
st  century.  Illustrating  this  nexus,  Goodman, 
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describing how Chinese workers had been constructing oil infrastructure in Sudan in 
the face of threats by southern Sudanese rebels, observed: ‘But the Chinese laborers 
are protected: They work under the vigilant gaze of Sudanese government troops 
armed largely with Chinese-made weapons — a partnership of the world's fastest-
growing oil consumer with a pariah state accused of fostering genocide in its western 
Darfur  region.’
623  According  to  Goodman,  Sudan  is  China’s  ‘largest  overseas  oil 
project’,  while  China  is  Sudan’s  largest  supplier  of  arms.  ‘Chinese-made  tanks, 
fighter planes, bombers, helicopters, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades’ 
have  been  used  by  the  Sudanese  government  in  its  civil  war  with  the  southern 
rebels,
624 and, according to Amnesty International, now also in Darfur. Regarding this 
lucrative and politically convenient relationship, Africa Action concluded that: 
 
At  the  core  of  China’s  support  for  Sudan  is  a  profitable  economic 
relationship  centred  on  Sudan’s  oil  wealth  …  Beyond  oil,  China  is 
Sudan’s largest trade partner more broadly. Traditionally, China also 
opposes  the  principle  of  external  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  a 
sovereign  state  on  human  rights  concerns.  At  the  same  time,  it  is 
selling military aircraft and parts, as well as guns and ammunition, to 
Khartoum.
625 
 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  China  and  Russia  have  significant  economic 
investment in and trade with Sudan, ties which Beijing and Moscow have a strong 
national interest in protecting from external interference. China, in particular, has 
‘paralysed the UN Security Council, ensuring that no effective actions have been 
taken against a regime that has allowed Chinese oil companies to become dominant 
in  Sudan’s  burgeoning  petroleum  industry’.
626  To  protect  against  internal 
interference, the two powers have sold weapons to Khartoum, which the Sudanese 
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government  has  then  used  to  brutally  attack  rebel  groups  and  civilians  allegedly 
sympathetic to their causes while also physically protecting its oil infrastructure. For 
Sudan, Chinese and Russian investment and weapons enable the regime to profit, 
become powerful relative to internal rebel movements and regional enemies, and to 
operate  free  from  international  intervention  into  Sudanese  affairs  (or  at  least 
negotiate  its  foreign  relations  on  stronger  terms).  For  the  vulnerable  civilians  in 
Darfur,  however,  this  congruence  of  Sudanese,  Chinese  and  Russian  national 
interests precluded the deployment of a coercive UN military intervention to protect 
them from their own state. 
 
Sudan’s Allied Non-permanent Members: Pakistan, Algeria, and 
Qatar  
 
While the powerful permanent members played the most important roles in 
shaping the Council’s response to Darfur — culminating in the body’s failure to 
coercively  deploy  a  UN  military  intervention  with  a  robust  civilian  protection 
mandate — the non-permanent, non-veto-wielding members also exerted influence 
on the body’s deliberations and actions. While individually they could not prevent a 
resolution  from  being  passed,  as  a  bloc  they  held  the  balance  of  power  in 
determining  if  a  Council  motion  would  be  successful.
627  More  important  in  the 
context of the body’s response to Darfur, however, was the perceived legitimacy that 
the non-permanent members could add to or detract from Council motions, which 
were otherwise largely driven by the P5’s interests and political calculations. 
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The  detailing  in  Chapter  3  of  Council  voting  patterns  and  the  public 
statements of its members revealed that a majority of the non-permanent membership 
increasingly supported more coercive action on Sudan over Darfur, as the crimes of 
the Sudanese government were revealed, the humanitarian crisis deepened, and the 
conflict became entrenched — including the proposed conditional transition from 
AMIS to a UN force with a robust civilian protection mandate (as authorised in 
Resolution 1706). This included non-permanent members from Europe, Asia, Africa 
and the Americas and gave the draft resolutions the requisite number of votes to be 
passed (although after being watered-down to accommodate Chinese and Russian 
positions and thus avoid their veto).  
Importantly,  although  Africa  has  no  permanent  member  on  the  Council, 
African non-permanent members (except Maghreb Algeria) tended to support more 
coercive  measures  on  Sudan  (perhaps  in  solidarity  with  Darfur’s  black  African 
population), although their arguments initially focused upon enabling the African 
Union to try to resolve the conflict. When it became clear that AMIS had neither the 
capacity nor mandate to effectively protect civilians (as it was set up as a military 
observer mission to monitor the 2004 N’djamena ceasefire agreement), sub-Saharan 
African non-permanent members increasingly became supporters of more robust UN 
intervention, as did the African Union Peace and Security Council itself.  
However, contrary to this African and broader support, three non-permanent 
members chose to abstain from voting on substantive draft Council resolutions on 
Darfur: Pakistan (on two resolutions), Algeria (on three), and Qatar (on two). The 
most persuasive explanation of the positions of these three countries is that they are 
all,  along  with  Sudan,  members  of  the  pan-Islamic  Organisation  of  the  Islamic 
Conference (OIC), while Algeria and Qatar are also fellow members of the Arab   270 
League. The governments of Pakistan, Algeria and Qatar thus practiced identity-
driven inter-elite solidarity with Khartoum by opposing coercive or mandatory action 
in  the  Council  against  Sudan,  while  they  couched  their  arguments  against  such 
intervention, as did China and Russia, in the language of protecting state sovereignty, 
implying  a  defence  of  pluralist  international  order  from  self-interested  and  neo-
colonial  Western  interventionism.  Indeed,  the  al-Bashir  regime  has  ‘regularly 
solicited [the Arab League’s] political support in the face in the face of international 
pressure on Darfur.’
628  
 According  to  one  observation,  Algeria  and  Pakistan,  ‘which  have  close 
political ties to Arab and Islamic governments, have worked to delay and weaken 
international  action  on  Darfur,’
629  while  another  view  is  that  the  ‘absence  of 
significant multilateral support for the international response [to Darfur] from either 
the  [OIC]  or  the  Arab  League  was  depressing.’
630  In  March  2006,  a  coalition  of 
international and Arab human rights organisations argued that the Arab League ‘has 
rightly condemned attacks on civilians across the region, but it has remained silent 
about Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur.’ They called upon Arab leaders, meeting for a 
2006 summit in Khartoum, to ‘put the interests of Sudan’s people first and support 
the transition to a U.N. force in Darfur.’
631 Similarly, the International Crisis Group’s 
Nadim Hasbani has observed that the Arab League has ‘expressed concern over the 
violence in Sudan's Darfur, but, like individual Arab member states, it has failed to 
support international action to protect the Sudanese citizens of Darfur.’
632  According 
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to another analysis, many Arab League members and officials were ‘xenophobically 
opposed to a Western-led intervention in North Africa, and strongly protective of one 
of [their] own’, Sudan.
633 In the Council, Qatar has “consistently aligned itself with 
the Sudanese government, with whom it declares a ‘fraternal’ relationship, and it has 
stood in solidarity with Khartoum in opposing the deployment of a UN force to 
Darfur.”
634 Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that: 
 
At the UN, Arab countries have been active, though all their activity 
seems to be directed at obstructing Security Council resolutions that 
could  have  helped  end  the  suffering  of  Sudan's  Darfur  population. 
Since 2004, the last two Arab non-permanent members at the Security 
Council — Algeria and Qatar — speaking and voting in the name of 
all Arab countries, either toned down resolutions in Khartoum's favour 
or abstained from voting in a clear message of non-support for the 
civilian  victims.  The  current  Arab  representative  on  the  Security 
Council, Qatar, abstained from voting on an August 2006 resolution 
(1706)  calling  for  the  deployment  of  UN  troops  in  Darfur.  Arab 
countries  said  that  more  efforts  should  have  been  made  to  secure 
Sudan's ‘consent’.
635 
 
The contentious US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 
respectively — both Muslim-majority countries like Sudan — clearly enhanced the 
credibility of the arguments made against intervention in Darfur by representatives of 
the Arab and Islamic worlds (as discussed in Chapter 4). Yet the Darfur crisis was 
different.  Not  only  was  there  clear  evidence  that  the  Sudanese  government  had 
orchestrated and committed atrocities against its own civilians, but those Darfurian 
victims  were  also  primarily  Muslims.  As  Hasbani  argues,  Arab  governments’ 
‘reference to Sudan as a "fraternal" neighbour is fair, but it is hard to understand why 
Arab solidarity should extend as far as defending a regime in its campaign of mass 
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killing against its own citizens.
636’ In addition, by sitting on the Council during this 
period the three dissenting non-permanent members had some capacity to oversee 
and shape the character of any Council-authorised intervention in Sudan if they were 
to first accept that such an intervention was necessary to protect Darfurian civilians 
and  support  a  resolution  authorising  a  coercive  deployment.  Illustrating  the 
contradictions of such inter-elite Arab solidarity, Slim has observed how the Arab 
League’s ‘strong criticism of US military action in Falluja and of Israeli military 
action in the Palestinian occupied territories in 2003 and early 2004 made a stark 
contrast to its silence over the violations in Darfur.’
637 Indeed, the ‘Arab world's 
acceptance of Khartoum's double standard does not do service to their well-placed 
critique of U.S. double standards in the Middle East.’
638 
The above analysis suggests that the governments in Islamabad, Algiers, and 
Doha were more interested in supporting fellow elites (Islamic and/or Arab) than 
ordinary Muslim civilians in Darfur. In addition to this inter-elite solidarity, this is 
likely  because  these  governments,  similar  to  Russia  and  China,  were  concerned 
about being the targets of criticism for their own repressive domestic governance or 
human  rights  abuses  and  thus  had  an  interest  in  resisting  an  emerging  norm  of 
humanitarian intervention and upholding traditional principles of non-intervention 
and state-centric forms of sovereignty. As Mustafa Kamel al-Sayed, director of the 
Centre for Developing Country Studies in Cairo, argues, “Some Arab governments 
have  minority  problems  of  their  own,  so  they  don't  want  international 
intervention”.
639  As  a  result,  despite  the  fact  that  a  majority  of  non-permanent 
members supported more coercive actions against the Sudanese government, and 
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supported the transition to a more robust UN force, the abstinence of Qatar, Algeria, 
and Pakistan on important resolutions, when coupled with similar non-votes from 
China  and  Russia,  furthered  the  appearance  and  reality  of  a  divided  and  thus 
weakened Council. Because of this division, the arguments of those supporting more 
coercive measures against Khartoum lost moral and political authority, and the result 
was that Khartoum, and those seeking to protect it and their own interests in Sudan, 
gained a measure of legitimacy. This was a ‘position that comforts the Sudanese 
regime and helps it deflect international pressure for a more robust force that could 
more  effectively  protect  civilian  populations.’
640  Again,  for  Council  members  — 
including  non-permanent  members  —  preserving  their  national  interests  was 
prioritised over the protection of vulnerable civilians in Darfur.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the positions and interests of the two non-Western 
permanent members and the three non-permanent members whom consistently acted 
to protect Sudan in the Security Council from any pressure over its actions in Darfur, 
including by obstructing attempts to coerce Khartoum into changing its behaviour 
through the threat of UN military intervention. Writing in 2005 after the peak of 
violence in Darfur, Erin Patrick argued that ‘[b]y now the divisions within the UN 
Security Council on the issue of Darfur are apparent to anyone following the crisis. 
China,  Russia,  Algeria  and  Pakistan  have  abstained  from  voting  on  most  of  the 
Darfur-related  Security  Council  resolutions  …  More  importantly,  however,  the 
reluctance of these countries to support any measures seen as punishing or even 
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directly threatening the government of Sudan has resulted in weak resolutions.’
641 
This trend continued through the end of the study period in 2006, resulting in a 
continuing  lack  of  adequate  protection  for  vulnerable  civilians  on  the  ground  in 
Darfur and a prolonging of both the conflict and humanitarian crisis. 
It has been demonstrated that extensive oil and arms trade between Sudan and 
China and Russia, and significant investment by China in the Sudanese economy, has 
resulted  in  the  two  non-Western  permanent  members  acting  to  protect  their  own 
national economic interests by protecting Sudan diplomatically in the Council. In 
addition, because of their own domestic problems with disaffected minorities and 
secessionist movements, concerns in Beijing and Moscow about setting precedents 
or  strengthening  emerging  norms  for  international  intervention  to  protect  abused 
minorities inside the borders of sovereign states has enabled them to protect their 
own political interests through arguing in the Council that the body should at all 
times respect Sudan’s sovereignty, despite Khartoum’s widespread commission of 
atrocities against its own civilians.   
Because  of  the  Chinese  and  Russian  positions  on  Darfur,  the  permanent 
membership of the Council was disunited, even if Western permanent members did 
not want to push Sudan too hard either because of their own interests in the country, 
and their lack of capacity to do so. The result was that Council resolutions were 
watered down in order to accommodate the interests of Khartoum, and by direct 
extension  Beijing  and  Moscow.  Most  evidently,  this  led  to  the  inclusion  of  the 
‘invites the consent of the government of Sudan’ clause in Resolution 1706, which 
effectively blocked the deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping force in Darfur and 
highlighted the non-coercive nature of the Council’s approach. Even more clearly 
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than was apparent for Western members of the Council, the protection by China and 
Russia of their national interests directly precluded coercive military intervention in 
Sudan.  
  Adding political support and legitimacy to the positions of China and Russia 
were three non-permanent members who also acted to obstruct and delegitimise any 
attempts to pressure Sudan over Darfur or any movements toward coercive military 
intervention. Demonstrating inter-elite support for a fellow Islamic (or Arab) regime, 
the governments of Pakistan, Algeria and Qatar acted consistently in the Council to 
preclude  the  provision  of  adequate  protection  of  fellow  Muslims  in  Darfur  by 
abstaining from key resolutions and by emphasising strict observance of the posited 
sovereign rights of the Sudanese government. While these non-permanent members 
could  not  individually  obstruct  a  Council  resolution,  their  political  support  was 
important in enhancing the legitimacy of the pro-Khartoum bloc within the body and 
lending some regional credibility to the self-interested positions of China and Russia. 
As a result of these various positions on Darfur/Sudan, the political dynamics 
inside  the  Council  worked  against  the  body  coercively  deploying  a  military 
intervention to protect civilians. While Western states and other members concerned 
about the plight of Darfurians pushed for greater pressure (but not too great) on 
Sudan,  the  China/Russia/Arab/Islamic  bloc  obstructed  an  effective  and  united 
position by the body, which Sudan understood well and used to its own advantage. 
The threats of Chinese veto meant that Western permanent members had to decide if 
it was worth forcing the issue and thus drawing a negative vote, a practice that was 
considered to be unwelcome in the post-Cold War environment of apparently greater 
P5  consensus.  Besides,  Western  permanent  members  were  wary  that  forcing  in 
public view a contentious vote — and thus veto — over Darfur, rather than first   276 
reaching minimal consensus in private consultations, could come back to haunt them 
when the Council deliberated in future over other issues that the Western P3 might 
oppose.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  the  US  and  UK  in  particular  were  not 
sufficiently committed to coercing Sudanese compliance over Darfur to necessitate 
forcing the Chinese to veto any tougher-worded draft resolutions. 
Because of these political dynamics, in the context of a persuasive legal-
institutional,  normative  and  moral  case  for  coercive  Council-authorised  military 
intervention  to  protect  civilians  from  atrocities  and  massive  human  rights  abuses 
when  their  own  government  fails  to  do  so,  the  body  mandated  to  maintain 
international  peace  and  security  did  not  deploy  a  military  intervention  in  Darfur 
between 2003-06. Despite belatedly authorising the transition from AMIS to a UN 
operation with a more robust civilian protection mandate in August 2006, Chinese 
and  other  insistence  that  deployment  of  the  force  require  Sudanese  government 
consent (which was predictably not forthcoming) meant that hundreds of thousands 
of vulnerable civilians on the ground in Darfur were not provided with adequate 
protection from marauding Janjaweed militias and the Sudanese military. Like the 
Sudanese  government,  the  UN  Security  Council  consequently  failed  in  its 
‘responsibility  to  protect’  Darfurians.  Indeed,  as  this  chapter  has  reaffirmed, 
‘perceived  strategic  interests  mitigated  against  an  interventionist  position’  on 
Darfur.
642 Put differently, it is evident that powerful states in the Council privileged 
the  preservation  of  their  own  national  interests  over  the  protection  of  vulnerable 
civilians. As such, this evidence further substantiates the claim that humanitarian 
interventions will likely not occur when they directly clash with the national interests 
of the major powers. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Protecting Civilians or Preserving Interests? 
 
 
  This thesis has examined the response of the United Nations Security Council 
to  the  brutal  state-directed  violence  and  ensuing  humanitarian  crisis  in  Darfur, 
western Sudan, between 2003 and 2006. This response was set against the context of 
a  compelling  moral,  normative  and  legal-institutional  case  for  coercive  Council-
authorised military intervention in Sudan to protect vulnerable civilians. The thesis 
addressed the central analytical question of why no such intervention took place in 
the face of continuing government atrocities against the population of Darfur during 
the period of study. It sought an answer to why, absent the prior consent of the 
Sudanese government, the world’s most powerful multilateral security body ‘chose 
not to assume responsibility for alleviating human suffering in Darfur by authorising 
humanitarian intervention.’
643 Most centrally, the thesis has demonstrated that the 
pursuit or preservation of various national interests in Sudan by permanent members 
of the Council — particularly in their desire to maintain cooperative relationships 
with Khartoum — precluded coercive UN intervention.  
  The  context  for  the  analysis  in  the  thesis  was  established  by  two  key 
developments. As Chapter 1 detailed, the first of these was an apparent normative 
evolution  in  conceptions  and  practices  of  sovereignty  and  security.  It  was 
demonstrated  that  the  increasing  salience  of  concepts  such  as  ‘responsible 
sovereignty’ and ‘human security’ in international society have started to recast ideas 
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about international order. In particular, it has become apparent that the protection of 
states — and often just of regimes — can no longer legitimately come at the expense 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  population  or  of  the  security  of  individuals  or  groups 
residing within states. With a number of civil wars and other internal crises capturing 
the  post-Cold  War  security  agenda,  the  UNSC  found  itself  having  to  adapt 
(inconsistently)  to  new  circumstances  using  tired  normative  frameworks  and 
outdated ideas. I have thus established the legality and legitimacy of ‘humanitarian’ 
intervention  as  a  coercive  method  of  dealing  with  internal  state  violence,  while 
noting  its  normative  contestation  by  defenders  of  a  fragile  pluralist  international 
order and by those sceptical of Western interventionary motives.  
The debate was distilled by the 2001 report of the ICISS, which pushed the 
doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ onto the international agenda. The General 
Assembly and Security Council’s endorsements of (a version of) this newly codified 
international obligation in 2005 and 2006, respectively, seemed to signal that the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, including protection from their own state 
without that government’s consent, was emerging as a new international norm with 
the prescriptive power to induce the Security Council — the appropriate body under 
the UN Charter and international law to authorise (and direct) military interventions 
for human protection purposes — to intervene when the enabling criteria had been 
met. 
  As such, the second development that established a context for the analysis in 
the thesis was the nature and scale of violence and terrorisation in the Darfur region 
since early 2003. I have argued that situation clearly met the enabling criteria of the 
‘responsibility  to  protect’.  In  Chapter  2,  the  thesis  outlined  how  in  April  2003, 
Darfurian rebel groups attacked a Sudanese military installation sparking a conflict   279 
with  the  state.  The  rebels  were  disaffected  with  their  region’s  continuing 
marginalisation  and  underdevelopment  by  the  central  Sudanese  government  in 
Khartoum and by the manipulation of ethnic identities in an environment of extreme 
resource  scarcity  and  intertribal  tensions.  The  chapter  then  detailed  how  the 
Sudanese  government’s  response  to  this  uprising  involved  the  orchestration  of  a 
campaign  of  brutal  violence  and  widespread  intimidation  of  Darfur’s  non-Arab 
civilian population, using both the Sudanese Armed Forces and government-allied 
militias in the region.  
According  to  UN  estimates,  the  human  cost  of  this  counter-insurgency 
campaign was over 200,000 killed from direct violence or from the ensuing disease 
and malnutrition that characterised the resulting humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, 
the displacement of over two million civilians from their homes and villages into 
vast IDP and refugee camps reflected the pervasive fear and insecurity in Darfur, 
while it was calculated that a total of over four million people in the wider region 
were in some way significantly affected by the conflict.  
It  has  therefore  been  argued  that  the  crisis  in  Darfur  represented  a 
quintessential  case  for  enacting  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  doctrine  because  it 
comprehensively met the criteria advocated by the ICISS, and moreover because the 
situation was consistent with the endorsed versions of that doctrine of the General 
Assembly and Security Council itself. Due to the scale and nature of the violence, 
insecurity and suffering, Darfur clearly exceeded the ‘just cause threshold’. It was 
argued that, because of the direct involvement of the Sudanese government in the 
orchestration and commission of atrocities in Darfur and the scale and nature of 
violence, insecurity, and suffering, it would have been morally unacceptable and 
politically cynical for the Council to allow Khartoum — which had clearly failed to   280 
protect its own citizens — to remain in control of Darfur’s security. In combination 
with these reasons, I argued that because a variety of non-military measures were 
first tried and had clearly failed, by 2006 a coercive UN military intervention became 
a necessary and justifiable action.  
  These  developments  on  the  ground  in  Sudan  and  in  international  norms 
regarding  sovereignty,  security,  and  international  responsibility  were  used  as  a 
context for the argument that there was a compelling legal-institutional, normative, 
and moral case for the Security Council to fulfil its own posited responsibility to 
protect by coercively deploying a military intervention in Darfur. Yet, despite this 
compelling case, no such coercive intervention took place during the 2003-06 period 
of study. The analytical aim of the thesis was then to explain this non-event in light 
of what was arguably the expected normative behaviour of the Council. 
To  do  so,  Chapter  3  examined  the  chronological  development  of  the 
Council’s  response  to  the  Darfur  crisis  between  2003  and  2006.  A  number  of 
important non-military measures that the Council took were highlighted, including 
the imposition of a limited sanctions regime and arms embargo, the establishment of 
the COI, the referral of Darfur to the ICC, and in league with the African Union, the 
deployment of AU military observers and the facilitation of the ultimately ineffective 
Darfur Peace Agreement. It was also explained that while the Council did authorise a 
UN  peacekeeping  operation  in  Darfur  with  a  robust  civilian  protection  mandate 
(Resolution 1706 of August 2006), that force did not actually arrive on the ground 
because the Council subjected its deployment to the prior consent of the Sudanese 
government, which was not forthcoming. This empirical study revealed that, in fact, 
a  coercive  UN  intervention  was  not  even  seriously  considered  by  the  Council’s 
members.   281 
Because of this, it was necessary to examine closely the political dynamics 
that existed inside the powerful body and to expose the voting patterns and public 
statements on Darfur of individual Council members. A prima facie review of these 
voting  patterns  and  statements  revealed  that  China,  Russia  and  non-permanent 
members  Algeria,  Pakistan  and  Qatar  generally  opposed  harsh  recriminations  of 
Sudan in the Council or any substantive form of punitive action against Khartoum. 
This  was  evident  in  their  consistent  abstentions  on  key  resolutions  on  Darfur, 
weakening the moral and political authority of the Council. I have also demonstrated 
that  Western  permanent  members  and  a  majority  of  non-permanent  members 
appeared instead to support the imposition of sanctions and other punitive measures 
on  Sudan  and  were  often  sharply  condemnatory  of  Khartoum  in  their  public 
statements. A number of these members also rhetorically advocated the application 
of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  doctrine  to  Darfur.  Yet,  coercive  military 
intervention was not publicly advocated by Western members in the face of Sudan’s 
open opposition to it. 
  In order to critically analyse the response of the Council to Darfur between 
2003  and  2006  and  to  explain  why  coercive  military  intervention  was  not 
undertaken, Chapters 4 and 5 probed the national interests and political calculations 
behind  the  positions  of  individual  Council  members,  focusing  on  the  P5.  It  was 
argued that despite their harsh public criticism, the US-led Western P3 actually had 
conflicting policy priorities and vested national interests when it came to Sudan and 
Darfur. Sudanese government intelligence cooperation in Western regional counter-
terrorism operations meant that the Bush administration was reluctant to sever its ties 
with al-Bashir’s regime, a result that a coercive military intervention in Darfur would 
likely  have  achieved.  In  addition,  extensive  American  and  British  political   282 
investment in the CPA process meant keeping the NCP onside for fear of reigniting 
the north-south Sudan civil war. More generally, US and UK capacity for military 
action  were  also  both  severely  constrained  by  the  wars  in  Afghanistan  and 
particularly Iraq, and this meant an inability to project a realistic deterrent for the 
Sudanese government during the Council’s efforts to bring about change in Sudan’s 
counter-insurgency policy. Moreover, the contentious Iraq war and its post-invasion 
alternative rationales significantly depreciated the arguments by proponents of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine for genuine humanitarian intervention in places 
like Darfur. As a result, I have argued that while Western permanent members did 
attempt to bring pressure on the Sudanese regime, coercive military intervention was 
not an option ultimately considered or desired by the P3, nor taken seriously by 
Khartoum. 
  In  addition  to  this,  it  was  argued  that  China  and  Russia  more  explicitly 
obstructed coercive military intervention in Darfur because Beijing and Moscow did 
not want to sever their own, economic, relationships with the incumbent regime in 
Khartoum. For China in particular, as Sudan’s largest foreign investor and primary 
importer of oil, this meant objecting to any Council measure that it deemed too harsh 
on  its  client,  including  abstaining  from  or  watering  down  any  toughly  worded 
resolutions. In line with historical policy, because of their own minority ‘problems’ 
in Tibet, Xinjiang and Chechnya, in particular, China and Russia were also more 
generally wary of setting a precent for coercive intervention in a sovereign state to 
protect an ethnic minority from an authoritarian central government.  
In this obstructionism and diplomatic protection of Sudan, China and Russia 
were joined by non-permanent members Pakistan, Algeria and Qatar, all of whom 
shared membership with Sudan of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and, in   283 
the case of the latter two, the Arab League. I have argued that, in the name of inter-
elite  Arab  or  Islamic  solidarity,  these  three  non-permanent  members  used  their 
positions on the Council to shield Sudan from criticism and ultimately contributed to 
a weakening of the Council’s moral and political authority. The resultant political 
dynamics inside the Council were such that there was little appetite amongst the 
major  powers  for  a  coercive  military  intervention  in  Sudan,  and  as  a  result  the 
Council  proved  to  be  weak,  divided,  and  easily  manipulated  by  the  Sudanese 
government.  
In analysing a variety of primary data and secondary sources, the thesis has 
concluded that despite a persuasive moral, normative, and legal-institutional case for 
coercive UN Security Council-authorised military intervention to protect vulnerable 
civilians in Darfur, the deployment of such a force was precluded by the conflicting 
individual national interests of the Council’s permanent members. Returning to the 
broader theoretical significance of such findings, the thesis suggests that the Security 
Council’s  response  to  Darfur  between  2003  and  2006  can  tell  us  something 
interesting  about  the  nature  of  norms,  interests  and  humanitarian  intervention  in 
contemporary  international  society,  particularly  the  apparent  tension  between  the 
pursuit of national interests and the pursuit of normative or more altruistic objectives 
by states in their foreign relations.  
In the thesis Introduction, the work of S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss 
was used to assert that national interests have been historically and contemporarily 
the most important drivers of intervention, including humanitarian intervention, in 
international  society.  Citing  other  cases,  I  used  this  argument  to  explain,  first, 
intervention for self-interested reasons cloaked as humanitarian ones (such as in Iraq, 
2003), second, a lack of intervention to protect vulnerable civilians due to an absence   284 
of  strategic  interests  in  or  political  apathy  towards  the  target  theatre  (such  as  in 
Rwanda,  1994),  and  third,  the  deployment  of  intervention  when  strategic  and 
normative interests coincide (such as for NATO in Kosovo, 1999).  
Yet, while accepting that national interests are in large part determinative of 
the extent or even existence of humanitarian interventions, I have demonstrated in 
this thesis that none of these circumstances were present in Darfur between 2003 and 
2006. For example, the first and third sets of circumstances are not applicable to 
Darfur because no intervention occurred, strategic or otherwise. The second set of 
circumstances are potentially more relevant, but are unpersuasive due to the evident 
national  interests  in  Sudan  of  the  major  powers  and,  due  to  the  vocal  activist 
movement, the not-insignificant political costs of appearing apathetic towards the 
crisis and crimes in Darfur (as least for Western governments).  
Instead,  extending  further  this  argument  about  the  privileging  of  national 
interests  over  humanitarian  objectives  in  foreign  policymaking,  the  evidence  and 
findings  in  this  thesis  substantiate  the  central  theoretical  claim  made  in  the 
Introduction that humanitarian interventions will likely not occur when they directly 
clash with the national interests of the major powers. Moreover, as Chapter 1 has 
demonstrated,  what  makes  humanitarian  intervention  most  unlikely  in  these 
circumstances is the particular structure and voting arrangement within the Security 
Council. Due to the P5 members’ individual powers of veto, the national interests 
versus expected normative behaviour equation must be favourable concurrently for 
five of the world’s major powers if any humanitarian intervention is to proceed. 
While this may not be unexpected, is the unfortunate reality of the Security Council’s 
response to Darfur and the most persuasive explanation of non-intervention in this 
case.   285 
This pessimistic conclusion may be taken by realists to substantiate their own 
arguments about how, on the final count, acting in the national interest will always 
trump  altruistic  or  normative  objectives  when  the  two  policy  objectives  clash. 
However,  realist  logic  claiming  that  states  must  act  in  their  own  self-interest  to 
ensure their survival in an anarchical system loaded with the inherent potential for 
conflict is unpersuasive in light of the pervasive constructivist critiques proposing 
instead the agency of governments to enact peaceful change in their interrelations. A 
more  critical  reading  of  such  interests  suggests  that  states  do  not  always  pursue 
national  interests  in  a  defensive  sense,  in  order  to  just  survive  in  international 
anarchy, but also because pursuing certain national interests leads to aggrandizement 
and self-enhancement for state elites and other interested parties.  
A more subtle version of this critique, however, would observe that states do 
pursue national interests and would accept that these are not inherently overly selfish 
or  illegitimate  pursuits  for  governments.  For  example,  the  Chinese  government 
seeking new sources of oil to fund a booming modern economy and to create jobs for 
its  massive  workforce  is  not  inherently  unethical  (except  perhaps  in  an 
environmental sustainability sense). Similarly, there is nothing inherently illegitimate 
about Western governments seeking to gather intelligence data on suspected terrorist 
networks  that  potentially  threaten  the  security  of  citizens  in  Western  and  other 
countries.  
The  ethical  problem  occurs  when  the  pursuit  of  narrow  national  interests 
leads to the creation or perpetuation of acute insecurity for ordinary people in other 
countries. This is where the claims by proponents of human security are persuasive. 
Hence, in this case, the pursuit by the P5 of trade, investment and counter-terrorism 
relationships  with  Khartoum  precluded  a  more  coercive  approach  to  the  Council   286 
acting upon Sudan’s atrocities against Darfurian civilians and thus prolonged and 
even  enabled  their  insecurity  and  suffering.  A  more  ethical  pursuit  of  national 
interests that does not come at the expense of the interests — including the lives — 
of  people  in  other  parts  of  the  world  should  therefore  ensure  that  humanitarian 
interventions are undertaken in a consistent manner whenever extreme circumstances 
warrant, and in such a way that the protection of civilians is the priority objective. 
However, the other interesting theoretical finding presented in this thesis is 
that we are seeing evidence of more ethical foreign policy pursuits, including civilian 
protection,  in  international  society,  even  if  intervention  did  not  occur  in  Darfur 
during this period of study. As such, while intervention didn’t occur in Darfur, this 
doesn’t  mean  that  international  society  is  not  increasingly  accepting  that  civilian 
protection  inside  state  borders  is  a  responsibility  of  others’.  As  demonstrated  in 
Chapter 1, it is clear that contemporary international society is further evolving and 
transforming itself. The end of the Cold War, accompanied by critical challenges to 
traditional conceptions and practices of sovereignty and security, have fostered the 
erosion of Westphalian and post-WWII norms regarding international order, justice, 
and the relationships between citizens, their governments, and international society 
more  broadly.  There  have  been  reassessments  of  ethical  obligations,  notions  of 
responsibility,  and  the  proper  location  and  hierarchy  of  rights.  As  such,  from  a 
previously strict adherence to the non-intervention norm via an emphasis on juridical 
aspects  of  sovereignty  has  emerged  a  formal  acceptance  that  a  government’s 
sovereignty  is  imbued  with  responsibility  for  the  security  and  well-being  of  the 
citizens  of  that  state,  meaning  that  matters  previously  veiled  by  the  ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ exemption have now become matters of legitimate scrutiny by external 
observers.    287 
This  expanded  and  two-phased  notion  of  responsibility  also  extends  to 
powerful actors within the society, meaning that — post-2005 UN World Summit —
the UN Security Council is now expected to provide a residual level of scrutiny and 
action if national governments are failing in their basic duties to their citizens. Taken 
to its logical conclusion, the result is that military intervention for human protection 
purposes, authorised by the UNSC, has become an accepted exception to the general 
norm of non-intervention; yet non-intervention remains the norm in all circumstances 
in which massive violations of human security are not occurring, thereby reinforcing 
the  exceptional  nature  of  humanitarian  interventions.  From  the  unanimous 
endorsement  of  this  normative  evolution  by  states  at  the  UN  World  Summit  in 
September  2005  and  in  the  Security  Council  in  April  2006,  it  its  clear  that  the 
‘responsibility  to  protect’  has  gained  sufficient  support  to  be  characterised  as  an 
emerging behavioural and ethical norm in 21
st century international society. In this 
sense, it can be said that humanitarian intervention, when enacted under the accepted 
circumstances  and  conditions,  has  become  a  legitimate  practice  in  contemporary 
international  relations.  In  other  words,  we  have  seen  a  shift  from  humanitarian 
intervention  being  a  proscribed  act  during  the  Cold  War,  to  an  increasingly  (if 
ambiguously) permissible act after the Cold War, to becoming a prescribed act under 
extreme circumstances after the respective endorsements by UN member states.  
In terms of IR theory, this adds weight to the arguments of constructivists and 
International Society scholars who contend that social norms are constitutive of the 
behaviour, interests and even identities of actors interacting within that society. As 
new  norms  are  promoted,  actors  (states)  are  influenced  and  affected  by  new 
expectations  of  their  behaviour  and  can  modify  their  interests  and  identities 
accordingly.  This  illustrates  the  process  of  social  construction  of  those  actors.   288 
Applied to protecting civilians, we can see that new norms requiring states to protect 
their own citizens, or to intervene (through the UNSC) to protect acutely insecure 
people  living  inside  other  states,  have  influenced  states  to  either  deny  their  own 
involvement in atrocities, speak out against atrocities in other states, or to speak in 
the language of the ‘responsibility to protect’ because they understand that doing so 
will have certain effects upon the rest of the society. In a number of cases, states 
(inside or outside the Council) have intervened in other states in conformity with 
new norms, even if not coercively so in Darfur.  
Therefore,  taking  a  longer  view,  rather  than  accepting  that  the  pursuit  of 
narrowly  defined  national  interests  will  always  be  privileged  over  the  pursuit  of 
humanitarian  objectives  in  foreign  policymaking,  as  the  lack  of  intervention  in 
Darfur suggests, it is also plausible to argue that the ‘responsibility to protect’ has 
not yet reached sufficient strength to compel consistent behaviour in conformity with 
it (according to the logic of Finnemore and Sikkink’ norm life-cycle model presented 
in  Chapter  1).  Whether  it  will  reach  such  a  level  of  ‘norm  internalisation’  is  an 
empirical  question  that  must  be  regarded  with  some  concern  in  light  of  the 
aforementioned consequences of the US-led ‘War on Terror’, invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention from China, 
Russia, and other developing countries. Yet, the potential for it to do so is evident. 
Finally, we can observe that the Security Council’s response to Darfur and to 
the question of humanitarian intervention more broadly reinforces the reality that, for 
the time being at least, the UN remains an ‘organisation of states’ and thus favours 
states’ interests. Despite the important roles that the UN generally and the Council 
itself have played in helping to recast conceptions of sovereignty and security — 
particularly in the post-Cold War era — and despite the fact that much of the work   289 
done by UN agencies and the focus of many UN fora is on human security and 
development, it is likely that the UN, and particularly the Security Council, will 
continue  to  reflect  the  historical  dominance  of  states  as  the  primary  actors  in 
international relations. As such, it is unclear the extent to which the alteration of state 
identities along more altruistic lines, the pursuit of national interests in such a way as 
to not oppress others in doing so, and the privileging of humanitarian interventions 
over  rigid  forms  of  non-intervention  will  develop  in  what  remains  a  relatively 
conservative anarchical society of states.   290 
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